

An outline for a case study: *Sleeping Dogs...* by Marek Świerczek¹

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In 2025, Wydawnictwo LTW released a book by Lieutenant-Colonel Marek Świerczek, PhD entitled *Sleeping Dogs. Russian intelligence operations against the State Protection Office (UOP) in the early 1990s*. It is devoted to an analysis of the case of the 1993 arrest and subsequent 1994 conviction for espionage on behalf of the USSR/Russia of Marek Zieliński, a former officer of the Security Service of the People's Republic of Poland.

The author of the book is a former officer of the Internal Security Agency. Between 2023 and 2024, he served as editor-in-chief of the Internal Security Review. In 2017, he defended his doctoral thesis, which focused on Soviet disinformation during the interwar period, with particular emphasis on Operation 'Trust'. According to the information on the cover, his body of work also includes several dozen academic articles and four

¹ M. Świerczek, *Śpiące psy. Rosyjskie gry agenturalne wobec Urzędu Ochrony Państwa początkiem lat 90. XX w.* (Eng. *Sleeping Dogs. Russian intelligence operations against the State Protection Office (UOP) in the early 1990s.*), Łomianki 2025, Wydawnictwo LTW, 318 p.

monographs, as well as four novels ‘which are hybrids of historical fiction and horror’ and over a dozen fantasy short stories.

The book has two reviewers: Prof. Grzegorz Łukomski, PhD, a historian by training, and Associate Professor Dominik Smyrgała, a security expert formerly associated with the Military Counter-Intelligence Service (in 2007), chief analyst at the Monitoring and Analysis Centre of the Ministry of National Defence (2016–2017), head of the Political Cabinet of the Minister of National Defence Antoni Macierewicz (2017), and Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of National Defence (2017–2018).

I would like to state at the outset that I do not share the views of the author of *Sleeping Dogs*... regarding the Zieliński affair and the picture he paints of the organisation, workings, equipment, operational capabilities and effectiveness of the UOP in the early 1990s. The book paints a picture of naive Poles, once again being led by the nose and manipulated by the Russians in order to protect Russian agents embedded high up within the secret service structures or even within the state apparatus itself.

I believe that, at a time when the Russian Federation’s secret services are engaging in increasingly aggressive actions as part of a hybrid war being waged, among others, against Poland, the de facto defamatory portrayal of the UOP presented in the book, and the assessment of the Zieliński case as an intelligence operation lost by Poland, are not only untrue but also harmful. They may undermine public confidence in the state and the effectiveness of its security services, and may also have a negative impact on the motivation of officers.

In the interests of historical truth and an objective assessment of facts and processes, this publication calls for a response, so as to enable the reader to take a critical look at the reality described in the book regarding the early 1990s. In my view, this is particularly important for officers currently on active duty, as many of them are familiar with the period of building a democratic state following the 1989 elections only through various, largely subjective accounts. Differences arising from the historical context, the distinct nature of the environment, and the unique nature of the situation – when the state system and the entire geopolitical context were changing – make it difficult today, often to a significant extent, to assess the decisions made at the time, the conclusions drawn, and the methods and approaches to operational work. Without a thorough knowledge of the historical background, a full understanding of the events will be impossible, and any assessment of them will be inaccurate.

The author of *Sleeping Dogs*... claims that his book is an academic publication. It is impossible to agree with this. Marek Świerczek formulates three research hypotheses and deems one of them to be true on the basis of dismissing the other

two as false. This is not a scientific method, not least because the author's three hypotheses are not the only ones that could be put forward in the situation under analysis. Furthermore, the evidence presented by the author to prove the falsity of the two hypotheses is unconvincing, and he has committed numerous distortions, mixing fact with fiction. I shall endeavour to demonstrate this in this review.

The problem with sources

The author based his analysis of the Zieliński case on court and prosecution files, which describe only a part of the reality under investigation during the trial, and do so in a specifically formalised manner. It is worth noting that practitioners who prepare operational material for evidential proceedings recognise that, in court, typically only 20–25% of such material can be used. Of course, there are exceptions, although most cases tend to indicate a lower rate of utilisation². The issue of the so-called 'admissibility' of operational material poses difficulties for all intelligence services worldwide, even in the face of local legal and procedural facilitations.

The author of the book states that he contacted Marek Zieliński, but that he refused to cooperate (p. 7). It is difficult to understand why he did not contact the UOP officers involved in the case, both during the operational and the trial phases. This group comprises a dozen or so people whom Marek Świerczek was unable to reach.

The author states that he had access to the testimonies given during Zieliński's trial, contained in the declassified materials of the Institute of National Remembrance (ref. IPN BU 3790/1-5), and that these form the basis of his argument (p. 7). Previously, the court files relating to this case were held in the archives of the Regional Court in Warsaw (ref. SO 84/94).

In 2017, when Tomasz Piątek's book *Macierewicz and his secrets*³ was published, describing the links between one of Minister Antoni Macierewicz's associates and the Security Service, the then Minister of National Defence began reviewing the court files of spies caught by the UOP a quarter of a century earlier⁴.

² This statement is based on the reviewer's personal observations of cases handled by the Investigative Directorate of the State Protection Office or made available through cooperation with partner agencies.

³ T. Piątek, *Macierewicz i jego tajemnice* (Eng. *Macierewicz and his secrets*), Warszawa 2017.

⁴ R. Gruca, *Pilna wizyta Macierewicza w IPN? Co stało się z teczkami agentów?* (Eng. *An urgent visit by Macierewicz to the IPN? What has happened to the agents' files?*), Fakt, 25 VI 2018, <https://www.fakt.pl/polityka/pilna-wizyta-macierewicza-w-ipn-co-stalo-sie-z-teczkami-agentow/hx509dh> [accessed: 26 VIII 2026].

The court files relating to the Zieliński case were also made available to Anna Gielewska and Marcin Dzierżanowski, the authors of the book *Antoni Macierewicz. An unauthorised biography*, published in 2018. It was only through this publication that the public learnt that Antoni Macierewicz, as Minister of Internal Affairs, had ordered in 1992 that counter-intelligence operations against the GRU station in Warsaw and its head, Vladimir Ivanovich Lomakin, be halted.

Minister Antoni Macierewicz verbally conveyed the order to end the Polish counter-intelligence operation against the Russians to Colonel Konstanty Miodowicz, Director of the Counter-Intelligence Directorate of the UOP. According to Miodowicz's account, he received this order in the Interior Minister's office in the presence of Piotr Naimski, then Head of the UOP⁵.

The use of just one, and a specific, source means that the author of *Sleeping Dogs...* has omitted the entirety of the operational material relating to the Zieliński/Lomakin – namely the opinions and analyses produced by the Investigative Directorate of the UOP, which were not included in the materials submitted alongside the indictment, the transcripts of interrogations, materials concerning the findings of surveillance, and the content recorded by operational technical means. This information is presented in court as evidence from the interrogation. Of course, it is the court that decides who is to be examined. Information which cannot be converted into evidence for the trial due to overriding operational interests, or where there is no way of presenting it without prejudice to other ongoing cases, the persons involved in them, or activities covered by state secrecy, is not included in the prosecution and court materials. This does not mean that such information will not be used in other cases and presented in a manner that safeguards legally protected interests.

How I view the aims behind the publication of *Sleeping Dogs...*

The author of the book states and emphasises (in bold) that: '*Its [i.e. the book in question – reviewer's note] purpose is purely academic, with the hope of practical application*' (p. 7). He goes on to state: *The author hopes that the analysis will be received as intended, i.e. as an application of scientific methodology and operational practice to the analysis of the methods and working practices of the Russian special services* (p. 7).

It is hard to shake off the impression that the book's true aims were different, and that it cannot be regarded as a scholarly work.

⁵ This statement is based on the reviewer's own knowledge.

To understand the true intentions of the author of *Sleeping Dogs...*, it is worth taking a closer look at the *Introduction*. In it, Marek Świerczek states that the Zieliński affair was, 'with a probability bordering on certainty', a ploy by the Russian secret services against the UOP (p. 17). Zieliński was a victim of this ploy, designed to shield the networks of agents belonging to the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) and the GRU, established during the era of the Polish People's Republic and – as the book seems to suggest – still operating to this day. According to Marek Świerczek, this 'deception operation' [sic!]: (...) *subsequently became the basis for a political myth, thanks to which it was possible to continue undermining Poland's international standing, by portraying the Polish political world as riddled with Russian agents* (pp. 17 and 18).

The author goes on to write: *The Republic of Poland will not be a guarantor of national interests for as long as it remains a victim of the processes of deception and myth-making that shape the attitudes of citizens and the ruling elites* (p. 19). *The distortion of the socio-political reality in Poland prevented the implementation of thorough reforms in the early years of the Third Republic of Poland, such as severing the web of covert influence over the state apparatus through decommunisation and vetting* (p. 18).

The author's statements quoted above are derived neither from the content of the book in question nor from any publicly available, objective academic work. They are, strictly speaking, a political assessment promoted by certain circles, with which the author of the book agrees.

Marek Świerczek presents no evidence to support these claims. He does not explain which myth he is referring to. Meanwhile, it is *Sleeping Dogs...* that attempts to create a myth about the powerful Russian security services, which, in the early 1990s, successfully outmanoeuvred the inexperienced counter-intelligence of the UOP.

In addition to the author's extremely categorical statements regarding the Zieliński case, the book also attempts to introduce the term 'deception and myth-making operation' into the discussion. This concept originates from psychology and related disciplines, but has not been definitively defined.

The book also contains a number of the author's opinions with political undertones (pp. 17–19 and elsewhere).

Following the (ideological) *Introduction*, the author moves on to a chapter entitled *The Case of Marek Zieliński*, in which he presents a rather cursory profile of the protagonist. He devotes most of his attention to the media attacks on Minister Antoni Macierewicz, who was accused of having very close ties with many people suspected of working 'on behalf of' or simply sympathising with Russia. Marek Świerczek writes: (...) *the case of Marek Zieliński became fully politicised, turning into an important link in the chain of evidence intended to demonstrate the alleged*

connections between Macierewicz and his circle and the military intelligence services of the Russian Federation (p. 48).

The question arises as to whether it is not the author of *Sleeping Dogs...* who is attempting to politicise the Zieliński affair, by claiming that attacks on Antoni Macierewicz undermine Poland's national interest, as they lead to Poland being perceived as a post-Soviet state rather than a credible member of NATO and the European Union? In his view: *The problem (...) is that (...) the Marek Zieliński case actually unfolded quite differently from what is generally assumed, and Marek Zieliński himself played a completely different role in it than that attributed to him by the court on the basis of the military prosecutor's findings* (p. 48).

It can therefore be inferred that the author of the book, drawing on the same evidence as the court, is challenging the handed down verdict.

In my view, the author reveals here one (perhaps the most important) of the true aims behind writing this book: to undermine the legitimacy of the attacks on Antoni Macierewicz by denying the significance of the Zieliński/Lomakin case, which is allegedly linked to those attacks (p. 48). However, at the time when this case was unfolding, there were no such attacks.

At first glance, one might get the impression that Marek Świerczek's perspective on the Zieliński/Lomakin case is simply a continuation of his previous academic interests and his doctoral thesis on Operation 'Trust'. Regardless of this, the book *Sleeping Dogs...* is also a defence of the decision by Minister Antoni Macierewicz, who prohibited the UOP from investigating the head of the GRU station at the Russian Embassy in Warsaw.

The second aim of *Sleeping Dogs...* is to discredit those who headed the UOP in the early 1990s by accusing them of incompetence and of succumbing to Russian manipulation.

The third objective is to reinforce the myth of the 'zero option', that is, to build the Polish special services without the involvement of former officers from the special services of the People's Republic of Poland. The author suggests this solution in several places throughout the book, without explicitly calling it the 'zero option'. He presents no arguments in favour of such a solution, tacitly acknowledging that it would be a far better solution for the Republic of Poland. The example of the Czech Republic, where, despite the 'zero option', the largest number of oligarchs in the former socialist bloc (with the exception of the Russian Federation) emerged, having appropriated state assets, suggests that the opposite is in fact the case⁶. At the same time, it is worth noting that over the last 35 years, the rate of economic

⁶ D. Tramba, *The Unstoppable Rise of Czech Oligarchs*, Aspen Institute Central Europe, 16 XI 2019, <https://www.aspeninstitutece.org/article/2019/unstoppable-rise-czech-oligarchs/> [accessed: 14 VI 2026].

growth in Poland, where the 'zero option' was not introduced, has been significantly faster than in the Czech Republic, where it was implemented⁷.

Myths and reality

In his book, Marek Świerczek, as I have already mentioned, perpetuates the myth of the power of the Russian secret services. Already in the *Introduction*, he presents examples of their successes, ranging from the creation of a fake Polish National Government following the fall of the January Uprising, through the fabrication of the fake counter-revolutionary organisation 'Trust' in the 1920s, to the dismantling of the underground in Poland, the Baltic states and Ukraine after World War II (pp. 15–17). The absence of examples of failures by the Soviet/Russian services is puzzling. Guided by scientific objectivity, the author of the book should at least have mentioned them. For example, the Soviet services failed to foresee the Third Reich's attack on the USSR in 1941, and in 2022 the Russian services underestimated Ukraine's defensive capabilities.

The author of the book endeavours to portray the Soviet, and later Russian, intelligence services as effective and efficient organisations. This is in contrast to the intelligence services of the People's Republic of Poland, which, according to him, were characterised by: drunkenness, nepotism, cronyism, ideological blindness, the low intelligence of the management, the servility of lower-ranking staff, bureaucracy and token gestures. He believes that these characteristics were transferred to the UOP 'in the early 1990s' (pp. 214–224). However, he fails to recognise that the Soviet and, later, Russian security services may have faced similar problems⁸.

According to the author of the book, another example of the Russian security services' success is the case of Zieliński, who in 1993, shortly after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland, was arrested by UOP officers and subsequently sentenced to nine years' imprisonment for spying on behalf of the USSR and the Russian Federation. To lend credence to this, he draws far-reaching conclusions, reminiscent of a typical conspiracy theory⁹.

⁷ J. Borowski, K. Jaworski, J. Olipra, *Jak mierzyć „cud gospodarczy” w Polsce?* (Eng. How should Poland's 'economic miracle' be measured?), Bank.pl, 23 VI 2025, <https://bank.pl/jak-mierzyc-cud-gospodarczy-w-polsce/> [accessed: 3 X 2026].

⁸ A. Grajewski, *Tarcza i miecz. Rosyjskie służby specjalne 1991–1998* (Eng. The shield and the sword: Russian special services 1991–1998), Warszawa 1998, p. 20.

⁹ P. Łukowski, *Sens wyrażenia „teoria spiskowa”, czyli jak odróżnić teorię spiskową od niespiskowej* (Eng. The meaning of the term 'conspiracy theory', or how to distinguish a conspiracy theory from a non-conspiracy theory), "Hybris" 2016, no. 33, pp. 101–124.

According to Marek Świerczek's account, the Zieliński case was straightforward. Its 'protagonist' was a former officer of the Security Service of the People's Republic of Poland. He specialised in writing analyses on the democratic and Solidarity opposition. In 1987, during an inspection of the contents of his office safes, it was discovered that he was illegally copying and collecting a large number of classified documents. He was given a reprimand and transferred to operational duties. It is said that there were those within the Security Service leadership who resented him for maintaining social relations with the Soviet military attaché, in addition to his official, work-related contacts with KGB representatives in Warsaw. Soon, however, Zieliński was reinstated to analytical work and joined the team directly supporting the Minister of Internal Affairs, Czesław Kiszczak, for whom he wrote speeches, particularly during the Round Table period (pp. 49–50, 98–99).

Zieliński's aversion to Solidarity was so strong that, following its victory, he did not submit to vetting but instead retired and became involved in the security industry, which was booming at the time (p. 101). His company, 'Dakota', sought to secure contracts in the East, while he maintained numerous contacts with former officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Polish People's Republic and members of the Polish United Workers' Party (pp. 53–58).

To help readers of this review understand the significance of the actions taken in the Zieliński case and their historical context, I have included a summary of the chronology of events contained in Marek Świerczek's book. I have supplemented this with well-known events from the political arena which, in all likelihood, influenced the course of the case but which the author did not mention.

- 26 June 1991 – Andrzej Anklewicz, head of the Analysis and Support Unit for the Minister of Internal Affairs, informed the UOP's counter-intelligence department and the Minister of Internal Affairs that his colleague from his time in the Security Service, Marek Zieliński, had tried to persuade him to cooperate with a 'journalist from the Russian news agency TASS', which was a clear attempt to recruit him to work for Soviet intelligence. The UOP's counter-intelligence instructed Anklewicz to play along.
- July 1991 – Zieliński held several meetings with Anklewicz, during which the latter set out his financial demands (several thousand dollars simply for agreeing to cooperate) and requested a face-to-face meeting with the 'journalist'.
- 19–21 August 1991 – the failed Yanayev coup took place in Moscow. As a result, on 22 August, the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky at Lubyanka was toppled; on 24 August, Ukraine, and on 25 August, Belarus, declared independence; on 29 August, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was dissolved (addition by the reviewer).

- 28 August 1991 – during a meeting at a restaurant, Zieliński learnt that his new case officer would be Commander Vladimir Lomakin.
- 27 September 1991 – Ankiewicz handed over to the Russians materials prepared by UOP's counter-intelligence.
- 2 October 1991 – Lomakin visited Zieliński at his company, 'Dakota'. He considered the materials provided by Ankiewicz to be of little interest.
- 12 November 1991 – Lomakin met Zieliński at a restaurant. They did not act in a secretive manner. Lomakin gave \$800, of which \$500 was for Ankiewicz.
- 15 November 1991 – Zieliński gave Ankiewicz the date (29 November) and location (near the Powszechny Theatre) of the meeting with the GRU officer, as well as a distinguishing mark (a plastic carrier bag) and a code phrase and reply. He also gave him a map of Warsaw with the meeting place marked on it and \$500 for the previous materials.
- 29 November 1991 – a meeting between Ankiewicz and Lomakin, who presented a covert communications system, promised to provide a camera for taking spy photographs, and announced that the payment for subsequent batches of documents would range from \$1000 to \$1500. In response to a question from Ankiewicz, he also outlined the GRU's areas of interest: the intentions of the US, the UK and Germany towards Russia; UOP's counter-intelligence activities against Russians in Poland; and assessments of the situation in Russia sent from the Polish Embassy in Moscow. Regarding information on defence and border security, Lomakin stated, 'We've got that'. He also recommended severing contact with Zieliński, as 'he is of no use to the GRU'. The next meeting was scheduled for 17 December 1991.
- 17 December 1991 – during the meeting, Lomakin told Ankiewicz that his materials were only of partial interest. He did not need the materials from the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he only wanted the dispatches from the Polish Embassy in Moscow and information on areas of interest to UOP's counter-intelligence. The next meeting was arranged for 14 February 1992. Lomakin was then to hand over \$1500 for the materials previously received and to provide a camera and a walkie-talkie.
- The new Minister of the Interior, Antoni Macierewicz (who took up his post on 23 December 1991), categorically ordered an end to the operation involving Lomakin. He authorised only a final meeting to bring the collaboration to a close. This decision made it impossible to obtain evidence in the form of secret communication devices (addition by the reviewer).

- Late January 1992 – Zieliński offered Dariusz C. a job working for the Russians. Dariusz C. did not take the offer seriously, as Zieliński had been drinking heavily during the meeting.
- 20 February 1992 – on the alternative date, a meeting took place between Lomakin and Ankiewicz, who, in accordance with instructions from the UOP, said that he was afraid to cooperate and would not meet again. Ankiewicz recorded this conversation.
- 20 May 1992 – Lomakin gave his consent to the recruitment of Feliks B., who, as a consultant, was preparing a commentary on the UOP Operational Instruction.
- 11 November 1992 – Zieliński once again proposed to Feliks B. to sell UOP documents for between \$50 and \$1000. A few days later, Feliks B. refused Zieliński's offer over the telephone, but did not inform UOP's counter-intelligence of this proposal.
- 18 November 1992 – During a meeting with Lomakin, Zieliński asked for a break in their collaboration, as he feared that Feliks B. might betray him. Lomakin agreed to this.
- 16 December 1992 – UOP officer Jan S. informed UOP's counter-intelligence that he had (at some point) received a proposal from Zieliński to collaborate with a 'Russian journalist'. UOP's counter-intelligence decided to play along for a second time, establishing both a list of targets and a course of action.
- 31 May 1993 – Lomakin met with Zieliński once again at a restaurant and failed to maintain secrecy. He pressed him about recruiting new agents.
- 19 June 1993 – Zieliński presented Jan S. with various proposals for business cooperation within the 'Dakota' company and mentioned the possibility of selling UOP documents for between \$1000 and \$3000. In accordance with UOP's counter-intelligence instructions, Jan S. did not refuse, but neither did he give his consent.
- 21 June 1993 – Zieliński met Lomakin at a restaurant and told him about his conversation with Jan S. Lomakin insisted that Jan S. be recruited quickly. Zieliński was to slip a note detailing the outcome of the recruitment conversation under Lomakin's door that night.
- 30 August 1993 – during the meeting, Zieliński gave Jan S. a price list for the documents to be handed over. Ministry documents: \$200–500; secret documents: \$500–1000; top secret documents: \$1000–5000. He also suggested a weekend trip outside Warsaw. As Zieliński later testified, Lomakin did not rule out attending this meeting. However, the weekend trip did not take place.

- 17 September 1993 – the last unit of the Russian army left Polish territory (added by the reviewer).
- 18 September 1993 – during a meeting at a restaurant, Jan S. handed over to Zieliński the documents prepared by UOP's counter-intelligence for Lomakin – to be returned the following day.
- 27 September 1993 – during a meeting at a restaurant, Jan S. handed over to Zieliński, among other things, the *Report on the state of national security*.
- 28 September 1993 – Zieliński wrote a profile of Jan S. for Lomakin and later met him in a restaurant. It was too crowded to hand him the *Report on the state of national security*, so they arranged to meet at the 'Dakota' headquarters. Lomakin left, while the UOP detained Zieliński and (as added by the reviewer) Lomakin.
- Zieliński was arrested, and Lomakin was immediately expelled from Poland.

Marek Świerczek presents this case as an example of an operational manoeuvre known as the 'pawn gambit', whereby an insignificant collaborator is sacrificed to protect more important assets. In this instance, the GRU was said to have sacrificed Zieliński in order, firstly, to divert UOP's attention away from other, more important spies working for the Soviet/Russian services, and secondly to convince UOP officers with a background in the Security Service that they were loyal to the new state (some of them report attempts at recruitment, while others successfully apprehend a spy), thereby preventing the 'zero option' (pp. 283–287).

This conclusion is based on an alleged demonstration that other possible explanations for the course of events in the Zieliński case are implausible.

Underlying the author's reasoning is the view that Lomakin's conduct in his dealings with Zieliński – both in terms of the manner of contact and the tasks he set him – was in stark contrast to the principles governing Soviet/Russian intelligence. Firstly, Lomakin made no effort to keep these contacts secret; and secondly, he insisted on recruiting individuals from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the UOP, without paying attention to these candidates' potential for obtaining information of value to the Soviet/Russian services (pp. 137–142).

Marek Świerczek puts forward two hypotheses that might explain what he considers to be Lomakin's unprofessional behaviour. Hypothesis one: Lomakin was incompetent and unable to conduct intelligence operations safely. Hypothesis two: Lomakin was under pressure to secure sources of information within the UOP and the Ministry of the Interior very quickly, as at that time the Soviet/Russian services had none at all (pp. 143–147).

According to the author of the book, the first hypothesis cannot be true, as Lomakin demonstrated his competence and professionalism while stationed in the US for six years and was not expelled from his post for espionage. The second

hypothesis is also false, as the Soviet services had a great many sources within the Ministry of the Interior of the People's Republic of Poland, so it is unlikely that none of these sources found their way to the UOP or the new Ministry of the Interior. Marek Świerczek concludes that, since both these hypotheses are false, the third hypothesis must be true: the Soviet/Russian intelligence services deliberately sought to sacrifice Zieliński (p. 252). Lomakin deliberately led Zieliński in such a way that the UOP would uncover his espionage activities. This was intended to protect far more important GRU assets. Zieliński is therefore a scapegoat covering up the continued operations of the intelligence network.

It is impossible to regard this line of reasoning as correct.

Lomakin did indeed work as a resident agent in the US for six years, but this resulted in him being repeatedly refused 'agrément' in subsequent European countries. Thus, the fact that Lomakin was not expelled from the US during those six years does not necessarily mean that he was competent as a spy. Perhaps he was so incompetent that the FBI had complete control over his activities and sources, and therefore did not want him expelled, lest his successor prove to be a more difficult opponent. It cannot therefore be concluded that Marek Świerczek has disproved this hypothesis.

Furthermore, his assertion that the second hypothesis is false has no logical basis, since even if one were to assume that the Soviet security services (KGB/GRU) had, in 1990, a network of Security Service officers within the structures of the Polish Ministry of the Interior, recruited in the 1980s – a claim for which, however, there is no evidence, neither at the time the Zieliński case was unfolding nor in the light of subsequent years and events – it is highly likely that few of them were still willing or able to cooperate in the new political climate. It is therefore impossible to conclude that Marek Świerczek has demonstrated the falsity of the second hypothesis.

An even more serious problem with the soundness of the book's author's reasoning is that the fourth hypothesis is both possible and highly probable: Lomakin wanted to secure new sources in order to prove his usefulness and remain at his post in Warsaw. At the time the Zieliński/Lomakin affair was unfolding, the USSR was disintegrating, so diplomats and spies could not feel secure at their posts. Even if the GRU had good sources, these were not down to Lomakin's success, but that of his predecessors. He, however, needed a success of his own to stand a better chance of remaining abroad in a diplomatic post.

Finally, it should be noted that the basis for this entire line of reasoning is also flawed, namely the author's assessment that the way in which Lomakin assigned tasks to and maintained contact with Zieliński was contrary to the principles governing intelligence operations. It was not contrary to these principles that they did not conceal their acquaintance; rather, they merely sought to make it difficult

for the UOP to determine the frequency of their meetings, while taking great care not to give the impression that these were of a clandestine nature. That is why they sat in the middle of restaurants rather than in a secluded corner, and did not avoid acquaintances they happened to meet. This was a fairly effective tactic. Routine UOP surveillance recorded several meetings between Lomakin and Zieliński, but this did not arouse much interest until Anklewicz informed UOP's counter-intelligence that Zieliński was attempting to recruit him. The above statements are the ABCs of counter-intelligence.

Marek Świerczek's suggestion that the Zieliński affair was a pawn's gambit is also illogical, as sacrificing Zieliński could in no way have safeguarded the interests of the Soviet/Russian intelligence services. On the contrary, it resulted in nothing but losses.

1. Zieliński's arrest, followed by his harsh sentence, must have served as a deterrent both to those then working with the Russian security services and to potential recruits. They saw that the UOP was capable of acting effectively, and that the courts showed no mercy.
2. Lomakin's expulsion on account of his espionage activities undermined Russia's position as a state seeking good relations with the West and pursuing a friendly policy towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and this perception was of great importance to the Russian Federation under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin¹⁰.
3. Lomakin's expulsion hampered the operations of the KGB/GRU station, and in particular its network of sources (if any existed).
4. The evidence that the UOP was capable of supplying fabricated materials containing disinformation must have led to increased uncertainty regarding the value of the documents and information provided to the Russian services by the agency (if it existed at the time).
5. The operation against Zieliński was not particularly intensive and did not require the special operational surveillance measures typically employed against large groups of people. Consequently, it did not in any way exhaust UOP's counter-intelligence resources and could not have hindered other counter-intelligence activities, including the detection of Russian agents.

If Zieliński's sacrifice was intended to prevent the 'zero option,' this would not have been in the interests of the USSR/Russia, as it is precisely this option that would have paralysed the activities of the Polish secret services for many years, weakened Poland and emboldened potential traitors to the homeland to collaborate with foreign intelligence services, including the Soviet/Russian intelligence. Nor would

¹⁰ A. Grajewski, *Tarcza i miecz...*, p. 197.

it provide any certainty that Russian agents had not infiltrated the new services, since – as Marek Świerczek also notes – the Soviet services could have recruited collaborators even within opposition circles (p. 190). After all, there were no records of these recruitments in the registers of the Polish security services, so they could not be uncovered during the vetting process.

Former Security Service officers established their credibility with the new leadership of the UOP through their actions (e.g. Operation ‘Samum/Friendly Saddam’ – the evacuation of American agents from Iraq). Their credibility was further bolstered by their day-to-day work alongside members of the so-called ‘Solidarity intake’, who were observing them closely and who, by the end of 1990, already constituted a sizeable group.

The Zieliński/Lomakin case was overseen by the Director of the Counter-Intelligence Directorate, while the trial phase was supervised by the Deputy Director of the Investigations Directorate – both were from the new intake.

In summary, Marek Świerczek’s claim that the Zieliński case was a pawn’s gambit by the Russian security services against the UOP is unfounded.

The background to the Zieliński case

What was the nature of Zieliński’s collaboration with the Soviet security services in the 1980s?

At that time, Zieliński was a prime example of a People’s Republic of Poland Security Service officer in the attempting to please the representatives of the Soviet security services, thereby seeking to win the attention and favour of his superiors. In those years, direct meetings between Security Service officers and KGB and GRU officers were not a problem. Zieliński also avoided more serious trouble when he was found to be a ‘collector’ who had been copying classified material. Before long, he was even appointed to the team of advisers to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Czesław Kiszczak, the so-called ‘Iwanciov team’.

What was the situation regarding the Soviet security services in Poland at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s? Towards the end of the 1980s, the Soviet security services did not know how the Poles would react if a turning point were to occur – not only the opposition, but also the party decision-makers. The dissolution of the Security Service and the vetting process caused enormous disruption to their intelligence networks, insofar as these still existed. Representatives of the Soviet security services began multi-track talks on the nature of future Polish-Soviet relations. One need only mention the series of meetings and discussions, lasting

nearly a year, between Jarosław Kaczyński and an alleged Soviet diplomat on the subject of the 'Finlandisation' of Poland¹¹.

The progressive collapse of the USSR meant that, within the Soviet security services, the time had come to 'save themselves', 'settle in' and 'seize opportunities'. KGB and GRU officers were not immune to fears about their own fate and their place in the new reality taking shape within the security services. Following the collapse of the USSR in December 1991, it took time for the new, now Russian, security services to find their feet and for the balance of power between them to be established, both domestically and abroad.

After 1 August 1990, the situation for the Soviet services in Warsaw became much more difficult. Russian officers lost access to government buildings, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Their direct telephone lines ceased to function (a few were left in place out of sheer curiosity), and they had to rapidly dismantle technical installations and secret bases in city-centre districts and buildings. In addition, a vetting process of former Security Service officers had begun, and no one from the new UOP and Ministry of the Interior was willing to speak to representatives of the Soviet security services. Staffing at Russian embassies across Europe was constantly changing, and this also applied to the personnel at the resident posts. Warsaw was headed by Ambassador Yuri Kashlev, a KGB colonel who also served as the resident. The staff of the GRU station were also under his command, although compared to their KGB colleagues they were probably in a less privileged position.

Amidst all this turmoil, the Zieliński affair begins: he himself will not volunteer to work for the new security services, but he knows many who are keen to join them. He can speak to them and persuade them to cooperate with the Soviet security services.

UOP's counter-intelligence operations regarding Zieliński began with his offer to Ankiewicz, who heads the Minister of Internal Affairs' analytical and support team. For the Soviet services, he is a potentially valuable source. He knows who has ended up where in the new reality, and has access to a calendar containing invaluable notes concerning, for example, meetings between the Minister, his deputies and the Head of the UOP. Ankiewicz loyally informs UOP's counter-intelligence and, with the Minister's consent, enters the first stage of the operation. From the outset, it is clear that the aim is to establish a resident network; consequently, Zieliński is urged to make direct contact with the handling officer and to seek to establish technical channels of communication. Such an outcome would be a huge success

¹¹ T. Piątek, *Kaczyński i jego pajęczyna. Tkanie sieci 1949–1995* (Eng. Kaczyński and his web. Weaving the web, 1949–1995), Warszawa 2022, p. 257.

for counter-intelligence, a rarity within the community to which the Poles were only just aspiring at that time.

Every case of this sort drags on, days and weeks go by, sometimes deliberately, sometimes by chance. The thread of dialogue that has been established must not be broken. Eventually, everything is ready. And then the Minister of the Interior, the Head of the UOP and some of its directors are replaced. In the mature security services of a well-established state, this would not matter, but in the young Third Republic of Poland...

When Ankiewicz, on the orders of Minister Antoni Macierewicz, ceases his activities on behalf of the GRU, Zieliński does not stop his recruitment and intelligence work, but directs it towards another of his former colleagues – Jan S. The latter reports Zieliński's recruitment proposal through official channels. The situation begins to develop not so much into a game¹² (given the circumstances, there is no going back) as into a scheme which nevertheless has its own important objectives. Meanwhile, the UOP begins to pursue the elimination of Lomakin more intensively. Operational officers bring investigators into the case, signalling an intention to take the matter to court. The decision to proceed is made taking into account numerous variables, including those relating to foreign policy.

Minor and major errors by the author of the book

The author's greatest mistake is his attempt to convince the reader that the Zieliński case – hitherto regarded as an unquestionable success for the UOP – was in fact a Russian ploy, which he describes as a 'pawn's gambit'. He claims that by deliberately sacrificing a relatively insignificant agent such as Zieliński, the Russian services achieved objectives that were far more important to them. He does not specify what these objectives might have been, objectives worth not only the loss of an agent sentenced to a long prison term, but also the expulsion of his handling officer, Commander Lomakin. He does not analyse how such events might have affected other agents or individuals whom the Russian services might have wished to recruit. He also ignores the fact that the handling of the Zieliński/Lomakin case shortly after the withdrawal of the Russian Northern Military Group sent a clear signal to Moscow: we do not accept your espionage and we will combat it. It is worth recalling that we are talking about 1993.

¹² A. Taracha, *Czynności operacyjno-rozpoznawcze. Aspekty kryminalistyczne i prawno dowodowe* (Eng. Operational and investigative activities. Forensic and evidential aspects), Lublin 2006, p. 21.

On analysing the text of *Sleeping Dogs...*, I realise that the author of the book has also made many other serious errors.

The first flaw is a lack of historical context and a failure to assess the impact of the collapse of the USSR on the events described in the book, as well as the organisational changes within the intelligence services, and a failure to analyse external factors.

The second flaw is the lack of references to counter-intelligence methodology, both at the level of the individual officer and within broader structures, particularly with regard to establishing areas of interest, constructing risk maps, reconnaissance and countermeasure vectors, prevention and pre-emptive actions.

The third flaw is a lack of understanding of the element of legal liability in the operational work carried out by officers with sources.

The fourth error is the false assumption that the facts contained in the court and prosecution case files provide a complete picture of the case. The court, in accordance with its role, assessed whether the individuals not charged had fulfilled the elements of the offence. The court therefore did not examine what operational benefits the UOP had gained in connection with this case.

The fifth error is a lack of objectivity. One cannot claim to be objective while including strictly ideological arguments in an analysis.

Another problem with the book under review is that it contains a large number of erroneous judgements, misrepresentations and instances of ignorance. Below, I set out the most glaring examples of the errors I have identified. Quotations from the book are set out in italics.

P. 60, footnote 7: *This means that Ankiewicz was fully aware that entering into cooperation with a foreign intelligence service meant there would be no easy way out of it. This makes the conversation he had to end his contact with the GRU all the more surprising.*

It is difficult to say what Marek Świerczek's doubts concern. What Ankiewicz says is the result of his collaboration with UOP's counter-intelligence, regardless of whether he is beginning or ending his feigned collaboration with Lomakin. Lomakin, while saying goodbye to Ankiewicz, may believe that he will be able to resume their relationship at a convenient time. The author of the book demonstrates that his knowledge of both the recruitment phase and the collaboration is limited.

P. 62, footnote 15: *Although this runs counter to the most basic principles of cooperation with a secret service, Lomakin did in fact give Zieliński not only his own business card, but also that of his deputy (...).*

The handing out of business cards by diplomats, including staff at military attaché offices, is common practice and has no connection with their espionage activities.

P. 75: (...) *the result of recruiting Jan S. (who, as head of the UOP unit dealing with the economy, was of no significant importance to the GRU) (...).*

By virtue of his position, Jan S. had access to information about the UOP and its officers. During peacetime, the GRU was interested in the economic situation in the Republic of Poland. Jan S. worked in a newly established unit about which the Russian intelligence services may not have had any information.

P. 75, footnote 75: (...) *in accordance with the UOP's working procedures at the time, surveillance operations ended at 22:00.*

The author of the book does not cite a source for this information. It is untrue. Neither such procedures nor such practices ever took place.

P. 78, footnote 95: *It is not difficult to see that the idea of Lomakin's visit was an operational absurdity. Firstly, why commission Zieliński to carry out the recruitment when the GRU was ready to take part in it? Secondly, if the operation were to be exposed, Lomakin would be arrested red-handed with agents and secret UOP documents, which would render any diplomatic denials completely impossible.*

Firstly, Lomakin did not know Jan S., so he had no way of recruiting him without Zieliński's involvement. One might assume that Lomakin would have joined Jan S. and Zieliński only if Jan S. had agreed to be recruited. Lomakin's presence would have fulfilled the requirement for the authenticity of the recruitment. The condition of a face-to-face meeting with the handler had previously been put forward by Ankiewicz. It was therefore not an absurd idea.

Secondly, should the UOP have intervened, Lomakin could easily have denied having breached his diplomatic status, claiming that he had fallen victim to a provocation. He would have said that his friend Zieliński had invited him to a social gathering, which turned out to be a trap set by the UOP. He had not intended to recruit anyone. It was Jan S. who had brought the materials and wanted money for them. Once again, the author of the book demonstrates that he does not understand the nature of operational work.

P. 80: *It was not until 28 September 1993 that Zieliński began writing a profile of Jan S. for Lomakin (...).* **Footnote 109:** *In other words, the profile of the candidate (...) began to be written by Zieliński only after (the alleged) recruitment of Jan S.*

Previously, Zieliński had provided a verbal character assessment of Jan S. Lomakin knew that the candidate, as a head unit at the UOP, was a valuable source of information. See the note on the author above.

P. 81: *When Zieliński got into his car, he was detained by the UOP, which, for unknown reasons, had decided not to detain Lomakin during the espionage rendezvous at the restaurant (...).*

Lomakin was arrested a few minutes later. The meeting was under the full control of the UOP. The decision to arrest the two suspects separately was based on operational considerations.

P. 94, footnote 17: *Nowhere in Zieliński's explanations did he reflect on why exactly the GRU needed him [in the 1980s – reviewer's note] when it had official access to all the information held by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Polish People's Republic.*

The Soviet services received only written information from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Polish People's Republic in response to requests submitted to it. Zieliński passed on other documents that might be of interest to these services and clarified them during meetings.

P. 96, footnote 27: *(...) KGB officers were in constant, daily contact with the Ministry of the Interior, both with the top-level management and with rank-and-file staff.*

The procedure involved Soviet intelligence officers submitting a request and then returning to collect the information. The head of unit decided whether to fulfil the request, except in matters reserved for a director. Enquiries were recorded in the unit's register. The official method of contact involved specifying the location and the person within the relevant unit who could provide the information. Of course, this was the theory – in practice, the whole process was considerably simplified. Another method of contact was official correspondence (complete with instructions and decisions). Thus, KGB officers had contact only with departmental management and designated staff members. These were often teams of two. Other officers were prohibited from having any contact with the KGB.

P. 114: *(...) Zieliński was apparently not formally recruited and did not sign a commitment.*

Very often, individuals collaborating with foreign intelligence services did not sign commitments. It cannot be ruled out that the agreement was verbal and documented by a recording.

P. 154: *The 'Wisła' Operational Group in Moscow.*

The author of the book does not state that his knowledge is based on the publication *Cooperation between the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the People's Republic of Poland and the KGB of the USSR in the years 1970–1990. An attempt at a review*¹³. On the instructions of the Head of the Internal Security Agency General Krzysztof Bondaryk, it was compiled by a team of Internal Security Agency officers following extensive research in the restricted collection

¹³ *Współpraca SB MSW PRL z KGB ZSRR w latach 1970–1990. Próba bilansu* (Eng. Cooperation between the Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior of the Polish People's Republic and the KGB of the USSR between 1970 and 1990. An attempt at an review), Z. Nawrocki (ed.), series: Biblioteka Przeglądu Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, Emów 2013.

of the Institute of National Remembrance and the gathering of over 30 accounts from former Security Service officers. The team was led by Lieutenant Colonel Zbigniew Nawrocki, PhD¹⁴.

P. 154: [The 'Wisła' operational group – reviewer's note] *was authorised to carry out operational work targeting Poles (including the recruitment of secret collaborators), but only in close cooperation with the KGB.*

P. 155: *The Russians (...) must have been aware of a sizeable group of citizens of the People's Republic of Poland who had been recruited as collaborators and who returned to the country after working in the USSR.*

This assertion is unfounded. Candidates for recruitment were referred to Department II of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which made the decision on whether to recruit them. The KGB was not informed of the results.

P. 172, footnote 135: *Access to information regarding the links between former opposition activists and the Security Service was virtually unlimited within the UOP, as the vetting lists for candidates for the Sejm and Senate in the 1991 elections were stored on publicly accessible unit and secretarial computers at the UOP.*

The author of *Sleeping Dogs...* cites this information from Michał Grocki¹⁵. In reality, the data on parliamentary candidates was a carefully secured collection held in the UOP's Records and Archives Office, with strictly regulated access, where there were no computers at the time. Nor were there any in the unit secretariats.

PP. 195–196: *The Reagan administration continued work on the deployment of MX, Pershing II and Cruise ballistic missiles, as well as B-1 bombers, thereby gaining, for the first time in the history of the Cold War, the capability to launch a pre-emptive strike against the USSR (...).*

The author of the book confuses the capabilities for a strategic nuclear strike (from the US against the USSR and vice versa) with medium-range capabilities (from Western Europe to Eastern Europe and vice versa). In the 1970s, the USSR held an advantage in medium-range nuclear missiles deployed in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. It could have planned a nuclear attack on Western Europe, counting on the US not to retaliate with its intercontinental ballistic missile system, as the USSR could then have responded with its strategic missiles deployed in Siberia. The deployment of American Pershing and Tomahawk missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads led to a balance of nuclear forces in Europe.

¹⁴ Zbigniew Nawrocki (1959–2017) – a former UOP officer. From 2006 to 2010, he was director of the archives division at the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), and from 2010 to 2015, he was director of the ABW's Central Training Facility in Emów and editor-in-chief of the Internal Security Review.

¹⁵ M. Grocki, *Konfidenci są wśród nas* (Eng. There are informers among us), Warszawa [n.d.].

The USSR could no longer count on the 'unpunished' use of its nuclear missiles in Europe, which rendered its plans for an attack on Western Europe null and void. The medium-range missiles deployed in Europe could not reach the intercontinental ballistic missile launch sites in Siberia, so the USSR retained the capability to destroy the US¹⁶. What might (in the distant future) have undermined this capability was the SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) announced by President Ronald Reagan in March 1983.

The Soviet security services once again demonstrated their characteristic weakness of presenting the state leadership with a picture of the situation that reflected the authorities' expectations rather than reality. They were unable to provide convincing arguments to support the claim that SDI was primarily a psychological operation. Any actual development of the system would have taken many years, and the outcome was highly uncertain. Instead of allaying their authorities' fears, the Soviet intelligence services launched the absurd 'Rajan' operation, designed to monitor NATO's preparations for a nuclear attack on the USSR. No such preparations existed, but many Soviet intelligence officers were enjoying themselves in Western Europe.

P. 209: (...) *the Soviet intelligence services (with a probability bordering on absolute certainty) had been building networks of agents in the People's Republic of Poland from 1976 at the latest.*

The author of the book states that they had no fewer than 15 years to build these networks. However, he fails to note that the situation changed fundamentally over the course of those 15 years. Until 1980, the main effort was directed towards controlling the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland, particularly the security services and the 'ideological front institutions'. It was only from 1980 onwards that one might expect some attention to have been devoted to infiltrating Solidarity and the opposition, with a view to potentially playing games with the authorities of the People's Republic of Poland, and in particular to forcing them to adopt a tougher line. It can be assumed that, even after 1980, the main focus of the Soviet services remained on circles associated with the authorities or opposed to them, but from the standpoint of orthodox communism and ties with the USSR.

P. 210: *Let us recall that in 1991, Lomakin was prepared to pay a one-off sum of \$1500 for UOP documents obtained by Anklewicz. In the waning days of the Polish People's Republic, where the average salary, converted into dollars, stood at \$15–20,*

¹⁶ *Koniec traktatu INF o zakazie posiadania rakiet średniego zasięgu?* (Eng. Is this the end of the INF Treaty banning medium-range missiles?), Stowarzyszenie Euro-Atlantyckie, <https://sea.org.pl/koniec-traktatu-inf-o-zakazie-posiadania-rakiet-sredniego-zasiegu-.html> [accessed: 26 VIII 2026].

this meant that in exchange for cooperating with the Russians, one could receive the equivalent of 75 to 100 average salaries in a single payment.

The offer to Ankiewicz was made in 1991, when the average salary was around \$190. Lomakin's offer therefore corresponded to around 8 average salaries. Senior officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with access to top-secret documents did not earn average salaries, but considerably more. These sums were therefore not all that staggering for them.

P. 224: (...) *it is impossible to find any rational reason why the GRU would have pressured Zieliński to recruit as quickly as possible, while disregarding the basic rules of secrecy.*

Firstly, Zieliński did not recruit very quickly. There were only four attempts, including two serious ones, over a period of more than two years. Secondly, any agents who had already been recruited (if there were any) were not recruited by Lomakin.

P. 229: *Why, then, did Lomakin instruct Zieliński to write a profile of Ankiewicz as if he were a figure completely unknown to the Russians?*

The author of the book seems to overlook just how much has changed since Ankiewicz's stay in the USSR in the 1980s, and how Ankiewicz's standing has changed. This is also a formal element of the recruitment procedure.

P. 229, footnote 8: *Who in their right mind would attempt to recruit someone, knowing that they clearly had a very strong incentive to keep their job at the UOP?*

It would make no sense to recruit someone who intended to leave the UOP in the near future.

P. 230: (...) *why did the GRU push Zieliński to recruit Ankiewicz, who was head of the Minister of Internal Affairs' Office, while abandoning attempts to recruit the unit head of the UOP's Technical Bureau and an officer from the UOP's Counter-Intelligence Directorate, as reported by Zieliński?*

The author of the book states that, unlike those officers, Ankiewicz could only have had very limited access to UOP's operational materials. He fails to note that not only did documents of a strategic nature pass through the Minister's office, but information regarding the Minister's contacts with specific members of the leadership could also have been significant. Ankiewicz also had direct contact with these individuals. It is reasonable to assume that Ankiewicz would have been a far more valuable source for the GRU than most UOP officers.

P. 231: *On 17 December 1991, during another meeting, Lomakin told Ankiewicz that he no longer wanted any documents from the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as – he said – they had extensive contacts there, knew people and had no problem obtaining documents (thus once again revealing the GRU's network of agents). The only information he considered valuable were the coded reports from*

Moscow containing the Polish Embassy's assessments of the situation in the Russian Federation, anti-Russian agreements between the Republic of Poland and the USA, and, above all, the active interests of UOP's counter-intelligence.

Marek Świerczek mistakenly believes that the tasks set for Ankiewicz by Lomakin were pointless, as he could not have had access to those materials. In fact, Ankiewicz did not have access to information regarding the active interests of UOP's counter-intelligence, but he did have access to the rest. At a time when the USSR was disintegrating and the Republic of Poland was experiencing a serious economic crisis, information on defence matters was of lesser importance. This was particularly so as the USSR possessed very detailed data on the state of the People's Republic of Poland's defences. On the other hand, information regarding the plans of the Western powers towards the emerging Russian Federation was of great importance to the authorities in Moscow. It is also entirely understandable that Lomakin was particularly interested in dispatches from the Polish Embassy in Moscow. Firstly, he personally needed information on the turmoil in Russia's domestic politics in order to steer his future career appropriately. Secondly, such dispatches, if intercepted by the Russians, as Marek Świerczek suggests, could have served as an excellent test of the reliability of the material supplied by Ankiewicz. This would have confirmed the value of the recruited agent and enhanced Lomakin's standing in Moscow.

P. 236: (...) *even a rank-and-file counter-intelligence officer of the UOP could obtain information on operational matters being handled by his colleagues, due to the practice at the time of leaving documents for department staff in open plastic trays in the secretariats.*

Furthermore, at that time, the Eastern Unit of UOP's Counter-Intelligence Directorate had only one telephone with an external line, located in the secretariat (...).

The situation described is not true. Documents in the trays, following approval by superiors, were kept in sealed envelopes. Upon receiving and opening an envelope, a staff member would inform the secretary of the reference number and the subject matter (only the codename or the person's initials) of the correspondence. The secretary did not have access to the documentation.

During its initial period of operation (for several weeks), the Eastern Unit had a single telephone line with a local number. Additional local numbers were allocated later that same year. It should be noted that, from the very beginning of the unit's existence, all internal numbers had the authorisation to make external calls.

Even if – which is highly doubtful – the rules on the confidentiality of operational work had not been observed in that department, Lomakin could not have known about it. However, in the eyes of Lomakin's superiors, his recruitment of

a rank-and-file officer would have been a far lesser achievement than that of the director of the Minister of the Interior's private office.

P. 236: (...) *he was giving the newly recruited spy [i.e. Anklewicz – reviewer's note] instructions regarding his (?) network of agents within the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

Does the author of the book not entertain the possibility that Lomakin was merely boasting and not telling the truth? After all, he obviously provided no evidence of access to these resources. Perhaps he was testing the agent? If measures to detect leaks were to be launched shortly afterwards in those ministries, that would be proof that Anklewicz was a plant by the UOP.

P. 237: (...) *strategic economic decisions in the Third Republic of Poland were taken on the basis of the opinions of a school-leaver and a forester who – for unknown reasons – ended up in the special services.*

The opinions in question were never the work of individuals alone. The author of the book also overlooks the fact that Bill Gates and Steve Jobs, and in Poland Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Lech Wałęsa and many other activists and politicians, also did not complete higher education.

P. 238: *UOP's economic division, which was still in its infancy, was unable to produce even quasi-professional reports on the economic processes of the time (...). Consequently, the value to the GRU of a source based in that division was very low (or perhaps even zero, given the specific nature of military intelligence's interests).*

Firstly, the department was functioning (for better or worse), but without a source there, Lomakin did not know the value of the reports produced by that department. Secondly, it is not only during periods of upheaval such as those in the early 1990s that the state's economic situation is crucial to its defence capabilities. Structurally, three departments within the UOP dealt with the economic situation.

P. 240: *Nevertheless, from the perspective of the GRU officer in charge of Zieliński, the approval of both the recruitment attempts described above [those of Feliks B. and Dariusz C. – reviewer's note] constituted operational nonsense, and was, moreover, associated with a monstrous risk of the recruiter's cover being blown (...).*

However, they did not report these attempts to the UOP's counter-intelligence unit, meaning the risk was no greater than in other cases. Generally speaking, the recruitment of spies is almost always associated with risk.

P. 248: *In short, with the onset of the 1990s, the anomie that had arisen within the special services during the 1980s deepened. (...) If we were to plot the counter-intelligence situation during the final decade of the Security Service and the early years of the UOP, (...) it would show a steadily declining curve, reaching its lowest point between 1987 and 1997. By contrast, a graph illustrating the level of involvement of the Soviet (Russian) services in Poland would show a steadily rising curve.*

The author of *Sleeping Dogs...* fails to recognise the influence of the political environment and organisational changes within the services themselves, both Soviet/Russian and Polish.

The Polish services, particularly the civilian ones, underwent a period of upheaval following the collapse of the People's Republic of Poland, the dissolution of the Security Service, the vetting of its officers and the establishment of the UOP. It can be assumed that the officers recruited into the UOP felt a sense of satisfaction and, for the most part, identified with the new service and the new state. From the very outset, the UOP was also bolstered by a small but energetic group of staff drawn from the democratic opposition, who were committed to fostering patriotic and pro-state attitudes among officers with a background in the Security Service. It is reasonable to assume that morale within the Polish civil services reached its lowest point in the first half of 1990, when the Security Service was dissolved and the Sejm's Extraordinary Commission for the Investigation of the Activities of the Ministry of Interior (the so-called Rokita Commission) was in operation. Morale subsequently improved, although this was not without its crises.

In the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet security services entered a crisis resulting from the Soviet state's abandonment of mass terror and total control over society. This led to the emergence of nationalist movements in the Soviet republics, the massive growth of criminal organisations, and the rise of a democratic movement in Russia itself. By mid-1991, when the Zieliński case began, the USSR was clearly heading towards collapse, which must have severely undermined the morale of the security services. In August 1991, Yanayev's coup drastically accelerated this process. The focus of secret service officers was, by necessity, on preserving their personal positions or leaving the services to pursue careers elsewhere (such as Putin). Morale within the Soviet/Russian security services thus reached its lowest ebb in the second half of 1991 and early 1992. The focus of the Russian security services shifted to the former Soviet republics (the near abroad) and the key Western nations, particularly the USA. The countries of the former socialist bloc were of secondary importance. Russian army units were withdrawn from these areas without significant resistance. The severe economic and structural crisis in the Russian Federation prevented the security services from committing significant resources to secondary fronts. They were unable to counter NATO's enlargement. It was not until 2000 that consolidation took place and aggressive actions were undertaken. It can therefore be concluded that the author of the book has misrepresented the evolution over time of the UOP's counter-intelligence situation and the intelligence activities of the Soviet/Russian services in Poland.

P. 281: *When filling management posts [at the UOP – reviewer's note] (...) no competitions were organised to select the best candidates (...).*

The author's assertion is untrue. Such practices were not used and are not used in any of the secret services.

P. 282, footnote 27: *At the UOP, and later at the ABW, the so-called language bonuses were probably the only avenue for lateral promotion (...). This possibility was blocked within the ABW by K. Bondaryk, who – in contravention of the constitutional principle of acquired rights – ‘terminated’ the language bonuses granted for an indefinite period, while at the same time doing a great deal to closely link ranks and the so-called pay grades to specific posts. As a result, the Polish special service (...) was to become a body modelled on tsarist offices, where senior officials earned a fortune, while the rank-and-file lived ‘from payday to payday’, repaying loans taken out at a time when – thanks to the bonuses – they received higher salaries. This dealt a severe blow to the morale of the ABW staff (...).*

This passage appears to explain why the author expressed precisely these views, and not others, in this book.

During this period, the ABW introduced an incentive scheme to reward officers with a variable service allowance, granted for a fixed period (usually a quarter, and renewable or not) at the request of a superior, based on performance in the line of duty. An officer's remuneration consisted of a basic salary together with a fixed allowance (usually low) and a substantial incentive allowance. The language allowance remained in the Cabinet of the Head (foreign affairs, interpreters, liaison officers) and in the Counter-Terrorism Centre.

Notwithstanding the above, great importance was attached to proficiency in foreign languages. For example, in 2011, funding was provided for 1244 ABW officers to attend a specialist course lasting several months to improve their English language skills¹⁷.

P. 283: *(...) the Zieliński case served as the perfect means of establishing credibility for all former Security Service officers joining the UOP.*

The two cases (Zieliński and Lomakin) were carried out not for the sake of establishing credibility, but for the sake of the security of the Republic of Poland. They did establish the credibility of the officers involved in them, but that does not mean all of them. Others had to establish their credibility through the results of their own work.

¹⁷ *Raport z działalności Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego w 2011 r.* (Eng. Report on the activities of the Internal Security Agency in 2011),

In conclusion

In my view, the author's intention, as I have already mentioned, is clear – to undermine the reputation of Polish counter-intelligence and to justify, from a 'professional' standpoint, Minister Antoni Macierewicz's decision ordering a halt to the investigation of Russian agents in Poland.

I also find it hard to shake the impression that, in conducting his historical research, Marek Świerczek limited himself to examining the Russian – or, in fact, Soviet – special services and their activities in the first half of the 20th century. He knows little about the current Russian special services.

While promoting the book on social media, the author also finds, in current affairs – such as the arrest for espionage of a civilian employee of the Ministry of National Defence – further examples of the 'pawn gambit', that is, a method of misleading the special services in order to protect higher-ranking agents. I am deeply puzzled as to what purpose such manoeuvres on the part of the book's author might serve. They are disturbingly reminiscent of Soviet and Russian disinformation aimed at breaking the opponent's will to resist and rendering them passive¹⁸.

Reading the book *Sleeping Dogs...* has once again led me to reflect that it is appropriate to undertake comprehensive, interdisciplinary research into the counter-intelligence situation in Poland in the early 1990s and the history of the UOP. The aim should be to create a source-based, as objective and reliable a picture as possible of how the services operated at that time, taking into account the circumstances of their activities during the period of political transition and making a clear distinction between findings derived from the sources and subsequent interpretations and assessments.

The review expresses its author's personal views and does not represent the position of the Internal Security Agency.

¹⁸ *Komisja do spraw badania wpływów rosyjskich i białoruskich na bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne i interesy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w latach 2004–2024. Raport Zespołu ds. Dezinformacji* (Eng. The Commission for the Investigation of Russian and Belarusian Influence on the Internal Security and Interests of the Republic of Poland in 2004–2024. Report by the Disinformation Task Force), Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, <https://www.gov.pl/web/sprawiedliwosc/raport-zespołu-ds-dezinformacji-komisji-ds-badania-wplywow-rosyjskich-i-bialoruskich>, p. 19 [accessed: 17 X 2026].

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