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## Anders Behring Breivik. A case study of a far-right terrorist - a lone wolf (Part I)

### Abstract

The aim of this article is to present the characteristics of Anders Behring Breivik, including the influence of his childhood and early youth on the development of his personality, and to describe his activities and preparations for the attacks carried out on 22 July 2011 in Oslo and on the island of Utøya, as well as their course. The author has sought to answer the questions of whether it was possible to prevent the attacks and what impact they had on social mood, the nature of changes in the shaping of internal security policy in Norway and the improvement in the efficiency of security services in this country. He also attempted to evaluate what level of threat of a similar attack exists in Poland at present. Conclusions from this study have been enriched by reflections on the consequences of Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

### Keywords:

Anders Breivik,  
active shooter,  
manifesto,  
lone wolf,  
terrorist

In January 2022, reports circulated around the world that Anders Behring Breivik had applied for conditional release from prison after serving 10 years of the 21-year sentence he was sentenced to in 2012 for the murder of 77 people. Breivik greeted those gathered in the courtroom with a Nazi gesture and expressed extreme views during his speech. However, he assured that he had changed and would no longer use violence when he was free. He claimed that it was possible to be a Nazi without being a fighter,

and he dissociated himself from violence, terrorism and the goals described in his manifesto entitled *2083 - A European Declaration of Independence*<sup>1</sup>. He expressed the opinion that he could not be held responsible for his actions because, through no fault of his own, he had been indoctrinated on the Internet. He announced that for the next 50 years he would fight in the Nordic resistance movement or found a non-militant nationalist movement in Europe. He stated that he was working for the Nordic state and was a candidate for parliament for the Nazi party. In the courtroom, he presented a text entitled *Stop the Genocide of Our White Nations*, a view familiar in right-wing extremist circles about the West being dominated by ethnically and culturally alien immigrants. Breivik placed one of the leaflets in the pocket of his suit so that it would be more visible, while the other he stuck to a briefcase which he showed during the court session. He also argued that he could give up his political activity if such a condition was set by the court. Then, he would be ready to move to Svalbard (a Norwegian archipelago in the Arctic Ocean) and take up business or leave the West altogether. The court rejected his request for parole. Prosecutor Hulda Karlsdottir called Breivik's submission of such a request a public relations exercise aimed at improving the conditions of his detention and a reminder of himself. The opinions of the psychiatrist and the prison authorities were also unfavourable to the inmate. Theoretically, he can reapply for parole in a year and repeat this request every 12 months. It is more likely, however, that he will be kept behind bars until his death on the basis of being sentenced to consecutive years of imprisonment, as allowed by Norwegian criminal law<sup>2</sup>.

Terrorist attacks in the first decade of the 21st century confirmed international public opinion that radical Islam is the main threat to security and world order. This message was reinforced by the war on terror declared by President George W. Bush after the terrorist attacks in the USA on

<sup>1</sup> See A. Berwick, 2083. *A European Declaration of Independence. De laude novae militiae. Peuperes commilitiones Christi Templique Solomonici*, London 2011, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/AndersBehringBreivikManifesto.pdf>, p. 1437 [accessed: 1 II 2022].

<sup>2</sup> J. Potocka, *Hitlerowskie pozdrowienie i nowe hasła. Breivik chce wyjść na wolność* (Eng. Hitler salute and new slogans. Breivik wants to go free), RMF24, 18 I 2022, [https://www.rmf24.pl/raporty/raport-zamachy-w-norwegii/fakty/news-hitlerowskie-pozdrowienie-i-nowe-hasla-breivik-chce-wyjsc-na,nId,5777148#crp\\_state=1](https://www.rmf24.pl/raporty/raport-zamachy-w-norwegii/fakty/news-hitlerowskie-pozdrowienie-i-nowe-hasla-breivik-chce-wyjsc-na,nId,5777148#crp_state=1) [accessed: 18 I 2022]; A. Grochot, *Anders Breivik zostanie w więzieniu. Sąd odrzucił jego wnioski* (Eng. Anders Breivik will stay in prison. The court rejected his request), RMF24, 1 II 2022 r., [https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/swiat/news-anders-breivik-zostanie-w-wiezieniu-sad-odrzucil-jego-wniose,nId,5806130#crp\\_state=1](https://www.rmf24.pl/fakty/swiat/news-anders-breivik-zostanie-w-wiezieniu-sad-odrzucil-jego-wniose,nId,5806130#crp_state=1) [accessed: 1 II 2022].

11 September 2001. The bloody attacks carried out by Islamic extremists in Europe, from Russia to Spain, meant that almost every subsequent incident was immediately attributed to al-Qaeda or to organisations and individuals inspired by the ideology and activities of Osama bin Laden's group<sup>3</sup>. It was no different immediately after the reports of the terrorist attack in Oslo and the massacre on the island of Utøya on 22 July 2011. Before the perpetrators were apprehended, one of Poland's terrorism experts said on television that Islamic radicals were behind it. Similar claims were made in Norway and other countries until it emerged that the perpetrator of the attack was Anders Breivik, a then unknown Norwegian extreme nationalist.

The aim of this article is to present the characteristics of Breivik and his activities, and to describe the preparations for the attack and its course. The author has sought to answer the questions whether it was possible to prevent the attack and what impact it had on social moods, the nature of changes in the shaping of internal security policy in Norway and the improvement in the efficiency of the security services in that country. He has also attempted to see whether there is currently a threat of a similar attack in Poland. The occurrence of such an event seems real not only due to the appearance of Breivik's followers, who have made their presence felt in various countries, but also due to radicalisation of social attitudes and sentiments, as well as sharp political discourse in Poland, which has recently been somewhat mitigated by the situation in Ukraine. The conclusions of this essay are enriched by reflections on the consequences of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. If the hostilities do not escalate, it can be assumed that they will result in terrorist attacks across our eastern border. Attacks may also take place on Polish territory. Diversionary actions are also to be expected. The war in Ukraine, like any other war, will facilitate access to weapons, ammunition and explosives. Their possession by extremists may have tragic consequences. If hostilities are extended to other states, some of the conclusions formulated at the end of the article will be outdated due to new threats and challenges, the scale of which is currently difficult to predict. The state of war will change the optics of terrorist threat perception.

In this article, the author has used the following research methods: historical - allowing to trace Breivik's biography, behavioural - when ing

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<sup>3</sup> The exception was the attack on the Madrid suburban railway trains on 11 March 2004. Immediately after informing the head of government about these events, Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero announced on television that ETA terrorists were behind the attack.

his behaviour, comparative, by means of which he has confronted Breivik's activity with other terrorists motivated by anti-immigrant, racist ideology.

### Biography of the assassin

In her book on the Breivik case, Elżbieta Czykwin wrote:

The key to understanding Anders Breivik's life trajectory seems to be an is of his family ties. They were severely violated from birth. His mother, who was undoubtedly the most important person in his life, brought with her a psychological baggage that put a fundamental strain on their relationship. Wenche was unable to cope with herself, a symptom of which was both the unwanted and rather accidental first child and the unwanted second child. The divorce clearly revealed the instability of her psyche, her bipolar disorder and her difficulties in arranging her relationship with her husband. The pathological baggage of childhood was shared not only by her but also by Anders<sup>4</sup>.

As an adult, Breivik displayed traits of emotional deprivation, narcissism and misogyny. This, combined with feelings of alienation, hatred, extreme right-wing ideology and the influence of computer games, led him to commit murder on an unprecedented scale. Unni Turrettini pointed out the similarities between Breivik's traumatic childhood, Timothy McVeigh's<sup>5</sup> and Theodore Kaczynski's<sup>6</sup>, which influenced their adult lives filled with hatred and aggression<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik. Między dumą a wstydem* (Eng. Anders Breivik. Between pride and shame), Warszawa 2019, p. 87. In this section of the article, most of the information on Breivik is taken from this book.

<sup>5</sup> On 19 April 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated a car filled with 2.5 tonnes of explosives at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion caused a partial collapse of the building and the death of 169 people (over 500 were injured). The investigation revealed that the perpetrator was affiliated with the radical-right Michigan State Militia movement, of which there are many in the US to date. McVeigh was sentenced to death.

<sup>6</sup> Theodore D. Kaczynski, known as the "Unabomber", sent explosive devices through the mail between 1978 and 1995. As a result of their explosions, 3 people died and 29 in it and handed him over to the authorities. The court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He is serving his sentence in a Colorado prison.

<sup>7</sup> U. Turrettini, *The Mystery of the Lone Wolf Killer: Anders Behring Breivik and the Threat of Terror in Plain Sight*, New York 2015, pp. 16–31.

Anders Behring Breivik was born on 13 February 1979 in Oslo. His mother, Wenche Behring (died 2013), came from a poor family. Even as a few years old, she took care of her mother, paralysed by childbirth, who blamed her for her disability and hated her. Wenche's father died early and the family was excluded from the local community. Breivik's sister in a way replicated her mother's fate and took over the family's caretaking functions when she was a few years old. Wenche completed a nursing course and worked in a hospital as an orderly. The turning point in her life came when she met Jens Breivik, a diplomat, 12 years older than her, a divorcee and father of three. Six months after Anders was born, the family moved to London, where Jens was seconded to work at the Norwegian embassy. After another six months Wenche demanded a divorce and returned with Anders and his half-sister Elisabeth to Oslo, where she occupied her ex-husband's flat. The mother could not cope with the children, especially Anders, which was brought to the attention of Bernevernet, a Norwegian state institution that works to ensure proper social and educational conditions for children and young people from difficult backgrounds. Bernevernet did not, however, place Anders in a foster family. His mother was an uneducated orderly, his father a member of the elite. Breivik aspired to his father's status, but felt that in Norwegian society he had a lowly position inherited from his mother. In doing so, he had the opportunity to see his father's world. He attended school in Oslo's most elegant district, and had previously gone to kindergarten with the grandson of the Norwegian king. He had a sense of belonging to the elite, but on the other hand he was aware of the material gap between him and his classmates. He was also an average student. He was not liked by his neighbours for his arrogance, rudeness, lack of education and bullying of those weaker than himself. He took great pleasure in watching the suffering of other children and animals, to whom he himself was cruel. During this period, his relationship with his father was good. Jens remarried and settled in France. Anders used to visit him and even took a liking to his father's new wife. At the age of 13, he entered secondary school. He began to build his identity by participating in a subculture of graffiti artists. He adopted the nickname "Morg" and tried to dominate a group of similar young people. He felt particularly comfortable in the company of graffiti artists coming from a background of Arab immigrants. At that time, graffiti was not socially perceived as an innocent, artistic expression of youthful creativity, but as an illegal, hooligan activity, a kind of vandalism prosecuted by the police. Breivik was also arrested by

them. Jens' reaction to his son's involvement in the graffiti community was to cut off contact with him, in accordance with the agreement they had made between themselves. Over time, however, "Morg" was excluded from the community for trying to impose his dominance on it. He lost his position and was humiliated. The sentence handed down by the graffiti community sealed the marginalisation of Anders by his colleagues at school.

At the age of 16, Breivik entered the prestigious Oslo Commerce School. He stopped using street language and presented himself as an open and friendly boy. He began to consider himself metrosexual<sup>8</sup>. He spent a lot of time in front of the mirror and wore make-up. He even underwent plastic surgery on his nose. However, in a personality sense he was not metrosexual, in his case it was more of a pose. Since his adolescence, Breivik devoted a lot of time to weight training and also started taking anabolic steroids. This made him look big and strong. While attending the Commerce School, he worked as a telemarketer and was a good salesman. He started to play the stock market and on just one transaction he earned 200 thousand crowns (approx. 90 thousand zlotys). As a result, in 1998 he dropped out of school and made a plan to become a millionaire. He also saw himself as a member of a Masonic lodge. He saw this as an opportunity to make a name for himself and become part of the elite. However, he did not know anyone who could introduce him to Freemasonry. He wanted to be someone with an appointment, with a title, and not someone whose work and devotion to others earned him respect and social approval. He did not have a high school diploma, but he boasted that he had read enough to be titled "bachelor of small business and management", as well as that he had familiarised himself with all the readings required for economic studies. Until 2001 he worked for the telemarketing company Direkte Respons Senteret, where he was promoted to head of customer service. While still at trade school, he began to see his place in the right-wing Progress Party (Frem-skriftspartiet, Norway). He met Lene Langemyr, a youth activist in the party. Lene was adopted by a Norwegian family as a one-and-a-half-month-old Hindu infant, abandoned in India. However, she believed that Norway should

<sup>8</sup> The term 'metrosexual' was first used in 1994 by Mark Simpson, a columnist for *The Independent*. This neologism, derived from the words "metropolis" and "heterosexuality", refers to the stereotype of a man in love with himself, an inhabitant of a big city, focused on his own appearance, associated rather with feminine care for beauty and manifesting stereotypically feminine personality traits, such as: emotionality, sensitivity, tenderness, warmth, empathy.

tighten its immigration policy and strengthen the army. Anti-immigrant slogans were already a source of growing popularity for the Progress Party, which was in opposition to the Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet<sup>9</sup>) in the 1980s. Lene and Anders began to think about a political career. Not only did they share political ambitions for the Progressive Party, anti-immigrant rhetoric and the stigma of childhood rejection, but also a love of guns. Anders was an expert in this field. This was astonishing, especially as he had been overlooked for conscription due to his criminal record (graffiti painting). He himself claimed that he had obtained an exemption from military service due to caring for his sick mother. Breivik's political goal was to be on the election list for Oslo councillors. However, he was not a good speaker. His advantage was his constant presence in cyberspace, but this made it difficult for him to participate personally in party life. This resulted in him not being on the party list, not even being called for a conclusive interview. He felt humiliated, especially since it included Lena and his party supervisor, who were both elected as city councillors.

In 2001 Breivik founded an E-Commerce Group, a company operating on the edge of the law, which sold diplomas-gadgets (in Poland similar products offered on the Internet, including replicas of ID cards or driving licenses, are called collector's documents), e.g. of graduation from any university, at an affordable price of about 100 dollars. His company stipulated on its website that the diplomas were offered as props and ornaments. The signatures on them were fictitious, electronically generated, so no one could sue for infringement of personal rights. On the other hand, these documents could be used by immigrants to legalise their stay and, if sent outside Europe, provide the basis for obtaining a visa from the country in which the university issuing the original diplomas was located. In his company, Anders employed his mother (for cleaning and laundry) and a graphic designer from Indonesia to create the document templates. At first he had doubts about the legality of such activities, but for 30,000 kroner a month he took the job and proved to be a very skilful designer. Breivik offered him a higher salary in exchange for working on the black market, but the graphic designer did not accept the offer. However, this company did not last long either, nor did others, including one that rented advertising space on billboards. In February 2004, Anders went with his mother to Malta as part of a ten-day trip. Perhaps it was then

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<sup>9</sup> Until 2011, it operated as the Norwegian Labour Party (Det norske Arbeiderparti).



that his fascination with the Crusaders awoke. At that time, he also started looking for a girl on the Internet sites of Eastern European countries. He believed that such a woman would be submissive and compliant to him, unlike the liberated Norwegians. He ordered the contact details of two women on a Belarusian dating site for 100 euros and selected two of them, after which his mother decided on the final choice. He chose Natasha from Minsk, who lived in a block of flats in a working-class neighbourhood and spoke little English. In 2005 Anders visited her in Minsk in 2005 and she, on his invitation and with the ticket he bought, came to Oslo later. However, they parted without much emotion. He considered her a dowry hunter, she considered him a male chauvinist. According to some, Breivik had homosexual tendencies and that is why he did not get on well with women, but the reason could also be his inability to relate and bond with people. On one occasion, Wenche and his son were invited to visit his mother's cousin, who turned out to be a member of a Masonic lodge. Breivik, who, as already mentioned, dreamed of joining this community, asked his uncle about the possibility. The latter stressed the importance of the brotherhood of Freemasons, Christian values, nobility, humility and tolerance. Anders, however, did not want a sense of community. He wanted to stand above others. Thanks to the patronage of his uncle, Breivik was to be - despite the difficulties - admitted to the lodge. This did not happen, because a new fascination meant that he had no time for anything, not even to attend the solemn ceremony of admission to Freemasonry. This fascination was computer games. This did not prevent him from later taking photos of himself in an elegant outfit decorated with the symbols of Freemasonry. This was not the only outfit that was supposed to make him look more valuable and reveal his vanity. He also photographed himself in a military gala uniform of an officer, with badges and insignia pinned to it, a special forces diver's suit of the navy or an anti-chemical suit<sup>10</sup>.

When Anders turned 27, he moved back in with his mother. As "Andersnor-dic" he played a computer game 17 hours a day for two years, which allowed him to become the leader of the guild "Virtue". He also received the title "Justicar". Leading the guild put him in charge of keeping up the motivation of the participants, who often, like Breivik, fell into addiction. He became addicted under the influence of "World

<sup>10</sup> *Profile: Anders Behring Breivik*, BBC, 12 IV 2012, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-14259989> [accessed: 14 V 2012].



of Warcraft”. For success-seeking individuals of Breivik’s ilk, the game can be very appealing, as it offers a clear structure for promotion and the path to achieve it. While holed up in his family home, he became more and more immersed in the world of mages and sword fighting. His need for elitism, success and connection was satisfied in the virtual world. The few years he spent playing games also allowed him to get to know another virtual world, including that of Muslim extremists. He delved into online knowledge of Islam, the Quran and the Crusades. He also became interested in anti-Muslim and anti-immigration websites, particularly Stormfront, whose slogan “White Pride, World Wide” appealed to him. He wanted to fight for the purity of white man’s Europe, or, as he claimed, to defend Europe from Eurabia (Arab influence on the continent). He thought more and more about the Islamisation of Europe. He tormented his few surroundings with his beliefs about the dangers of Arab immigrants. His mother hoped that this was a temporary phase which would pass when her son finally found a job and a wife. Friends shunned his lectures and invited him less and less to social gatherings. Over time, Breivik began to create an alternative reality. He dreamt of creating a pan-European resistance movement against Islam, which he himself would lead. He decided to write a book in order to convey what he thought were innovative and revolutionary ideas to the world. He had neither writing talent nor leadership charisma, so in his “work” he used mainly biased fragments of the Quran and other texts, often simply copied. One can find there, among others, references to the manifesto of the aforementioned Theodore Kaczynski. He selected facts to fit his thesis. He saw conspiracy theories everywhere. He compared the problem with Islam to a broken tap. When water floods the bathroom, the first thing to be dealt with is fixing the fault, not wiping it out. The water for him was the Muslims, the faulty tap the Norwegian government and left-wing parties. This may explain why Breivik attacked not immigrants, but a government district of Oslo and a Labour Party youth rally<sup>11</sup>.

The desire for authority and connection was too strong in Breivik to remain unexpressed. So Anders found someone with whom he shared his views and identified completely. This was the blogger Peder Are

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<sup>11</sup> A. Sobańda, *Skąd wziął się Breivik i czy można go było powstrzymać? Przejmująca opowieść o Norwegii* (Eng. Where did Breivik come from and could he have been stopped? A moving story about Norway), *Dziennik*, 21 VIII 2015, <https://kultura.dziennik.pl/ksiazki/artykuly/498350,jeden-z-nas-przejmujaca-opowiesc-o-norwegii-autorstwa-asne-seierstad.html> [accessed: 24 VIII 2015].

Nøstvold Jensen, known online as ‘Fjordman’. He preached hate towards immigrants, which he combined with apocalyptic prophecies. Such a narrative brought in an element of transcendence and was somewhat reminiscent of the virtual game world that Anders had mentally been in over the past few years. He addressed ‘Fjordman’ with the words: *Keep up the good work mate. You are a true hero of Europe.* In an e-mail to him, in which Anders wanted to recommend his book, he wrote: *Much of the knowledge I possess remains inaccessible to most people, even to you*<sup>12</sup>. In another letter he assessed: *Defeating Eurabia is brilliant*<sup>13</sup>. Fjordman ignored him, however, and so this time too Breivik remained alone. So he concentrated on writing the manifesto, which caused him to move further and further away from the “World of Warcraft” gaming community. As with the games, however, he mentally followed the direction of increasing authoritarianism and cruelty. He advocated the deportation of all Muslims from Europe. In order to reach as many people as possible with his ideas, he wanted to found a conservative newspaper. He also proposed and developed unrealistic projects and boasted of his influence in the Progressive Party and the Masonic lodge. When in 2009. Progress Party again lost the election to the Storting (the Norwegian parliament), Breivik turned to it for help in establishing a new newspaper. The refusal made him feel humiliated and alienated again.

### Preparations for the attack

In his manifesto, Breivik stated that he began a nine-year plan to prepare for terrorist attacks in 2002, when he was 23 years old. In order to finance them, he set up his own software company. He was to earn his first million kroner when he was 24. He lost two million on stock market speculation, but still had two million kroner to finance the attack<sup>14</sup>. The information in which Anders presents himself as a financially successful man

<sup>12</sup> Å. Seierstad, *Jeden z nas. Opowieść o Norwegii* (Eng. One of us. A story about Norway), Warszawa 2013, p. 71. The book Breivik referred to in his letter to “Fjordman” is his famous manifesto, which he worked on.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> *Norway gunman claims he had nine-year plan to finance attacks*, The Guardian, 25 VII 2011, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/25/norway-gunman-attack-funding-claim> [accessed: 27 I 2022].

contradicts his biography. During the period he writes about, he owned the aforementioned E-Commerce Group company. Despite the demand for the documents it produced, it is difficult to see how Breivik could have made millions by trading in them. In the following years he could not deal with the planning of the attack either, as he was completely absorbed by computer games. The disregard from “Fjordman” may have triggered a desire in Anders to show him and others that he could do much more than just write a book. The thought of shedding blood in the name of the only right idea may have already been in Breivik’s mind while he was writing it. The subsequent parts of the manifesto show the intensification of radicalisation. At first it is quite moderate, containing content and ideas circulating on the Internet at the time. Then, the opinions expressed become more and more radical, and by the end Breivik’s words are an overt call to fight and shed blood. The cultural revolution, restoring the purity of race in Norway, was to be led by the organisation Knights Templar, which Breivik established in the pages of his “work”, and made himself the highest-ranking Commander of the anti-communist Resistance Movement against the Islamisation of Europe and Norway. Breivik despised left-wing views, was against feminists, gender equality and tolerance for sexual minorities. However, he saw the main threat in immigrants, who, in his opinion, were destroying the culture and society of Europe. An expression of Breivik’s progressive radicalisation was the preparations for the attack. These began in 2009. On 18 May, Anders registered a one-man company, Geofarm, allegedly to carry out agricultural activities, including growing vegetables. The following year, he began stockpiling chemicals in the basement of the house where his mother lived<sup>15</sup>.

Part of his plan was based on the use of firearms. In early 2009, Breivik was stopped during a routine check near the town of Wetzlar, near Frankfurt am Main. The Norwegian was carrying ammunition and gun parts. The ammunition was seized, but he was allowed to keep the parts because it was not considered possible to build a functioning weapon from them. The incident was not reported to the Norwegian police<sup>16</sup>. At the end

<sup>15</sup> A. Sobańda, *Skąd wziął się Breivik...*

<sup>16</sup> *Anders Breivik był zatrzymany przez niemiecką policję dwa lata przed zamachem na wyspie Utøya. Miał przy sobie amunicję i części uzbrojenia. Został wypuszczony na wolność* (Eng. Anders Breivik was detained by German police two years before the Utøya island attack. He had ammunition and weapon parts on him. He was released), *Wirtualna Polska*, 14 I 2016, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/anders-breivik-był-zatrzymany-przez-niemiecka->

of August 2010 Breivik travelled to Prague, where he spent six days. While surfing the Internet, he realised that it was fairly easy to obtain weapons illegally in the Czech Republic. He intended to buy an AK-47 carbine, a Glock pistol, hand grenades and an RPG-7, the latter two of which he hoped to receive as a bonus. He provided himself with an alibi in the form of a prospectus on the mining and sale of minerals in the Czech Republic, so that if necessary he could explain the purpose of his stay. To his surprise, he did not buy any firearms in Prague. He decided to forego obtaining them abroad and try to acquire them legally in Norway. Obtaining a firearms licence, even though he had bought two pistols seven years earlier, proved more difficult than he had anticipated. For it was necessary to prove regular attendance at one of the shooting clubs. Breivik therefore enrolled in a shooting club in Oslo, where he received 15 hours of training in rifle shooting. He also practised his marksmanship skills in the computer game “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare”, set in the reality of modern conflicts. As he wrote in his manifesto, this game helped him to improve his concentration and reaction speed. At the shooting club, he was given permission to buy short and long guns. He bought a Glock 17 pistol, a Sturm Ruger Mini-14 calibre 5.56mm semi-automatic carbine, 300 rounds of rifle cartridges and 150 rounds of pistol ammunition, a laser sight, an extra trigger to facilitate rapid shooting and a rifle bayonet. He named the pistol Mjøltnir after the hammer of the Norse god Thor, and the rifle Gugnir after Odin’s spear that always hit the target. He engraved the corresponding runes on the weapons. He also gave names to other objects, which he altered as he saw fit, and treated them as amulets<sup>17</sup>.

Acquiring chemicals was a sensitive phase of Breivik’s activities. This was the sphere where it was easiest to arouse suspicion and to be deconstructed. He bought chemicals to produce explosives via the Internet or in person. In December 2010, he bought 0.3 kg of sodium nitrite (a chemical used in Norway for preserving meat) from Keten, an internet sales company in Wrocław. He paid 10 euro by card. In the same month, he ordered 150 kg of aluminium powder from the same Polish shop, for which he paid 2 000 euro by bank transfer. Powdered aluminium increases

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policje-dwa-lata-przed-zamachem-na-wyspie-utoya-mial-przy-sobie-amunicje-i-czesci-uzbrojenia-zostal-wypuszczony-na-wolnosc-6027685648360577a [accessed: 15 I 2016].

<sup>17</sup> E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik...*, p. 98; M. Piekarski, K. Wojtasik, *Polski system antyterrorystyczny a realia zamachów drugiej dekady XXI wieku* (Eng. The Polish anti-terrorist system and the reality of attacks in the second decade of the 21st century), Toruń 2020, p.18.

the explosive power of the charge. Breivik wrote in his manifesto that up to 100 kg of this substance can be purchased in Poland without raising suspicion. Buying chemicals in our country was not a problem at the time<sup>18</sup>. He stated in his order that he needed the powder as an ingredient in paint to protect his boat. In fact, the two substances bought in Poland were necessary for him to construct the detonator. After making these purchases, Breivik was blacklisted by the British special services<sup>19</sup>. At the time, his personal contacts with Łukasz Mikuś, the owner of Keten, who had been in Sweden several times, were not ruled out<sup>20</sup>. Breivik had contacts with yet another online shop, located in Pobiedziska near Poznań, where he bought the fuse. The shop was popular and recommended on forums, also among Norwegians, because its owner, Tomasz P., did not ask customers uncomfortable questions. Under the pseudonym “Czort” he also published instructional videos and advertising materials about his shop’s offer on Internet forums. All of them concerned the construction of explosive devices. A few months before the attack in Oslo, Tomasz P.’s transactions

<sup>18</sup> After the attacks in Norway, the situation in Poland changed dramatically. Internet shops offering dual-use chemicals were obliged to register their customers’ personal data, the type and quantity of substances ordered, and to inform the Internal Security Agency or the police when an order was placed.

<sup>19</sup> Keten was a legally operating company selling chemicals. At the time, the Polish Explosives Act and the Ordinance of the Minister for the Economy did not require a licence for the purchase and storage of most pyrotechnic articles. A licence was required for the sale of finished explosives. The company in Wrocław where Breivik bought the components for the bomb also did not need a licence.

<sup>20</sup> Łukasz Mikuś was passionate about chemistry. After graduating from university, he opened an online shop with chemicals. In 2001, he was legally convicted of offences involving explosives. In one case it was about the purchase and possession of two kilograms of TNT and ammunition for small arms. In the second case, he constructed and sent an explosive device to Ryszard H. The package exploded during sorting at the Main Post Office in Wrocław. The police then ordered the evacuation and search of the building, Mikuś’s flat, the recipient of the package and a dozen or so other people who were in contact with Mikuś. Ryszard H. was a member of the Silesian “Danon” gang at the time. The group was broken up in 2002. According to the Central Investigation Bureau of the Police, the bandits planted an explosive charge near an escort agency in Rydułtowy. In the explosion 5 people were injured, 3 of them seriously. The owner of the premises lost his arm, one of the municipal guards called to the scene of the attack was also seriously injured. Ryszard H. was sentenced for participation in a criminal group to 5 years in prison. See M. Rybak *Wrocławianin, który sprzedał chemikalia Breivikowi, miał kiedyś problemy z prawem* (Eng. Wrocław man who sold chemicals to Breivik once had legal problems), “Gazeta Wrocławska”, 22 XI 2011; B. Kittel, J. Jabrzyk, *Czy Polak pomógł Breivikowi* (Eng. Did a Pole help Breivik), TVN24, 22 XI 2011, <https://tvn24.pl/polska/czy-polak-pomogl-breivikowi-ra191578-3531692> [accessed: 23 XI 2011].

aroused suspicion in the “Global Shield” programme, which brings together customs offices from NATO countries which supervise the trade in goods useful in the manufacture of explosive devices. The Norwegian customs office sent a list of 41 suspected transactions to the Norwegian counterintelligence service. Breivik’s name was on it, but his person did not arouse the suspicions of the special services. According to “Global Shield”, Breivik bought a fuse that was not on the restricted goods list. The purchase was small and Breivik was not a prime suspect on the list<sup>21</sup>.

In his manifesto, the future bomber mentioned that while shopping, not only in Poland, he pretended to be the owner of a company conducting research related to agriculture or suggested that he was a pyrotechnician and wanted to put on a low-budget fireworks display at his sister’s wedding. Poland is mentioned dozens of times. Breivik pointed out that in this country you can buy an AK-47 and legally try out the carbine at a shooting range. His idol is King Jan III Sobieski, who stopped the Turks at Vienna. The Norwegian also mentioned Polish nationalist groups. He included Self-Defence of Poland, League of Polish Families, National Rebirth of Poland, League for the Defence of Sovereignty and Law and Justice. In his manifesto, he quoted Czesław Miłosz’s *The Captive Mind*<sup>22</sup>. He placed online orders for most of the chemicals in December 2010, when postal workers were too busy to notice anything suspicious about them. He collected them in the basement of the house where his mother lived. Thanks to a company he set up in 2009 called Geofarm, he was able to buy fertiliser, which was used as the main ingredient in the explosive, without raising suspicion. In the spring of 2011, he rented an abandoned farmhouse, Vålstua, in Åmot municipality, Hedmark County. He drew up a list of the most important equipment, tools and chemical components, together with the approximate cost of purchasing them. This was necessary due to the limited preparation time and capital available. He drew inspiration from an assassination attempt by the aforementioned Timothy McVeigh in the USA. He bought ammonium nitrate fertiliser for the purpose of allegedly growing vegetables. As it later turned out, there was enough of it left on the farm to make one more explosive. Perhaps Breivik overestimated his strength, ran

<sup>21</sup> M. Kaćki, *Breivik kupił lont w Polsce* (Eng. Breivik bought the fuse in Poland), “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 23 VIII 2011.

<sup>22</sup> J. Haszczyński et al., *Robił zakupy we Wrocławiu, podziwiał Jana III Sobieskiego* (Eng. He shopped in Wrocław, admired Jan III Sobieski), “Rzeczpospolita”, 26 VII 2011.

out of time, money or everything at once<sup>23</sup>. He ordered powdered sulphur on eBay as a material for plastic artists, and bought Chilean saltpeter from a pharmacy in a nearby town. He had a detailed story prepared for each purchase. He said, for example, that he needed an aquarium cleaner or meat preservative. The fuse was allegedly to be used during the New Year's Eve party. He precisely calculated and experimentally investigated how long it would take for it to burn in time to escape. To obtain acetylsalicylic acid he needed several kilograms of aspirin. In order not to arouse suspicion, he only bought two packs each from different pharmacies in Oslo. He travelled to the capital several times at two-week intervals. He appeared at the pharmacies dressed smartly. To disguise himself, he initially chose the more expensive equivalent of aspirin, and only later the cheaper ones. Buying sulphuric acid (30 l) also required cleverness. He bought it in small quantities from various sellers connected mainly with the automotive industry. Instead of three tonnes of ammonium nitrate, he took six - he ordered the unnecessary half to disguise himself. From China he imported 60 watertight bags used for transporting and storing chemicals and liquid nicotine. He bought three steel containers from Ikea, which he planned to convert into detonators. He also brought chemicals to the farm that he had previously collected in Oslo<sup>24</sup>.

He was systematically manufacturing an explosive in a farm building. It was not an ordinary ANFO charge made from the aforementioned ammonium nitrate. ANFO is made by soaking ammonium nitrate in one of the liquid fuels, but the explosive prepared in this way is difficult to detonate. Typically, detonators are used to create the explosion, and aluminium dust is added to increase its force. Breivik began to construct a high-powered explosive himself, based on information gleaned from the internet. First of all, he proceeded to laboriously centrifuge fertilizer granules in a blender to obtain pure ammonium nitrate free of the antihygroscopic lagging, which he then poured over diesel fuel. He worked systematically, soaking it evenly into each 50kg quantity of pellet-free fertiliser. He then packed the substance into double-layered bags imported from China. He sealed each bag and set it aside. The work progressed slowly and he was under time pressure. When he realised that he would not be able to fully implement the plan, he centrifuged only part

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<sup>23</sup> E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik...*, pp. 90–91.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94.



of the fertiliser from the pellets and packed the remaining fertiliser into bags as well. This had the effect of reducing the explosive force. The work was dangerous. After a long period of purifying ammonium nitrate, which involved a lot of chemical dust floating in the air, he wrote: *I will surely die of cancer within twelve months. So much of this shit must have got into my lungs, although I used a mask*<sup>25</sup>. The barn where he worked was filled with harmful volatile substances, corrosive liquids and aluminium dust. In addition, he boiled 30 litres of sulphuric acid on a primitive cooker to increase its concentration by evaporating water. The wafting stench made him decide to heat the acid at night. He used almost no special protective equipment. He worked in a mask with an acid filter, a thick protective apron and rubber gloves. The risk of explosion was very high. Breivik was aware of this because he read the warnings on the packaging. He feared that a possible explosion would not kill him immediately, but that he would be badly burned or lose his hands. In that case he planned to commit suicide by shooting himself in the head with a rifle using his feet. Another stage of the work involved preparing a suitable detonator. He was to use diazodinitrophenol, also known as dinitrobenzenediazoxide, as the initiating explosive. Anders had all the chemicals needed to make it, except for picric acid, which he had to produce himself<sup>26</sup>. The first sample he produced failed to ignite. This failure was compounded by a computer malfunction, and Anders needed it on an ongoing basis during the subsequent phases of explosive production. Obtaining acetylsalicylic acid from crushed aspirin tablets also proved too laborious. At first, he tried crushing them with a pestle, but this method was inefficient. So he covered the tablets with foil and smashed them with a heavy dumbbell. Eventually, he managed to obtain the desired chemical compound. He also came up with the idea of using a small concrete mixer to mix Chilean saltpeter with aluminium dust, despite fears that a spark would cause a detonation. However, this proved to be safe and greatly reduced production time. One of the final stages of work on the bomb was to test the fuse. The experiment was a success<sup>27</sup>. Anders modified some of the ammunition he bought - he filled the cartridges with poison in the form of liquid nicotine imported

<sup>25</sup> Å. Seierstad, *Jeden z nas...*, p. 247.

<sup>26</sup> See *Diazodinitrofenol*, Vortal Młodego Chemika, 4 XII 2011, <https://www.vmc.org.pl/pirotechnika/materiay-wybuchowe/inicjujce/item/297-diazodinitrofenol> [accessed: 31 I 2022].

<sup>27</sup> E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik...*, pp. 98–101.

earlier from China. In the next batch of cartridges, he cut off the tips and replaced them with lead ones. This was to increase the fatality rate from gunshots. He bought a tight-fitting sweatshirt from a sports shop, which he used to imitate a police uniform. A month before the planned attack, he began to experience financial shortages. He had already taken out loans amounting to 28 750 euros with nine credit cards, which had to be repaid<sup>28</sup>. Failure to do so meant he risked being put on the debtors' list, which in turn made it impossible to rent a car. Thanks to some financial acrobatics, he managed to postpone the critical moment until mid-July. As in the past, he acted on the edge of the law or broke it. The fact that he only ran out of money at the end of the preparatory work meant that he had considerable sums at his disposal even though he was not working.

During the preparations for the assassination, Breivik kept fit by weight training and taking anabolic steroids. He gained courage through online games, especially the "Cataclysm" add-on for the game "World of Warcraft". Morale and motivation were kept up by contemplation, which he used three times a week during walks. When times were tough, he would reach for food as a reward. He also used a protein supplement to increase his muscle mass and a thistle preparation to protect his liver from the effects of steroids. In addition, he stockpiled various tablets to get a boost of energy just before the actual action. When in danger, he would also reach for Red Bull and other drugs<sup>29</sup>. Breivik could have been uncovered several times. One such incident was the arrival of the farm owner's daughter at the end of June 2011. She showed up in the evening and stayed overnight. Anders was determined to kill her if she found anything suspicious. However, this did not happen, so he let her go. Other uninvited guests also disturbed him in his preparations. One of them offered to remove the stones and to fertilise the field. Breivik firmly refused. He suspected that his neighbour had figured out what he was using the fertiliser for and reported him to the police. When a strange car appeared in his yard, he was almost sure he had been exposed. In the meantime they were random visitors, four Poles<sup>30</sup>. Local farmers noticed Breivik's unusual behaviour (for example, he hung a padlock on the door, which was not a local custom), but they were too busy with their summer jobs to pay attention to their isolated neighbour.

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<sup>28</sup> A. Berwick, 2083. *A European Declaration of Independence...*, p. 1437.

<sup>29</sup> E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik...*, pp. 94–95.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104.

Breivik began the final phase of preparations for the assassination on 2 May and it lasted 81 days. He described each day's work in detail in a diary that forms part of his manifesto<sup>31</sup>. He concluded the diary with the conclusion that the knowledge he had gained while working on preparing all the components of the bomb would allow another person acting on his instructions to reduce this time from 81 to 29 days. He also gave an estimate of the reduction in time if more people had been involved in such work. With two people it would be 20 days, with three people 16 days, with four people 13 days and with five people 12 days. He also indicated the scale of the risk of deconspiration depending on the number of people involved in the preparation of the explosive - from 30 per cent for one person to 90-95 per cent if five people were involved<sup>32</sup>. Potential imitators received detailed information about the various phases of the bomb's construction<sup>33</sup>. The bomber set 22 July 2011 as his personal D-Day. The date was important for several reasons: it was a Friday in July after working hours, a time when many officers were on leave or starting a weekend break. Gro Harlem Brundtland of the Labour Party, three times prime minister of Norway, was then scheduled to address participants in the party's youth group, during its camp on the island of Utøya near Oslo. Breivik also wanted to kill Norway's Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, who was in office and present at work that day<sup>34</sup>. On 19-20 July Anders loaded an explosive weighing 950 kg (sources also claim that it was 1050 kg) into a Volkswagen Crafter van rented a few days earlier, which had been converted into a VBIED (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device) bomb. The front of the vehicle bore the words "Sewer Cleaning". He also had at his disposal a Fiat Doblo, also on hire<sup>35</sup>. On 21 July he drove both vehicles to Oslo and refuelled them. He then parked the Volkswagen at a garden centre. He changed to the Fiat, which contained weapons and ammunition. He parked the car at Hammersborg Square, opposite the government district. He quickly walked around it to see if there were any new blockades. He had already monitored this area several times during his stay in Oslo. He took a taxi to his mother's house. The next

<sup>31</sup> A. Berwick, 2083. *A European Declaration of Independence...*, pp. 1454-1470.


<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1470-1471.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1438-1453.

<sup>34</sup> E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik...*, p. 92.

<sup>35</sup> S. Death, *Anders Breivik massacre: Norway's worst nightmare*, The Guardian, 25 III 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/22/anders-breivik-massacre-one-of-us-anne-seierstad> [accessed: 28 IV 2015].

day, before leaving home, he switched on his computer to send a file to 1000 e-mail addresses containing the aforementioned manifesto entitled 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, with a Templar cross and the Latin subtitle *De laude novae militiae Peuperes commilitiones Christi Templique Solomonici* (Praises of the new warrior. Poor Knights of Christ and the Temple of Solomon), signed with his pseudonym, with the place and date of publication: (see the figure). At the end Breivik has included seven photographs of himself<sup>36</sup>. The study runs to 1515 pages and is the second largest ideological text, after Mustafa Setmariam Nasar alias Abu Musab al-Suri's work entitled *Dawa al-mukawama al-islamiyya al-alamiyya* (Call for Islamic World Resistance) published in cyberspace in 2004 and running to 1604 pages. A short but interesting is of Breivik's manifesto was conducted by Ryszard M. Machnikowski<sup>37</sup>.



**Figure.** Title page of Anders Breivik's manifesto.

Source: <https://info.publicintelligence.net/AndersBehringBreivikManifesto.pdf> [accessed: 1 II 2022].

<sup>36</sup> A. Berwick, 2083. *A European Declaration of Independence...*, p. 1.

<sup>37</sup> R.M. Machnikowski, *Zabójcze idee. Co próbują nam przekazać terroryści?* (Eng. Lethal ideas. What are the terrorists trying to tell us?), Łódź 2020, pp. 157–170.

### The course of the attack

On 22 July 2011, after 12:00, Breivik returned to the vicinity of the garden centre where he had parked the van the previous day. He got into it through the back door. He changed into an imitation police uniform. He put a bulletproof vest over his sweatshirt. He got out of the luggage compartment, where the bomb had been placed, and sat behind the wheel. He drove up near the seventeen-storey building housing the Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister's Office. There was a no-entry sign on a chain between two pillars, but he easily avoided it. When he turned towards the entrance of the building, he saw that the best place to park was taken by two cars. Because of this, he had to place the volkswagen differently than he had planned, because the force of the explosion would have focused not on the building, but in the opposite direction. And he planned to destroy the entire office building, just like the aforementioned Timothy McVeigh. Nervously, he lit a fuse sticking out of a hole in the wall separating the cabin from the luggage area. He feared he might be killed by a pre-explosion due to the fumes coming from the bags, but this did not happen. He took the keys but forgot his mobile phone, which he had left on the dashboard, and got out. He locked the car and looked around. In the planning phase of the attack, he had taken into account the possibility of security agents or policemen whom he would have to eliminate, but there was no one. Nevertheless, he took out his pistol and with the gun in his hand started to move away from the car. The two guards monitoring the building on screens did not notice the van. They were informed about the improperly parked car by one of the receptionists in the office building. By this time, Breivik was already out of camera range. He passed a man with a bouquet of roses, who was surprised to see a police officer with a gun in his hand getting into a Fiat Doblo. He noted the make and registration number of the vehicle: VH 24605. At 15:25 there was an explosion. Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, who was due to make a speech at Utøya the next day, was on the phone when he heard the bang. His press spokesman, who was injured by the glass, called from his direct phone and made sure that the prime minister was not hurt. Breivik found out about the explosion from the car radio when the broadcast was interrupted to report a strong explosion in the government district<sup>38</sup>.

<sup>38</sup> Å. Seierstad, *Jeden z nas...*, pp. 287–292.

The first police car arrived at the scene three minutes after the explosion. At the same time, ten ambulances were sent to the area. The injured were given first aid by passers-by. A state of emergency was declared at Oslo University Hospital. Nine minutes after the explosion, a man identifying himself as Andreas Olsen called the police emergency phone. He reported that a few minutes earlier he had passed a strangely behaving man in police uniform, with a gun in his hand, walking from the government district. He gave details of the car in which the alleged policeman had driven away. It was Olsen who walked with a bouquet of roses and turned his attention to Breivik. The phone call was answered by the policewoman on duty, who carried the piece of paper with the make and registration number of the car noted down into the room and placed it on the chief's desk. The officer on duty was on the phone at that moment. At that time, Breivik was standing in a traffic jam near the capital's opera house. Oslo District Police Headquarters had no notification procedures, so the duty officer at the operations headquarters, instead of coordinating with the commanding officer on the scene, decided that it would be more important to call the officers on duty by phone. During the critical phase, there was no contact between the duty officer at headquarters and the commander in the field, who was in charge of the security and rescue work in the government district. Meanwhile, Breivik was still standing in a traffic jam. He feared that because of the terrorist attack the entire city had been shut down and the streets leaving the capital blocked. But this was not done, not even considered as a possibility. All available patrols were directed to the government district to join the ongoing rescue operations there. Beredskapstroppen - Delta, a special unit of the Norwegian police, whose members are trained to carry out dangerous operations, was also sent in<sup>39</sup>. The explosion killed seven people, an eighth died in hospital and 209 people were injured. The destruction was visible even within a kilometre radius of the epicentre of the explosion. There was little indication in the way the Oslo police operated that a terrorist attack had taken place in Norway and there was a high risk of another. When other police districts offered support, the capital generally rejected it, even though many of Oslo's most strategic facilities were still not secured. The police have closed all roads, but only those leading to and from the centre of the capital, the main railway station, large shopping centres

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 293–295.

(City and Byporten), the headquarters of the Norwegian news agency NTB, the dailies: “Verdens Gang” and “Aftenposten” and TV2<sup>40</sup>. The attack in the government district was initially attributed to Islamic terrorists and al-Qaeda. This was the opinion of experts on television.

Meanwhile, employees of the parliament administration asked for extra security because there were no armed guards in front of the building. The police informed them that they had to manage on their own. The head of parliamentary security was instructed to lock the buildings. The administration of the Labour Party headquarters asked for police protection and the People’s House also requested it<sup>41</sup>. All were refused and advised to evacuate the people. In 2011, the Norwegian police had only one helicopter, and in July its crew was on leave. As a consequence of subsequent budget cuts, there was no system in place in the police force for calling the crew back from leave. One of the pilots himself reported for duty just after 16:00, after hearing about the explosion on the news. He was told he was not needed. At the same time, Delta asked for a helicopter twice over the next hour. The reply was that it was not available, although it was standing on the ground fully prepared for flight. Nor did the police take any steps to mobilise military helicopter crews or use civilian machines. After the explosion in Oslo, a national alert was not immediately issued. Such an alarm triggered special procedures for sending important reports to all police headquarters in the country. In the event of a national alarm, the district commands had specific rules of operation. At Asker and Baerum district headquarters this involved setting up a police blockade on the E16 road near Sollihøgda, where Breivik was travelling. Furthermore, communication between the different police authorities and units was unclear and imprecise. There was a lack of concrete information and decisions<sup>42</sup>.

At 15:55, i.e. half an hour after the explosion, someone at the police headquarters happened to notice a piece of paper with the car details given by Andreas Olsen. He was contacted by phone and asked to repeat the report.

<sup>40</sup> E. Czykwin, *Anders Breivik...*, p. 16.

<sup>41</sup> The tradition of People’s Houses has been known throughout Scandinavia since the 19th century. They were established with the development of the labour movement as places for meetings and gatherings. In Norway, the first Folk House (Folkets Hus) was built in the 1890s. Today they are used for conferences, celebrations, entertainment and recreational activities.

<sup>42</sup> Å. Seierstad, *Jeden z nas...*, pp. 298–300.



The information was then passed on to the patrols in the capital. However, the media was not asked to provide information on the vehicle being sought and the armed man wearing a police uniform. Nor was the Oslo Traffic Headquarters, which had an extensive camera system, notified. There was a plan in place to deal with a terrorist threat, but it was not implemented. Nor were existing capabilities and resources used. Breivik, meanwhile, had left Oslo. At 16:03 he drove past the police station in Sandvika, and at 16:16 he passed the aforementioned Sollihøgda, heading towards Utøi. At 16:43, the Criminal Police Headquarters (Kripas) broadcast an announcement: *National alert - explosion. Possible bomb(s) in the centre of Oslo. We urge people to be on the lookout for a small grey van, possible registration number 24605. The connection between the explosion and the vehicle is currently unclear. If the vehicle is found, notify the duty officer at Kripas or K.O.P. Oslo for further instructions. Be cautious of the driver and the vehicle. Yours sincerely, Officer on Duty at Kripas*<sup>43</sup>. No word was passed on the fact that the driver of this car, whose letters in the registration number Kripas did not include in the message, was wearing a police officer's uniform. Besides, not many police stations received the message. Either the receiving equipment was not switched on in time, or the alarm frequencies were incorrectly set. This was also the case at the police station for Nordre Buskerud, where Breivik was already in the area. It was located a few kilometres from the ferry landing on Lake Tyrifjorden. Breivik parked his car at some distance from this marina and waited for the ferry that would take him to the island. He told the young people concerned, who were also waiting for the vessel, that because of the attack in Oslo he needed to get to the island to ensure the safety of the young people staying at the camp there. When the ferry MS "Thorbjørn" arrived at the harbour from Utøya, the passengers boarded and the boat headed back towards the island. Breivik's luggage consisted of a box on wheels and a rifle wrapped in plastic. Among the passengers was Monika Bøsei, the head of the centre on Utøya. At 17:10 the ferry reached the shore. Its captain helped Breivik carry the crate ashore, believing it to contain explosive detection equipment. The fake policeman was approached by Trond Bernsten, one of two (unarmed) guards guarding order on the island. Breivik introduced himself as Martin Nilsen (the identity of his former colleague)<sup>44</sup>.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 304.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., p. 308.

At the time, about 600 young people belonging to the Labour Party youth group were on Utøya, an island measuring about 500 by 300 metres. At 17:22 Breivik fired the first gun shots. The victim was Bernsten. After him, Monika Bøsei was shot. To those lying down Breivik fired two more shots each in the head. The ferry captain, who saw the whole incident, started running towards the island, shouting to the people he met to run away. The other guard, Rune Havdal, was shot in the back as he ran towards the grove. The killer approached the man lying down and fired another shot to the head. He was his third victim. Breivik was in no hurry. He walked calmly behind the largest group of fleeing youths. He planned to shoot as many people as possible and scare others into throwing themselves into the lake and drowning. Within five minutes he had shot 9 people. He then entered the building of the centre where he committed mass murder of the boys and girls there<sup>45</sup>. At about 17:29, the daughter of an officer of the Police Headquarters, who was on the island, called her on-duty father and informed him about the uniformed man who was killing the campers. Residents of the area around the lake, alerted by the sound of gunshots and the sight of smoke rising from the island, called the emergency services. The first units - a fire engine and a police patrol - arrived near the ferry landing at 17:38, followed by ambulances. Local residents rushed to the rescue in their boats and fished out the teenagers who had swum away from the island. On the advice of the village chief, a logistics centre was set up in the nearest village at a hotel 3 km away with a golf course to serve as a landing pad. The decision was also dictated by the fact that the bomber's car was parked at the marina and it was suspected that it might contain explosives. A Criminal Police operations officer arrived at the jetty from a neighbouring district and took charge. At the same time, a medical helicopter arrived with an anaesthetist on board, who was also a paramedic instructor and therefore familiar with most of the emergency services personnel in the area. He took charge of the medical services. The operation was extremely difficult due to the lack of adequate communication systems. Mobile phones were mainly used, which increased the time taken to transmit information, as one call blocked the connection with another caller waiting - a police officer, doctor or ambulance worker. In addition, part of the area was out of mobile phone coverage. The walkie-talkies they had were also failing. The weather made

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid., pp. 311–320.

the rescue operation even more difficult. Short briefings were held every 15-20 minutes in the established command centre. Fifty units of various services took part in the action. During the course of the murder, Breivik called the police emergency number twice and introduced himself by name as a member of the anti-communist resistance. He also stated where he was and declared his willingness to hand himself over to the officers. He then interrupted the conversation and continued killing. In Oslo, the decision was made to use Delta. The lack of a helicopter meant that its officers had to use a car. They set off around 17:30 and had to make their way through the congested city. When they reached the shore of Lake Tyrifjorden, a speedboat was waiting for them. Unfortunately, at 18:11 it got stuck in the middle of the lake due to overloading. Support was provided by local residents with their boats. At 18:27 the Delta team reached the shore of the island<sup>46</sup>. It advanced towards the roar of gunfire in a covering formation. In the last seven minutes Breivik shot five more people: four girls and one boy. At 18:34, the bomber, offering no resistance, surrendered to Delta officers, who were surprised to see a white man. He waited for their arrival but did not stop the killing. In 72 minutes he shot 67 people. He shot in the torso and the head. In total, he fired 186 shots, an average of more than two shots per minute. He therefore still had a large supply of ammunition left. He also caused the deaths of two more people, one of whom fell off a high cliff and the other drowned as he tried to swim away from the island. In addition, 32 people were seriously injured but survived. Over the course of an hour and 12 minutes, Breivik shot a total of 99 people, so it took him on average less than a minute to kill or injure each person. In addition, more than 70 people were injured as a result of their attempts to flee the island and the accompanying stress. Most of Breivik's victims killed on Utøya were between 14 and 18 years old. The bomber hoped to find former Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland on the island, but she had returned to Oslo a few hours earlier. He intended to decapitate her with a knife and filmed the incident and posted it on the Internet<sup>47</sup>. Among the injured was Adrian Pracoń, a Norwegian citizen of Polish origin, who recounted his experiences in a book<sup>48</sup>.

<sup>46</sup> M. Piekarski, K. Wojtasik, *Polski system...*, pp. 20–21.

<sup>47</sup> R.M. Machnikowski, *Zabójcze idee...*, p. 158.

<sup>48</sup> A. Pracoń, *Masakra na wyspie Utøya* (Eng. Massacre on the island of Utøya), Bielsko Biala 2013. In court, Breivik said that he spared Pracoń because he had a right-wing appearance. Even if the terrorist had indeed judged Pracoń in this way, this was to be his last victim.

## Conclusions

After ing Breivik's biography, it can be concluded that the Norwegian state, which for years has had a protective policy towards its citizens, in this particular case completely failed. Anders' mother and himself needed psychological care. The environment in which Breivik grew up contributed greatly to his problems. After the attack in Oslo, the state services also failed all the way. After detonating a bomb in the capital, the terrorist easily made his way to the island. The Prime Minister's house was not secured after the incident. Despite the fact that the so-called man with roses informed the police about Breivik's suspicious behaviour, gave his description and car registration numbers, the note got stuck on someone's desk. No roads were closed, no helicopter was dispatched. The pilot, who heard about the events on television, reported himself for duty but was sent home. A helicopter appeared over Utøya during the massacre, but it did not belong to the police, but to one of the TV stations. The cameraman filmed Breivik shooting at the terrified people. It took a long time for the Delta officers to reach the island on the shore of the lake, and only with the help of local residents. When they arrived on the scene, Breivik had surrendered and all that remained was to arrest him. He even had a photograph prepared for the occasion. Had it not been for the mistakes and negligence committed, it would have been possible, if not to prevent this tragic event by surrounding the future assassin with proper care during his adolescence, to significantly reduce the number of victims and even prevent Breivik from reaching Utøya. Now one can only hope that he spends the rest of his life in prison, simply because he has never shown any compassion either for the victims or for their families. Moreover, according to the opinion of Elżbieta Czykwin, there is no chance of rehabilitation in his case. The limit he crossed when he killed so many people caused such big changes in his brain and personality that a return to normality is no longer possible<sup>49</sup>.

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Breivik was already very tired at this point. Pracoń is a declared homosexual and his appearance may have mattered to Anders, but in a different sense than he described in court. For one of his friends testified that Breivik is a closeted homosexual. So far it is not known if this is true, or what really stopped him from shooting Pracoń. See I. Grelowska, *Anders Breivik. Nakrecony do zbrodni* (Eng. Anders Breivik. Driven to crime), Interia, 20 IX 2019, <https://styl.interia.pl/magazyn/news-anders-breivik-nakrecony-do-zbrodni,nId,3213764> [accessed: 21 IX 2019].

<sup>49</sup> I. Grelowska, *Anders Breivik...*

Breivik's followers had similar views, similar problems and personality traits, which consequently led them to extreme violence. Their motivation was also racist ideology and hatred of immigrants or people with dark skin colour. In addition to the imitators already mentioned, similar cases, albeit not as dramatic, but also with fatalities, or attempts to carry out terrorist attacks have been reported in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Estonia, Russia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, among others. Some of these perpetrators were inspired by Anders Breivik, while others were called "Breiviks" by the media. The Norwegian example has shown that not only Islamic terrorism, which until recently remained the greatest threat, but also extreme right-wing ideologies increasingly find their followers, ready to murder others in their name. Until the attacks in Norway on 22 July 2011, almost all the effort had been focused on combating the threat from Islamic extremists, whose actions are focused on murdering Americans and their allies and, more broadly, all non-believers and Muslims who do not share the only correct views propagated by radical preachers and their followers. Meanwhile, opposition to a multicultural society in Europe and the growing number of Muslim minorities is growing in strength. Political correctness and the self-censorship of pro-government media in Western Europe, which are silent on the negative effects of the presence of immigrants from high-risk countries, including the increase in terrorist threats and common crime, have made cyberspace the main platform for exchanging opinions on this issue. These are often accompanied by racist content and calls for violence, and far-right organisations are growing in strength and using anti-immigrant slogans to gain public support and parliamentary seats. In their shadow, further radicalised individuals are following in the footsteps of Anders Breivik. Meanwhile, the fact that the attack on 22 July 2011 was a protest against multicultural society is ignored, despite the fact that Scandinavian countries, especially Norway, are extremely tolerant and open to foreign cultures, and the Norwegian standard of living has for years been among the highest in the world.

The far right is growing in strength throughout Europe, but within the EU countries, Germany is the worst in this respect. For many years, the German services did not see this threat or underestimated it, because they also focused on Islamic terrorists. There has been an increase in the number of attacks perpetrated by people with a far-right ideology who are loosely connected to some organisational structure or who have no such connection. These are individuals acting alone who, thanks to the Internet and social

media, have gained access to ideological manifestos, instructions on how to carry out terrorist attacks or how to obtain weapons. This is exacerbating the terrorist threat. The popularity of far-right ideology is growing, especially in the context of an anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim narrative. It enjoyed particularly strong support after 2015, which saw the largest influx of irregular migrants into Europe after World War II. It was then that Breivik's followers became even more active. Norway has become a model for a new type of terrorism, because the proponents of the theory of white supremacy and the alleged threat of the native population being replaced by immigrants from Muslim countries are not united by formal organisational structures. Lone wolves seek inspiration online and - following Breivik's example - leave their message before embarking on a terrorist operation. In its 2019 report, the Australian Institute for Economics and Peace pointed out, for example, that the rise in Germany of terrorism motivated by far-right ideology is only part of a much broader phenomenon spanning the entire West. In five years, the number of attacks carried out by people associated with this group has increased by 320 percent<sup>50</sup>. In 2021, more politically motivated crimes were recorded in Germany than in previous years. More than 19 000 of these were committed by suspects from the right-wing political spectrum, more than 17 000 crimes were not classified ideologically by the police (they were linked to public opposition to the authorities' decisions on combating the pandemic), and around 9 000 were attributed to perpetrators motivated by extreme left-wing political views<sup>51</sup>.

Breivik and his followers prove that similar terrorist attacks can be carried out anywhere in the world. Classic right-wing thought patterns are also present in Poland. Racism, hatred of Israel, contempt for Islam, anger directed at supporters of migration and volunteers helping migrants are motivating factors. These, combined with the paranoia typical of some right-wing extremists, can give impetus to actions that will have tragic consequences. After the attack in Norway, the Polish police and special

<sup>50</sup> J. Bielecki, *Nasładowcy Breivika rosą w Europie w siłę* (Eng. Breivik's followers are growing in strength in Europe), rp.pl, 23 II 2020, <https://www.rp.pl/swiat/art.871721-nasladowcy-breivika-rosna-w-europie-w-sile> [accessed: 24 II 2020].

<sup>51</sup> PAP, *Fala przestępstw politycznych w Niemczech. „Więcej niż kiedykolwiek w ciągu ostatnich 20 lat”* (Eng. Political crime wave in Germany. “More than at any time in the last 20 years”), InfoSecurity 24, 19 I 2022, <https://infosecurity24.pl/za-granica/fala-przestepstw-politycznych-w-niemczech-wiecej-niz-kiedykolwiek-w-ciagu-ostatnich-20-lat> [accessed: 20 I 2022].

services faced new challenges in preventing acts of terrorism. Cooperation between individual services and units of state and local administration has been institutionalised and tightened, and specialist units have been created within the ABW and Police to monitor cyberspace for racist content<sup>52</sup>. The adopted recommendations made it possible to prevent a terrorist attack prepared by Brunon Kwiecień. This does not mean, however, that the situation in Poland is completely under control, because year by year the confidence of society in the state is decreasing. The results of the 2020 survey of Poles' moods turned out to be so bad that they surprised even the authors themselves. The various shields introduced by the government at the time, which were supposed to protect companies during a coronavirus pandemic, did not reassure citizens fearing a lack of work and money. There was no faith in the effectiveness of the proposed solutions, and confidence in the state proved extremely low. Since then, the country's economic situation has deteriorated. Disputes within the government and social divisions meant that, after the improvement recorded in autumn 2021, public sentiment further deteriorated<sup>53</sup>. This difficult situation was partly masked by the conflict in Ukraine. Poles became aware that refugees from across the eastern border had lost everything but saved their lives. The involvement of a large part of the population in helping the Ukrainians and the images of war damage and victims shown by the media distracted Polish citizens for a while from worrying information about the economic situation, inflation, high prices and the coronavirus pandemic. The war has also caused the further perspective on life to cease to have much meaning for people. They are worried about the immediate future. They fear that military action will move into our country and that a nuclear conflict, however unlikely at present, is not impossible. Vladimir Putin has nothing left to lose. Forecasting the scale of the terrorist threat, not to mention

<sup>52</sup> This issue is presented in detail in: *Zamach w Norwegii. Nowy wymiar zagrożenia terroryzmem w Europie* (Eng. Assassination in Norway. A new dimension of the terrorist threat in Europe), K. Liedel, P. Piasecka, T.R. Aleksandrowicz (sci. eds.), Warszawa 2011.

<sup>53</sup> *Tsunami uderzy w gospodarkę i finanse Polaków. Wyniki badań zszokowały nawet ich autorów* (Eng. Tsunami will hit the economy and finances of Poles. Research results shocked even their authors), Forbes, 12 V 2020, <https://www.forbes.pl/gospodarka/nastroje-spoleczne-w-polsce-w-kwietniu-2020-badanie-irg-sgh-i-zpf-dr-slawomir-dudek/4mdqnw7> [accessed: 14 III 2022]; PAP, *Jakie są nastroje społeczne w Polsce? Zaskakujące wyniki najnowszego sondażu* (Eng. What is the public mood in Poland? Surprising results of the latest poll), DEON, 21 X 2021, <https://deon.pl/swiat/jakie-sa-nastroje-spoleczne-w-polsce-zaskakujace-wyniki-najnowszego-sondazu,1654190> [accessed: 14 III 2022].



including lone wolves in these predictions, is very difficult because it is impossible to predict the development of the situation in Ukraine, and it has a huge impact on security in our country. We can only say with certainty that the threat is currently high and will continue to grow.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has also increased the level of terrorist threat online. Russian attacks on Polish cyberspace have been ongoing for a long time. The fears and anxieties present in society, fuelled by the activity of trolls and the dissemination of fake news, are exacerbating social tensions. Agents of influence play a significant role in this. A few days before the Russian aggression, the number of anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian comments suddenly increased in Polish cyberspace. Many of them were fake news, but a large part of them were opinions of authors from extreme right-wing circles, who had previously spoken about the threat from Ukrainian nationalists, motivated to a large extent by the heritage and ideology of Stepan Bandera and the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. The posts reproduced, among other things, themes from Putin's speech, in which he argued for Russia's recognition of the independence of two separatist republics in eastern Ukraine. This anti-Ukrainian narrative was reproduced in far-right forums<sup>54</sup>. The historically justified anti-Ukrainian character of nationalist organisations in Poland (far-right Ukrainian organisations have similar resentments towards Poland) is nothing special, especially since, during the protracted war, the hostile rhetoric became almost silent on internet portals, where neutral journalism, not referring to either side of the conflict in Ukraine, began to dominate. However, hateful comments still appear on social media. The situation may become more acute in the event of a prolonged conflict in Ukraine and an increasing number of war refugees from the country. Admiration for the determination of the defenders, patriotically motivated and united, public recognition of the heroism of the Ukrainians, enthusiasm and help for the refugees will gradually wane and may turn into indifference and then into dissatisfaction with the presence of hundreds of thousands of newcomers from across the eastern border. It can be assumed that refugees and the EU will be blamed for the deterioration of the economic

<sup>54</sup> See „Mądry Putin” i „sztuczne państwo Ukraina” – antyukraińskie narracje w polskiej sieci (Eng. “Wise Putin” and “artificial state of Ukraine” - anti-Ukrainian narratives in Polish internet), *Konkret* 24, 23 II 2022, <https://konkret24.tvn24.pl/polska,108/madry-putin-i-sztuczne-panstwo-ukraina-antyukrainskie-narracje-w-polskiej-sieci,1097200.html> [accessed: 23 II 2022].

situation in Poland and the high prices of goods. It can also be assumed that the Ukrainians staying in Poland will be too insistent in expressing their patriotism and spreading nationalist ideas, for example by placing Ukrainian symbols and slogans on the facades of buildings. This may displease Polish society and inflame the activity of domestic nationalist groups, becoming a source of hatred, aggression, violence and mutual recrimination. In the initial period of the migration wave from Ukraine such activists were ‘patrolling’ areas near border crossings in Podkarpacie and behaving aggressively towards Asians and Africans crossing the border with Ukrainians. It follows that the war across the eastern border has not significantly affected racist behaviour, it may have reduced its scale, but it has not eliminated it from the public space.

Depending on how the war in Ukraine ends, it will have far-reaching implications for security in Europe and the terrorist threat. On 27 February 2022, three Russian saboteurs were arrested in Ukraine. On one of them a notebook was found with the address of a hotel in Zgorzelec (its owner turned out to be a person with a criminal past), the names of two nearby towns: Liberec in the Czech Republic and Markersdorf in Germany, as well as the phone numbers and names of two people: Igor and Artem. The second one was marked “coordinator”<sup>55</sup>. The danger is therefore great. This has also been pointed out by the German services, which estimate that there may be between 200 and 2 000 Russian agents operating in their country. Their aim is not only to gather information on politicians and companies that criticise Russia, but they may also be preparing attacks on NATO bases in Germany as well as acts of sabotage and diversion. They recruit young men, especially in East Germany, where in recent years there have already been several mysterious explosions at armament plants and arms depots<sup>56</sup>. Russia will also carry out destabilising and

<sup>55</sup> M. Rybak, *Rosyjscy dywersanci, złapani na Ukrainie mieli w notesie adres hotelu w Zgorzelcu* (Eng. Russian saboteurs caught in Ukraine had address of hotel in Zgorzelec in notebook), *Wyborcza*, 28 II 2022, <https://wroclaw.wyborcza.pl/wroclaw/7,35771,28164136,dywersanci-zlapani-przez-ukrainskie-sluzby-mieli-kartke-z.html> [accessed: 3 III 2022]; the same, “*Wyborcza*” *ustalila hotel w Zgorzelcu z notesu dywersantów złapanych na Ukrainie. Ma gangsterską przeszłość* (Eng. “*Wyborcza*” established a hotel in Zgorzelec from the notebook of divers caught in Ukraine. It has a gangster past), *Wyborcza*, 1 III 2022, <https://wroclaw.wyborcza.pl/wroclaw/7,35771,28167910,wyborcza-ustalila-hotel-w-zgorzelcu-z-notesu-dywersantow.html> [accessed: 3 III 2022].

<sup>56</sup> V. Baran, *Niemcy. Służby: groźną nam akty dywersji* (Eng. Germany. Services: we are threatened by acts of diversion), *Wirtualna Polska*, 7 III 2022, <https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/niemcy-sluzby-groza-nam-akty-dywersji-6744701005154912a> [accessed: 7 III 2022]; T. Waleński,

subversive activities in Poland. This creates room for terrorists with different ideologies and sympathies. They may be anti-Polish, anti-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, anti-NATO or anti-EU. In any case, the new group of terrorists may have an easier task when it comes to choosing their targets and motivation. They may not necessarily be driven by a racist, anti-immigrant ideology like Anders Breivik, but his successors may also want to exist.

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