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**Paradigm of war and peace.
The role and significance of dialectical materialism
in the Russian military science of the 21st century**

Introduction

Paradigm (from Latin *paradigma* – pattern, example) is a set of fundamental postulates, concepts and theories constituting the basis of a given branch of science. It is a system of views, frames and laws shared by scientists and constituting principles helping to do research on a given object, phenomenon or issue¹. The attempts to formulate paradigm or paradigms are also made in the course of research on methods of waging contemporary wars. In the opinion of analysts from the West such a paradigm is for example the concept of hybrid war and hybrid warfare formulated in the USA in the beginning of the 21st century². However, it is important to underline that the definition of the mentioned terms is still unclear and disputable among the western experts. Their studies show that the range of attributes of a hybrid war is not constant in its nature and is subject to permanent changes. In general, the concept of hybrid war or hybrid warfare refers to activities based on using both military and non-military means, integrated in an operation aiming at taking an advantage over the enemy, seizing the initiative and achieving benefits through psychological impact. For this purpose diplomatic, informative and radioelectronic means are used on a large scale. Operations in the cyberspace are also carried out in order to keep both military and intelligence activities secret for as long as possible. It is often done simultaneously with exerting strong economic and political pressure³. The element of “hybrid” paradigm in the research on

¹ T.S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition*, Chicago 2012, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 43–52; idem, *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change*, Chicago 1970, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 293–320; I. Hacking, *Paradigms*, in: *Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' at Fifty: Reflections on Science Classic*, (ed.) R.J. Richards, L. Daston, Chicago 2016, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 96–115.

² P.R. Mansoor, *Introduction: Hybrid Warfare in History*, in: *Hybrid Warfare. Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Presents*, W. Murray, P.R. Mansoor (ed.), Cambridge 2012, The Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–18; M.A. Piotrowski, *Conflict is never simple: American war and hybrid opponents theory and doctrine*, „International Affairs” 2015, issue 2, pp. 7–39; O. Wasiuta, *genesis of hybrid war notion and changes in the approach to it in the Western political and military discourse*, „Geopolitical Review” 2016, issue 17, pp. 26–40.

³ *Hybrid Warfare. Challenge and Response*, „The Military Balances” 2015, issue 115, pp. 18–19. Compare: F.G. Hoffman, *Conflicts in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Virginia 2007, pp. 17–35. Literature on hybrid war/ hybrid warfare is immense. Therefore only most significant studies have been mentioned here. For more information and bibliography see: *Terrorism. Commentary on Security Documents: Volume 141. Hybrid Warfare and Gray Zone Threat*, (ed.) D.C. Lovelace, Oxford 2016, The Oxford University Press.

war and conflicts is the response to restrictions and weaknesses of previous analytical attitudes, prevailing among the NATO Member States from the beginning of the 70s of the 20th century. It includes, among others, the theory of asymmetrical warfare, the concept of fourth generation warfare, the non-trinitian war and the concept of so-called new wars⁴. At present the “hybrid” element is attached to nearly every war or conflict, which has been confirmed in *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America* published on 1 July 2015. In this document it has been stated that there exists a conflict zone where state and non-state kinds of violence overlap and the parties use mixed techniques, capabilities and means to achieve their goals:

Such “hybrid” conflicts may consist of military forces assuming a non-state identity, as Russia did in the Crimea, or involve a VEO fielding rudimentary combined arms capabilities, as ISIL has demonstrated in Iraq and Syria. Hybrid conflicts also may be comprised of state and non-state actors working together toward shared objectives, employing a wide range of weapons such as we have witnessed in eastern Ukraine. Hybrid conflicts serve to increase ambiguity, complicate decision-making, and slow the coordination of effective responses. Due to these advantages to the aggressor, it is likely that this form of conflict will persist well into the future.⁵

The concept of hybrid war functions as a universal paradigm helping to describe the ways of waging wars also by those states and non-state entities whose art of warfare is far from the western military traditions⁶. This opinion is confirmed by the paradigm of a hybrid war finding its application in analyses concerning the Russian activities in the south-eastern part of Ukraine. Among the NATO and the European Union Member States it is believed that the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as RF) has applied a new model of modern war referred to as “a new generation war” or “a hybrid war”. Western analysts use the “hybrid” paradigm to create the alleged innovative, universal model of the Russian activities, restricted to a few base operations⁷. Analysis

⁴ A. Gruszczak, *Hybrid type of current wars – critical analysis*, in: *Asymmetry and hybrid nature – old armies against new conflicts*, W. Sokała, B. Zapala (ed.), Warsaw 2011, National Security Bureau, p. 10; A. Kober, *Practical Soldiers: Israel's Military Thought and Its Formative Factors*, Leiden 2016, Koninklijke Brill, p. 25.

⁵ *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., June 2015, in: *Terrorism. Commentary on Security Documents: Volume 142. Security Strategies of the Second Obama Administration: 2015 Developments*, (ed.) D.C. Lovelace, Oxford 2016, The Oxford University Press, pp. 69–70.

⁶ In the American source literature the term “hybrid war” has been attached to the First Chechen War (11 XII 1994–31 VIII 1996), the Second Chechen War (11 X 1999–31 VIII 2009) and the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War (the conflict between the Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah paramilitary forces, 12.07–14.08.2006). See: W.J. Nemeth, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*, Monterey 2002, Naval Postgraduate School; D. Dilegge, R.J. Bunker, A. Keshavarz, *Iranian and Hezbollah Hybrid Warfare Activities: A Small Wars Journal Anthology*, Bloomington 2016, Universe.

⁷ This tendency is reflected, for example, in the following opinion: *The neo-imperial direction*

of the Russian activities in Ukraine and their nature is carried out without due consideration to the rich heritage of the Russian military science, which goes along with disregard for the strategic culture of that country⁸ and this is because the contemporary American strategic studies, whose cognitive approach has been based on the empirical methodology, do not pay due attention to the systematic and critical analysis of the art of warfare history. That tendency, clearly disadvantageous to the reliability of the American analyses, was pointed out in 1991 by Col. David M. Glantz – the Director of the Soviet Army Studies Office in Fort Leavenworth in Kansas. He described that tendency in the following way:

By its very nature Soviet military science differs significantly from what the U.S. construes as military science. The U.S. has neither a well developed and focused body of military knowledge nor an analytical process that compares with Soviet military science. The U.S. does not systematically study and critique its past military experiences and the past military experiences of other nations. U.S. military theorists and doctrine developers tend to consider war outside the context of all other human activities.⁹

Keeping in mind the negligence of the Soviet studies after the Cold War and the creation of the concept of a hybrid war, referring mainly to the contemporary security environment, it is to be pointed out that D. M. Glantz's opinion is, unfortunately, still valid¹⁰. In the opinion of the author of this work, using only the western analytical

*of Moscow was launched by Vladimir Putin's accession to power. In Putin's opinion the collapse of the Soviet Union is the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century. Hence all his activities are focused on regaining hegemony in the region and subjugating the countries that used to be part of the USSR or at least having significant influences in those countries. For this purpose the project of a new generation war was created combining low-intensity engagement (often from the cover) with high-intensity engagement as a superpower. The strategy was verified in Chechnya and Georgia, then refined and used again in Ukraine, also for the purpose of further refining. The Russian idea of "a new generation war" is based on five main elements: political subversion, creating backgrounds, intervention, deterrence and manipulation of negotiations. After: A. Antczak-Barzan, *Dynamics of hybrid war in Ukraine*, „Bellona Quarterly” 2016, issue 1, p. 46. Compare: K. Wařowski, *The essence and universality of the Russian model of hybrid war used in Ukraine*, „International Affairs” 2015, issue 2, pp. 39–57; J. Eichler, *War, Peace and International Security: From Sarajevo to Crimea*, London 2017, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 174–176.*

⁸ This is reflected in the scientific attitude presented by Anna Antczak-Barzan: *Some scientists say that it is inappropriate to refer to the Russian new generation war as a hybrid one, since it is unsuitable to define and explain the Russian way of waging wars with the use of western concepts. However, the fact that the concept itself is of western origin, as most of the theories applied in the science of security or international relations, does not necessarily mean that it is conceptually and methodologically wrong for it to be applied in describing non-western phenomena. It is true that Russia uses different tools and applies a different kind of logic, but this does not exclude it from waging hybrid wars.* Quoted after: A. Antczak-Barzan, *Dynamics ...*, p. 46.

⁹ Quoted after: D.M. Glantz, *Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle*, New York 1991, Frank Cass, p. 2.

¹⁰ For more about the negligence of the Soviet studies after the Cold War see: D. Lieven,

approach, focused on the “hybrid” aspect, results in a deficient picture of the activities carried out by those who have a different strategic culture from the western one¹¹. It is however worth remembering that the way of waging wars is an integral aspect of every society’s development and it is attributed to that society as every other characteristic. The culture of a given society is reflected in wars. Wars may also be a determinant of a given society or nation’s culture¹².

Hence the goal of the author of this article is to present basic scientific paradigms used by the Russian military analysts. Their works show that the character of contemporary wars and conflicts is viewed in Russia through the prism of at least three paradigms: dialectical materialism, theory of the systems, cybernetics and geopolitical paradigm. In the author’s opinion, presenting the three paradigms is crucial to understanding the fundamental differences between the Russian and the western analytical approach, which may help in determining the way of viewing wars, conflicts and security environment by the Russian military and decision making elites. The existence of those differences was revealed as early as in 1960 by Oleg Penkovsky, colonel of the Russian military intelligence GRU, who claimed that the interpretation of the same data by the American or British military staff and their Soviet counterparts was diametrically different and that was the result of the Russian officers basing their deduction on the Marxist-Leninist dialectics, logic and epistemology as opposed to deductive reasoning¹³.

The character and complexity of the phenomenon under discussion herein makes it impossible to present all paradigms used in the Russian military science in just one article¹⁴. Hence, the present work is focused only on dialectical materialism. Anticipating the results of further considerations, it is to be underlined that dialectical materialism is still a philosophical, cognitive and methodological basis for analysis of wars and conflicts, although after the fall of the USSR its function as the official ideological superstructure of the military science has been given up.

Western Scholarship on the Rise and Fall of the Soviet Regime: The View from 1993, „Journal of Contemporary History” 1994, issue 29, pp. 195–227; P. Rutland, *Sovietology: Notes for a Post-Mortem*, „The National Interests” 1999, issue 31, pp. 109–122; R. Sakwa, *Postcommunist Studies: Once Again through the Looking Glass (Darkly)?*, „Review of International Studies” 1999, issue 25, pp. 709–719. The research aiming at defining the “hybrid” attribute in wars and conflicts from the past centuries has been launched only recently. See: *Hybrid Warfare. Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Presents*, W. Murray, P.R. Mansoor (ed.), Cambridge 2012, The Cambridge University Press. The authors try to determine whether the term “hybrid war” is a new, previously unknown phenomenon or just opposite – a well-known, but differently described one. They assume that the military history, focused on spectacular and regular warfare, has been so far missing the aspect of hybrid wars and hybrid warfare, which have been known since the beginnings of the mankind, but became popular only in the 21st century.

¹¹ S.T. Lawson, *Nonlinear Science and Warfare: Chaos, Complexity and the U.S. Military in the Information Age*, London–New York 2014, Routledge.

¹² M. Wojnowski, *Hybrid war legend. Conflict in Ukraine in view of the Russian military thought of the 19th and 20th centuries*, „Internal Security Review. Special edition” 2015, pp. 20–23.

¹³ J.D. Douglas, *Soviet Military Strategy in Europe*, New York 1980, Pergamon Press, pp. 1–2.

¹⁴ The issues of the theory of the systems, cybernetics and geopolitical paradigm will be discussed in further works.

The article has been mainly based on the works of representatives of the Russian state power ministries, in the first place taking into account the works of the authors deriving from the scientific–didactical background of the Russian Army. For the problems dealt with in the present article their works are pivotally important, since they reflect the Russian military thought. The term “military thought” (Russian: военная мысль) in the Russian Federation means the system of ideas relating to the most important areas of military science, which are predominant among state officials, military personnel (military scientists, specialists on the military–industrial complex etc.) as well as philosophers and political scientists. The heritage of military thought is actively used in the works aiming at formulating war doctrines, training programmes, acts of law and recommendations, creating new means of fighting measures, as well as preparing the so–called protection of warfare¹⁵.

The structure and tasks of the Russian military science

Both in the times of the USSR and in the present Russia the phenomenon of “military science” (Russian: военная наука) is defined as a system of knowledge concerning character, laws of war, preparing the armed forces and the society for war and also about ways of waging wars. Military science means analysing laws of war and military actions. The laws reflect dependency of the course and the outcome of war and military actions on economic, moral–political, scientific–technical and military potentials of the fighting parties¹⁶. The Russian military science is a systematised compilation of different areas of knowledge consisting of:

1. General theory (Russian: общая теория) concerning logical and methodological basis of military science, its subject matter, structure and tasks, as well as the internal and external dependencies between areas which together form the theory. The general theory also deals with defining paradigms of doing research on laws of war and military actions, organising the armed forces, as well as other phenomena and processes. The most important tasks falling within that area include working out new concepts of unconventional conflicts and wars, forms and ways of information warfare, creating theoretical basis for tactical and technical use of weapon on the new physical principles (so–called weapon of perspective generation), designing and creating automated systems of leading armed forces. An important scientific issue also includes the following: increasing the effectiveness of military personnel education and training

¹⁵ С.Г. Бандурин, Е.К. Лукашев, Р.М. Португальский, *История военной мысли Отечества*, Москва 2005, Пограничная академия ФСБ России, р. 4. Compare: R.D. Crane, *The Structure of Soviet Military Thought*, „Studies in Soviet Thought” 1967, issue 7, pp. 28–34.

¹⁶ Compare: С.Ф. Ахромеев, *Военный энциклопедический словарь*, Москва 1986, Воениздат, pp. 135–136; А.М. Плехов, *Словарь военных терминов*, Москва 1988, Воениздат, р. 50; В.Н. Чернавин, *Военно-морской словарь*, Москва 1990, Воениздат, р. 81; А.П. Горкин, *Военный энциклопедический словарь*, vol. 1, Москва 2001, Институт военной истории МО РФ, pp. 296–300; А.Э. Сердюков, *Военный энциклопедический словарь*, Москва 2007, Воениздат, р. 135.

basing on a complex computerisation of didactical background, as well as developing new branches of military science, e.g. military systemology and futurology.

2. Military science theory (Russian: теория военного искусства) is a branch of military science combining the theory of strategy, operational art and tactics. What is done within the frames of the military science theory is the research on military–technical and social–political character of war, which basically means the basis of planning, preparations for and waging wars on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. One of the most important tasks of the theory of the contemporary Russian art of warfare is working out the laws of interactions between different kinds of armed forces operating within all theatres of warfare, including space, airspace and information.

3. Organisation of armed forces theory (Russian: теория строительства ВС) deals with the problem of keeping armed forces in operational readiness and providing them with the sufficient support for completing the assigned tasks. Research done within that theory also concerns the projects of creating and perfecting the optimal organisational structure enabling the effective realisation of military actions on the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Experts on the organisation of armed forces theory also prepare the recommendations on the course and specification of military service and dislocation of respective units during peacetime and wartime.

4. Military education and training theory (Russian: теория воинского обучения и воспитания) concerns research on forms and methods of operational and combat preparation of soldiers and officers in the course of military education and military service. The frameworks of that theory also include studies on military psychology, i.e. forming high moral values among officers and soldiers, raising the level of their discipline at the same time.

5. Armament theory (Russian: теория вооружения) deals with scientific and analytical protection and justification of consistent military–technical policy within the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

6. War economy and armed forces facilities theory (Russian: теория военной экономики и тыла ВС) deals with gathering and use of any material means and goods necessary for guaranteeing the functionality of the armed forces and waging possible war in the future. The frames of that theory also include research on military aspects of functioning of the country during wartime and ways of enhancing the endurance of the social and economic potential of the country in case of military aggression.

7. Type and kinds of armed forces theory (Russian: теория видов и родов ВС) is the research on the preparedness and use of thereof in case of wartime and peacetime.

8. Military history (Russian: военная история) which, within the frameworks of military science, deals with war history, military thought, art of warfare and other military–related areas¹⁷.

¹⁷ В.Ю. Микрюков, *Война: наука и искусство. Книга 2. Военная наука*, Москва 2016, РУСАЙНС, pp. 38–43. Compare: Б.Ф. Сингаевский, *Что же такое военная наука?* „Военная мысль” 1993, issue 9, pp. 29–32; С.А. Богданов, *О структуре и содержании военной науки на современном этапе развития военной мысли*, „Военная мысль” 2004, issue 5, pp. 29–39;

According to Russian experts military science formulates a determined level of theoretical views and is strictly connected to social, natural and exact sciences. According to Gen. Makhmut Gareev, the Chairman of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, research on such a complex social-political phenomenon as war demands combination of many branches of science¹⁸. Such an interdisciplinary attitude enables one to select those areas of given branches which will be useful for the needs of the army. For example, the law of war theory, military psychology and military education are important for the armed forces of as representatives of the social sciences. The natural sciences, on the other hand, are represented by the military geography, military cartography, military geodesy, military hydrometeorology and military medicine. Within the frameworks of the exact sciences the areas of the research are radioelectronics, cybernetics and ballistics¹⁹.

Categories, laws and principles of dialectical materialism vs. art of warfare theory

One of the outcomes of the fall of the USSR was a deep fracture among the Russian servicemen. Some of them remained faithful to the Soviet military doctrine, allowing only for subtle modernisation of its traditional basics, whereas others supported new beliefs entailing a thorough reforms of the Russian army. In the contemporary Russia representatives of the two trends defined the basic problems of the military science²⁰.

From the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century one of the main topics within the scientific and expert environments was the problem of philosophical, ideological, methodological and cognitive foundations (paradigm) of the military science²¹. The works of the Russian experts show that, in spite of the advanced scientific and technological progress, the analysis of the art of warfare in contemporary Russia is

А.А. Озеров, *Дисциплинарная (предметная) структура военной науки*, in: *История и философия военной науки*, Б.И. Каверин, С.А. Тюшкевич (ed.), Москва 2007, Воениздат, pp. 212–232; Е.Н. Карлова, *Военная наука как социальный институт (структура, функции особенности)*, in: *Военная наука в России и за рубежом. Вторая всероссийская межведомственная научная конференция (Москва, 20 ноября 2013 г.)*, И.Е. Сойкин, В.А. Аватков (ed.), Москва 2014, МГИМО-Университет МИД России, pp. 106–112.

¹⁸ М.А. Гареев, *Сражения на военно-историческом фронте*, Москва 2008, Инсан, pp. 87–88.

¹⁹ В.Ю. Микрюков, *Война: наука и искусство. Книга 2...*, p. 41.

²⁰ В.Н. Коньшев, А.А. Сергунин, *Дискуссии о войнах будущего в российском экспертно-аналитическом сообществе: мифы и реальность*, „Проблемы национальной стратегии” 2013, issue 4, pp. 100–114.

²¹ Compare: Ю.Н. Голубев, В.Н. Каргин, *О необходимости новой парадигмы военно-научных исследований*, „Военная мысль” 2008, issue 1, pp. 71–80; И.С. Даниленко, *От прикладной военной науки – к системной науке о войне*, „Военная мысль” 2008, issue 10, pp. 23–32; Г.П. Огюцкий, *Философия войны структура, задачи и функции*, „Военная мысль” 2010, issue 3, pp. 72–78; С.А. Тюшкевич, В.В. Круглов, *Военная наука: размышления о ее содержании и развитии*, „Военная мысль” 2010, issue 10, pp. 63–68; М.А. Гареев, *В интересах обороноспособности страны*, „Вестник Академии военных наук” 2015, issue 1, pp. 4–10.

based on the tradition and heritage of the Soviet military science. That opinion concerns mainly dialectical materialism – the worldview, cognitive, methodological and ideological basis of the Marxist–Leninist science of war and army (Russian: марксистско-ленинское учение о войне и армии)²². It is worth underlying that, in spite of the fall of the communism, dialectical materialism is still widely recognised among the significant part of commanders, scientists and analysts in Russia. What is more, it is also popular in the People’s Republic of China, where it is referred to as the military dialectics²³. According to Russian experts, if the military science is to develop and properly fulfil its prognostic function, anticipating scientific and technological progress, its philosophical and methodological foundations must be based on dialectical materialism. Referring to the works of the Russian strategists, the contemporary Russian military analysts underline that the kind of dialectics that was commonly used in the USSR cannot be removed from the process of strategic thinking, because it constitutes its substance²⁴. The opinion of Gen. Maj. Vasili Kopytko may be given here as an example. Gen. Maj. V. Kopytko held the position of a main specialist, and then a professor, in the Department of Operational Art in the Research Centre of the Military Academy of the General Staff of RF. Trying to characterize the problem of contemporary Russian military science he claimed that the research on different ways of preparations and use of the armed forces is not possible without due knowledge of social–economical and military–political aspects of war, as well as its laws and principles, set forth in the phenomenon of dialectical materialism²⁵. What is more, dialectical materialism is the ideological basis for so–called military–political theory (Russian: военно–политическая теория), which is the system of ideas, views, perceptions and concepts reflecting, in the awareness of decision–making elites and the society, the interrelation between politics, war and peace, ways of army organisation etc. A significant role in formulating the military–political theory is played, for example, by the military–political analysis of global and regional security, conflicts and war environments. In Russia the military–political theory is extremely important, since it constitutes the scientific basis for the defence policy of the state²⁶.

²² С.А. Тюшкевич, Н.Я. Сушко, Я.С. Дзюба, *Марксизм-ленинизм о войне и армии*, Москва 1968, Воениздат, pp. 346–349, 352; Д.А. Волкогонов, *Марксистско-ленинское учение о войне и армии*, Москва 1984, Воениздат, pp. 12–13.

²³ В. Ерыкалин, *Военная наука Китая (2016)*, „Зарубежное военное обозрение” 2016, issue 1, p. 15; Г.П. Отюцкий, *Философия войны: проблемы конституирования*, „Военная мысль” 2009, issue 10, p. 57; В.В. Бабич, *О военной науке и войне*, „Военная мысль” 2009, issue 12, pp. 61–62.

²⁴ See: И.Н. Воробьев, В.А. Киселев, *Военная наука на современном этапе*, „Военная мысль” 2008, issue 7, p. 27. The statement of dialectics constituting the basis of strategic thinking has been applied herein after the work of Aleksandr Swieczin – a Soviet theoretician of the art of warfare. See: А. Свечин, *Стратегия*, Москва 1927, Военный вестник, p. 246.

²⁵ В.К. Копытко, *О некоторых проблемах отечественной военной науки*, „Военная мысль” 2013, issue 9, p. 17.

²⁶ И.В. Бернацких, *Военно-политический анализ общественных явлений и его особенности*, „Вестник Академии военных наук” 2016, issue 1, p. 32.

According to Russian experts the basic goal of the military science is the recognition of war through the description and explanation of some objective laws reflecting its qualitative and quantitative character, as well as the prediction of the character and the course of future wars²⁷. Prediction (Russian: предвидение) is a complicated analytical process aiming at the recognition of future phenomena and processes determining the military–technical and social–political directions of further development of the art of warfare characteristic for different countries or military–political blocks. The process includes such scientific areas as character and nature of future wars, military and political situation in individual regions of the world, new means and ways of military actions. According to Russian servicemen, prediction in its character may be empirical, i.e. basing on reason, experience and intuition or scientific, i.e. basing on recognition of objective laws of war and military actions. The empirical attitude is characterized by the western analytical approach and hence it is not considered by the Russian experts as scientific. According to them, prediction means creating the model of future conflict and algorithm of potential enemy actions. By knowing in advance your enemy’s actions, you can impose on them a disadvantageous way of acting, which may increase the effect of a surprise factor. That in turn may allow for achieving previously planned strategic, operational and tactical goals. The image of the enemy’s expected reaction is made with the help of general methods, characteristic for various fields of knowledge and so–called special methods applied in the military science, which include: extrapolation, modelling, expert assessment, network assessment and war games on the headquarters’ level, as well as military manoeuvres. A successful prediction enables to take an intellectual–informative advantage over the enemy²⁸.

Russian servicemen assume that knowledge about laws of war is based on dialectical materialism and dialectical method²⁹. As it has already been stated, dialectical materialism is a philosophical and theoretical basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, a branch

²⁷ И.Н. Воробьев, В.А. Киселев, *История и философия военной науки*, „Военная мысль” 2007, issue 2, p. 68.

²⁸ See: Ю.В. Чуев, Ю.Б. Михайлов, *Прогнозирование в военном деле*, Москва 1975, Воениздат; Ю.С. Солнышков, *Предвидение в военном деле*, w: *Военная энциклопедия. Т. 6. Огарков–Прогресс*, (ed.) С.Б. Иванов, Москва 2002, Воениздат, p. 576; В.Д. Рябчук, *Проблемы военной науки и военного прогнозирования в условиях интеллектуально-информационного противоборства*, „Военная мысль” 2008, issue 5, pp. 67–76; В.Д. Рябчук, В.И. Ничипор, *О роли и месте прогнозирования и предвидения в системе планирования операции и общевойскового боя*, „Военная мысль” 2007, issue 10, pp. 61–67. Compare: А.И. Подберезкин, В.Г. Соколенко, С.Р. Цырендоржиев, *Современная международная обстановка: цивилизации, идеологии, элиты*, Москва 2015, Центр военно-политических исследований МГИМО МИД России, pp. 23–156; М.В. Александров, *К вопросу о возможности создания математической модели прогнозирования военно-политической и стратегической ситуации вокруг РФ*, in: *Некоторые аспекты анализа военно-политической обстановки: монография*, А.И. Подберезкин, К.П. Боришполец (ed.), Москва 2014, Центр военно-политических исследований МГИМО МИД России, pp. 25–50.

²⁹ See for example: А.И. Владимиров, *Диалектика и общая теория войны*, „Военно-промышленный курьер” 2010, issue 2, p. 5.

of science dealing with objective laws of any development of the matter creating objective reality, i.e. regularities characteristic for common natural, social and awareness processes³⁰. The term “objective” in dialectical materialism means “independent of one’s awareness, ego, will, feelings, senses, actions and human influence”³¹. In most common concept a “law” is a determined, desired relation between objects, phenomena or processes, coming out of their inner nature, their essence. The law is one of the categories helping humans to acquire the unity, relationship and interdependence between phenomena occurring in the material, i.e. objective, world³². On the other hand, “dialectical method” is referred to as a collection of scientific proceeding directives aiming at gathering adequate knowledge about the world and general world transformation directives based on the general laws of its development, referring to the world as a collection of processes, not as a set of unchangeable phenomena³³. Every branch of science uses categories, i.e. a group of concepts characteristic for thereof, helping to formulate laws from its area. Dialectics also has its categories helping to express the characteristics of any processes. What is more, dialectics formulates its laws, which may be general, unique or individual in nature³⁴. Here is a list of several of those categories, though it is not a complete catalogue: transformation, development, motion, process, quantity, quality, ability, necessity, coincidence, contrast, contradiction, content, form, structure, function, phenomenon, essence, relativity, absoluteness etc.³⁵

³⁰ А.Д. Макаров, С.И. Попов, Л.В. Славнов, *Диалектический материализм*, Москва 1973, Издательство Мысль, pp. 19–24; А.С. Миловидов, *Диалектический материализм*, в: *Советская военная энциклопедия. Т. 3. Гражданская война в США – Йокота*, Н.В. Огарков (ed.), Москва 1977, Воениздат, pp. 173–176.

³¹ Ф.В. Константинов, В.Г. Марахов, *Материалистическая диалектика. Т. 4. Диалектика общественного развития*, Москва 1984, Издательство Мысль, pp. 127–138; А.М. Израилевский, *Специфика теоретического уровня современного обществознания и принцип объективности (философско методологический анализ)*, in: *Проблемы объективности в социальном познании*, А.Я. Райбекас (ed.), Красноярск 1988, Красноярский государственный университет, pp. 18–32. It is worth underlying that such an explanation of the term “objective” is immeasurably different from its interpretation proposed by idealistic philosophical sciences, in which it often derives from the Kantian tradition: “universally important for the spirit and human intellect”. In common language the term “objective” is associated with such adjectives as “neutral”, “truthful” or even “just” and it is given a strong emotional and evaluative connotations. See: J. Ładosz, *Dialectical materialism*, Warsaw 1973, State Educational Publishing Company, p. 33.

³² А.Д. Макаров, С.И. Попов, Е.Н. Чесноков, *Диалектический материализм*, Москва 1960, Издательство ВПШ и АОН при ЦК КПСС, pp. 153–160; В.С. Соколов, *Закон как категория марксистской диалектики*, в: *Вопросы диалектического материализма. Элементы диалектики*, Москва 1960, Академия наук СССР, pp. 3–30.

³³ А.П. Шептулин, *Диалектический метод познания*, Москва 1983, Политиздат, p. 44 and the following. Compare: М.М. Розенталь, *Марксистский диалектический метод*, Москва 1952, Политиздат, pp. 40–43.

³⁴ Н. Dahm, *Soviet Philosophy’s Conception of “Basic Laws”, “Order” and “Principles”*, „Studies in Soviet Thought” 1961, issue 1, pp. 52–63.

³⁵ G. Planty–Bonjour, *The Categories of Dialectical Materialism: Contemporary Soviet Ontology*, Dodrecht 1967, D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 12–23, 39–77; F. Rapp, *Gesetz und Determination*

The categories in question help to formulate general laws, i.e. the following:

- universality of development law,
- law of unity and struggles of opposites,
- law of transformation of quantitative to qualitative change and its interdependence,
- law of the contradiction of contradiction (law of the negation of negation)³⁶.

Dialectical materialism theoreticians underline that the above laws represent only the most important, crucial and basic laws of dialectics and they do not exhaust the subject. General laws of dialectics are formulated in the process of comparison of possibly diverse areas and establishing their common characteristics. Because of its universality, dialectics bases its research on the results received from other branches of science, not on independent research of particular transformation of reality³⁷. What is more, as a general law of development for various phenomena and processes, dialectical laws appear in thereof in numerous ways depending on their characteristics, including the art of warfare³⁸.

General laws

According to Russian servicemen, general, unique and individual laws of dialectics are defined by:

- conflict nature as a basic human history driving force,
- perception of war as a phenomenon of human existence,
- mutual relations of countries and societies in the paradigm of war and peace,
- means and ways of waging wars³⁹.

Dialectical materialism assumes that the fundamental dialectical law, which is the starting point for all the others, is the universality of development law, according to which all the phenomena, things and processes are subject to changes and development. That means that within a given area there do not exist things or phenomena which are unchangeable, endless, uniform and ideally separated from all the others⁴⁰.

in der Sowjetphilosophie: Zur Gesetzeskonzeption des dialektischen Materialismus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Diskussion über dynamische und statistische Gesetzmäßigkeit in der zeitgenössischen Sowjetphilosophie, Dordrecht 1968, D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 3–37.

³⁶ А.П. Шептулин, *Марксистско-ленинская диалектика. Книга 1. Материалистическая диалектика как научная система*, Москва 1983, Издательство Московского университета, pp. 31–47, 70–279; Ф.В. Константинов, В.Г. Марахов, *Материалистическая диалектика*, vol. 2, *Субъективная диалектика*, Москва 1982, Издательство Мысль, pp. 70–101, *The grounds of Marxist philosophy*, (ed.) F.W. Konstantinow, Warsaw, 1964, The book and the knowledge, pp. 192–193.

³⁷ J. Ładosz, *Dialectical materialism...*, p. 93.

³⁸ *The grounds of Marxist philosophy...*, p. 195.

³⁹ А.И. Владимиров, *Основы общей теории войны. Часть I: Основы теории войны*, Москва 2013, Московский финансово промышленный университет Синергия, pp. 99–100. Рог. И.М. Капитанец, *Война на море. Актуальные проблемы развития военно-морской науки*, Москва 2001, Вагриус, p. 117.

⁴⁰ Ф.В. Константинов, *Основы марксистско-ленинской философии*, Москва 1979, Политиздат pp. 85–89; *Podstawy filozofii marksistowskiej...*, pp. 190–197.

That law has been also applied in the art of warfare, seen as a constant process of development, perfecting means and ways of fight, armed forces organisation methods etc.⁴¹. The source of that development, its internal impulse and the driving force generating progress is, on the other hand, defined by the law of unity and struggles of opposites. That law assumes that in all phenomena, things and processes there exist contrasts and contradictions, whose mutual interactions make the world being in a state of constant motion and development. Every phenomenon, thing or process has its specific internal contradictions determining their existence, character and development regularities. Consolidation, combination, i.e. unity of contrasts determining peculiarity of a given phenomenon, thing or process is transient and relative as the phenomenon, thing or process itself. The struggle of contrasts, i.e. mutual interactions of contrasts focused on their synthesis is, on the other hand, absolute and eternal. It lasts all the time a given phenomenon, thing or process exists and when they come to an end it only changes its nature. The nature of development is therefore a constant terminating some of the contradictions and, as a result of that action, appearing of the new ones⁴². That law has also found its application in the military science, determining the holistic nature of war, which according to the Russian servicemen is a social-political and military-technical phenomenon, the most fierce way of solving economic, ideological, national, religious, territorial and other contradictions between countries, nations, political-military blocks, classes, social groups and other entities, which is gained through violence and military actions. Apart from military actions, which constitute the essence of war, also economic, diplomatic, ideological, psychological and other forms of confrontation are applied in order to achieve the goals set⁴³. War is a complex phenomenon which has its characteristics and properties. Historic, social-political, military-technical and territorial factors determine the nature of war. Taking the historic criterion under consideration, war is perceived as a social-political phenomenon placed in a given historic period, having an impact on social, technological and other changes, which will come out as its consequence in the future. Social-political nature of a given war, on the other hand, is reflected in contrasts and contradictions between the parties of the conflict. The analysis of the contrasts and contradictions is also a cri-

⁴¹ Е.И. Рыбкин, *Диалектика в военном деле*, in: *Советская военная энциклопедия. Т. 3. Гражданская война в США – Йокота*, Н.В. Огарков (ed.), Москва 1977, Воениздат, pp. 170–173. Compare: С.В. Максимов, *Диалектика отечественного военного прогресса*, Красноярск 2013, Сибирский федеральный университет, pp. 3–6.

⁴² Л.Ф. Ильичев, *Материалистическая диалектика как общая теория развития. Т. 1. Философские основы теории развития*, Москва 1982, Наука, pp. 252–277; М.А. Парниюк, Е.Н. Причепий, В.В. Кизима, *Материалистическая диалектика. Закон единства противоположностей*, Киев 1991, Издательство Наукова думка, pp. 11–26, 46–55.

⁴³ Д.А. Волкогонов, С.А. Тюшкевич, *Война*, in: *Советская военная энциклопедия. Т. 2. Вавилон – Гражданская война в Северной Америке*, Н.В. Огарков (ed.), Москва 1976, Воениздат, pp. 305–310; Д.А. Волкогонов, С.А. Тюшкевич, *Война*, in: *Военная энциклопедия. Т. 2. Вавилония – Гюйс*, В.С. Грачев (ed.), Москва 1994, Воениздат, pp. 233–235; В.В. Серебрянников, *О понятии «война»*, „Военная мысль” 2004, issue 10, pp. 61–65; В.Ю. Микрюков, *Война: наука и искусство. Книга 1. Война*, Москва 2016, РУСАЙНС, pp. 41–42.

terion of moral assessment of a particular war, which is usually done through the prism of justification or unjustification of intentions, aims and actions of the fighting parties. Military–technical factor reflects the technical character of a given war, whereas territorial factor is concerned with the territorial extent of a war (e.g. the division into global and local wars)⁴⁴.

Extremely interesting analysis of the nature of war perceived from the perspective of the unity and struggle of contrasts law was presented in 1963 by Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, who held the positions of the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (from June 1952), next the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, and then, between 1960 and 1968, served as the General Inspectors Group of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. Marshal V. Sokolovsky was also the author and editor of numerous scientific publications devoted to the art of war, including his monumental work titled *Military Strategy*, which is still classified as a canon of compulsory reading in the Russian military academies⁴⁵. In the times of the USSR representatives of the military elites treated that book as a practical manual and the source of knowledge on general strategy laws and the nature of wars of those times⁴⁶. Basing on the works of Carl von Clausewitz and Vladimir Lenin, Sokolovsky underlined that war is just a part of a bigger process – politics. In his opinion politics is the pivot joining two opposite phenomena, namely war and peace, determining their interdependence, i.e. penetration of each other. According to Lenin and Sokolovsky war is a continuation of politics carried out with the help of violence, i.e. the armed forces⁴⁷. Such a definition refers to the beliefs of Clausewitz, according to whom war is just the next step in political relations, but carried out with different means⁴⁸. However, Lenin and his followers – the Russian strategists, referred to the idea of politics differently for the Prussian General. For in the USSR politics was referred to as a conflict of classes, countries and nations carried out with the help of any possible means (e.g. ideological,

⁴⁴ С.А. Богданов, *О современных подходах к теории военных конфликтов и их предотвращению*, „Военная мысль” 1993, issue 7, pp. 36–44; В.Н. Горбунов С.А. Богданов, *О характере вооруженной борьбы в XXI веке*, „Военная мысль” 2009, issue 3, pp. 9–10.

⁴⁵ И.Н. Шкадов, *Герои Советского Союза: Краткий биографический словарь. Т. 2. Любков – Яцук*, Москва 1988, Воениздат, pp. 497–498; М. Чередниченко, *Маршал Советского Союза Василий Соколовский*, in: *Полководцы и военачальники Великой Отечественной. Выпуск 1*, Москва 1971, Молодая гвардия, pp. 331–372.

⁴⁶ *A Translation from the Russian of Soviet Military Strategy V.D. Sokolovskii*, H. Dinnerstein, L. Goure, T. Wolfe (ed.), Santa Monica 1963, RAND Corporation, p. 83.

⁴⁷ В.Д. Соколовский, *Военная стратегия*, Москва 1963, Воениздат, pp. 214–217. Compare: В.И. Ленин, *Выписки и замечания на книгу Клаузевица «О войне и ведении войн»*, in: *Ленинский сборник. Т. 12*, В.М. Молотов, М.А. Савельев (ed.), Москва–Ленинград 1930, Институт Ленина при ЦК РКП(б), p. 397; В.И. Ленин, *Первоначальный вариант предложения ЦК РСДРП второй социалистической конференции*, in: *Полное собрание сочинений В.И. Ленина. Т. 27. Август 1915 – июнь 1916*, Москва 1973, Издательство политической литературы, pp. 458–459. For more on the subject of war and military science in the works of Lenin see: Н.Н. Азовцев, *Военные вопросы в трудах В.И. Ленина*, Москва 1964, Воениздат.

⁴⁸ С. von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Berlin 1905, Ferdinand Dummiere Verlagshandlung, p. XII 1–2.

political, economic, diplomatic, administrative–legislative and other). In the process of the conflict of classes a military action was predicted in case of the appearance of extreme opposites between its participants. So, in the Soviet leaders' minds war was just one of the forms of the conflict of classes⁴⁹.

It is worth underlying that the Soviet understanding of the relationship between politics, peace and war at that time was fundamentally different from the concepts favoured by the Western military strategists and theoreticians, which was reflected in the critical opinion of Basil Liddell Hart's beliefs presented by Sokolovsky. B. H. Liddell Hart was the author of so-called strategy of the indirect approach, which is currently considered as the source of the concept of a hybrid war⁵⁰. He also claimed that the war attributes should include not only operations carried out by the armed forces but also the whole complex of non-military activities such as economic pressure, propaganda, diplomacy or sabotage⁵¹. Sokolovsky, on the other hand, undermined that theory since, in his opinion, the main characteristic of war is military actions carried out by the army. Hence, making a connection between war and any non-military forms of confrontation (i.e. ideological, diplomatic, economical etc.) is wrong, since the non-military struggle between countries or classes, as opposed to military actions, happens all the time. The only thing that changes is its role and meaning and that depends on how the situation develops. During wartime the basic means of are the armed forces and other, non-military, forms like economic, diplomatic or ideological ones, are just the supportive measures for the military actions. During peacetime political goals are achieved with the help of fight carried out exclusively with non-military means⁵².

It is worth underlying though that a modified continuation of the abovementioned theory can be found in the contemporary Russian theory of military science. In the materials coming from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of RF war is defined as a confrontation between countries, coalitions of countries and political powers existing in thereof, carried out in order to achieve their political goals with the help of military actions⁵³. So, just like in the times of the USSR, the term "war" is restricted to military actions. The significance of politics, however, has been re-defined by substituting conflict of classes with geopolitical and civilizational rivalry between countries and polit-

⁴⁹ В.Д. Соколовский, *Военная стратегия...*, pp. 215, 217; К. Максимов, *Актуальные проблемы идеологической борьбы по военным вопросам*, „Военно-исторический журнал” 1979, issue 5, p. 14. Compare: В.И. Земсков, *Войны современной эпохи*, „Военная мысль” 1969, issue 5, pp. 52–62; Ф.В. Константинов, *Марксистско-ленинская теория исторического процесса*, Москва 1983, Издательство Наука, p. 320; И.А. Гобозов, *Смысл и направленность исторического процесса*, Москва 1987, Издательство Московского университета, pp. 67–88.

⁵⁰ M. Fryc, *Polish defence strategy against military threat with elements of „hybrid war”*, „National Security Quarterly” 2015, issue 33, p. 63.

⁵¹ В.Н. Лиделл Харт, *The Strategy of Indirect Approach*, London 1941, Faber & Faber, Ltd.

⁵² В.Д. Соколовский, *Военная стратегия...*, pp. 217–218.

⁵³ П.А. Казарин, *Характер войны как категория военной науки*, „Военная мысль” 2002, issue 6, pp. 15–18.

ical–military blocks in the field of international relations⁵⁴. It is worth underlying that in the opinion of contemporary geopoliticians civilizational confrontation, just like conflict of classes in the times of the USSR, is subject to laws and regularities defined by dialectical materialism. In this context, the opinion of Aleksandr Dugin is particularly interesting. Aleksandr Dugin is the author of the book titled *The Foundations of Geopolitics. Geopolitical Future of Russia* which is the basic book about geopolitics and has been chosen as a compulsory reading at Russian universities and military academies⁵⁵. In his opinion there are a lot of analogies between Marxism and geopolitics. He claims that the struggle of contrasts law plays an important role in geopolitics, which is shown by everlasting, endless conflict between Sea and Land Empires. The conflict constitutes a scene of “The Great War of Continents”, which is a “solution of contrasts” between the Civilisations of Sea and Land⁵⁶. Dialectics as a branch of science describing contrasts (opposites) between civilisations, resulting in wars and armed conflicts, is the point of reference for Aleksandr Vladimirov, the Vice-president of the Board of military experts of the Ministry of Defense of the RF⁵⁷. In his opinion war is a social process characterised by fight carried out by geopolitical entities in order to strengthen their position in the forgoing network of international relations and gaining abilities to create the new map of the world, indirectly ruled by them. The aim of the war is not a complete eradication of the enemy but the allocation of the countries’ key functions by force. Military actions are the hardest form of solving the contrast between civilisations⁵⁸. Vladimirov, alike Dugin, claims that in the contemporary world relations between countries and blocks of countries belonging to different civilisations will become antagonist in their nature. In his opinion, the most conflictual are the so–called “war niches”, i.e. areas on the point of contact of respective civilisations. In microscale those are the borders between the worlds of Islam, Orthodox Church, Hindu, African and Christian (Western) civilisations. In macroscale the main division is made between the West and the rest of the world, the most violent conflicts engaging the Muslim and the Asian countries on one side and the West on the other side⁵⁹.

⁵⁴ А.И. Владимиров, *Концептуальные основы Национальной стратегии России: политологический аспект*, Москва 2007, Издательство Наука, р. 385; В.Ю. Микрюков, *Война: наука и искусство...*, р. 42.

⁵⁵ J.B. Dunlop, *Aleksandr Dugin’s “Neo-Eurasian” Textbook and Dmitrii Trenin’s Ambivalent Response*, „Harvard Ukrainian Studies” 2001, issue 25; P. Eberhardt, *Aleksandr Dugin’s geopolitical ideas*, „Geopolitical Review” 2010, issue 82, р. 236.

⁵⁶ А.Л. Яанов, *Русская идея. От Николая I до Путина. Книга 3 (1990-2000)*, Москва 2015, Новый хронограф, pp. 359–360. Compare: А.Г. Дугин, *Война континентов. Современный мир в геополитической системе координат*, Москва 2015, Академический Проект. For more on the meaning of the fundamental law of conflicts between Sea and Land Empires in the Russian geopolitical thought see: Р.А. Абдуразаков, *Фундаментальный геополитический дуализм. Предпосылки античной культуры*, „Геополитика и безопасность” 2016, issue 3–4, pp. 65–71.

⁵⁷ Владимиров Александр Иванович [online], http://www.kadet.ru/lichno/vlad_v/vlad_in1.htm [access: 11 VI 2017].

⁵⁸ А.И. Владимиров, *Государство, война и национальная безопасность России*, „Пространство и время” 2011, issue 1, р. 30.

⁵⁹ А.И. Владимиров, *Государство, война...*, pp. 28–29. Compare: idem, *Стратегия*

The conviction that national relations may be the point of confrontation between civilisations and countries having conflicting interests is reflected in the publications of many contemporary Russian servicemen. As an example the opinion of Col. Vladimir Babych, a lecturer at the Military Faculty of the Ryazan State Radio Engineering University, may be given. He defines the interdependence of war and peace on geopolitical rivalry in the following way:

Confrontation is a natural phenomenon in the course of human existence and the number of confrontations is uncountable. The majority of confrontations result from conflicting relations between countries realising their own, incompatible interests. It is worth underlying that during peacetime confrontation between countries taking place in non-military areas (starting from economy) takes the form of rivalry, which becomes the economic, diplomatic, ideological, informative or other form of fight in case of exacerbating of the contrasts (...) During wartime non-military means are substituted by military actions. In my opinion, confrontation as one of the key phenomena in the area of international relations takes the form of three stages: competition, contrast and fight (...) It can be said that fight is the hardest form of confrontation between countries in all spheres of their lives⁶⁰.

Analogically, the meaning of fight in politics identified with geopolitical competition for influence and resources and its relation with war (military action) was presented in 2015 by Four-Star Gen. Makhmut Gareev:

In the past years, in connection with the increasing growth of a specific kind of political-diplomatic, economic, informative, cybernetic and psychological means and ways of pursuing political goals in international confrontation, a question about fundamental change of the concept of war and the whole system of knowledge related to it has been raised. Throughout the years international confrontation has been carried out with the use of different forces and means, whose inseparable parts are intelligence and counterintelligence, deceiving the opponent, using tricks, disinformation and other tricky, sophisticated means and ways of fight (...) Confrontation without the use of weapon is a fight, whereas continuation of politics through violence, with the use of armed forces, is a war. Some philosophers, presenting very little knowledge of history, have claimed that all non-military means have appeared only in the present times and, basing on that assumption, they treat the use of thereof as a war. If the use of all non-military means in international rivalry is a war, then the whole history of the mankind is a war indeed. We could then make further assumption that there was no the Hundred Years' War, the Russo-Japanese War or the Second World War (...)

«организованного хаоса», „Пространство и время” 2010, issue 1, pp. 53–57; idem, *Основы общей теории войны...*, pp. 128–142.

⁶⁰ В.В. Бабич, *О новом подходе к анализу современного противоборства и некоторых других проблемах*, „Военная мысль” 2008, issue 3, pp. 34–35.

The same economic or informative fight during peacetime and wartime may be carried out in different ways. During peacetime those may be the economic sanctions and informative actions, whereas during wartime – the entities of economic and informative importance destroyed by rockets or bombs. Hence, it is impossible not to consider the fact that some non–military forms and means of fight have been subject to technological development, taking dangerous form or practically carried out by force. For example, targeted cyber attacks, which can be carried out by special services of particular countries, hired persons or terrorist groups, may completely disorganise financial or bank systems, as well as the economy of the fighting parties (...) War is a continuation of politics through violent means (military actions) along with other forms and non–military means, so–called “soft power”⁶¹.

That is why in the contemporary Russian military nomenclature, just like in the times of the USSR, the term “war” is not associated with non–military forms of fight. For example, instead of the term “information war”, so willingly used by publicists, journalists, politicians and civilian analysts, the representatives of the Russian army prefer the term “information confrontation” (Russian: информационное противоборство) or “information warfare” (Russian: информационная борьба)⁶². War is just one of the means of pursuing a policy which, in the opinion of Russian strategists is a self-existent, absolute, endless and uncompromising process of rivalry, confrontation and fight of the opponent parties, powers and tendencies. The policy is pursued by the state with the help of unlimited number of means in order to achieve its own interests (e.g. class, geopolitical and other interests) as long as it exists. It is worth underlying that such an understanding of international relations is characteristic for some of the people from the close surroundings of president Vladimir Putin. It is confirmed by the thesis titled *The Vision of Victory*. One of the authors of that thesis is Anton Vaino, who has been holding the position of the Chief of Administration of the President of the Russian Federation since 12 August 2016. He has also been a permanent member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation since 25 May 2012⁶³. The authors make a clear distinction between war and politics. In order to explain the sense and meaning of politics they used the metaphor of a game in which you need to make skilful and synergetic use of different forces and means to achieve your own interests. Ac-

⁶¹ М.А. Гареев, *Война и военная наука на современном этапе*, in: *Эволюция форм, методов и инструментов противоборства в современных конфликтах*, (ed.) И.В. Бочарников, Москва 2015, Академия военных наук Российской Федерации, Издательство Экон-Информ, pp. 4–5.

⁶² В.И. Орлянский, *Информационное оружие и информационная борьба: реальность и домыслы*, „Военная мысль” 2008, issue 1, pp. 62–71. Compare: С.А. Комов, *Информационная борьба в современной войне: вопросы теории*, „Военная мысль” 1996, issue 3, pp. 76–80; idem, *О концепции информационной безопасности страны*, „Военная мысль” 1994, issue 4, pp. 16–17; idem, *О способах и формах ведения информационной борьбы*, „Военная мысль” 1997, issue 4, pp. 18–22.

⁶³ Антон Эдуардович Вайно. Биографическая справка на сайте Президента России [online], <http://kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/307/biography> [access: 20 V 2017]; Кто такой Антон Вайно, новый глава Администрации президента России? [online], <https://www.currenttime.tv/a/vaino/27916751.html> [access: 20 V 2017].

According to the authors the main tool for realising those interests is manipulation understood as a part of power technology, a specific kind of hidden, spirit and psychological influence on individuals, social groups and society. As opposed to the game, which is not subject to any laws, war is just one of its elements and has precise laws: it has the beginning and the end, there are the winners and the defeated ones⁶⁴.

Equally important for describing the character of war are the law of transformation of quantitative to qualitative change and its interdependence and law of the contradiction of contradiction (law of the negation of negation). Here is a short summary of the first of them: in every process there are qualitative and quantitative transitions. The two types of transitions are always connected in the following way: quantitative transitions lead to qualitative transitions and the basis of every quantitative transition is a qualitative transition⁶⁵. That law is strictly connected to the contradiction of contradiction law which assumes that the nature of development is based on transition from lower to higher levels. The transition is done through the violation of relative stability which is characteristic for the lower level as a result of cumulation of internal contradictions and next through gaining the relative balance as a result of creating a more complex process structure resistant to violations typical for the higher level. In dialectical materialism “contradiction” (negation) is a synonym of the “solution of the opposite” i.e. “transition into a new quality” through partial rejection of “the old” and coming up of “the new”. The essence of dialectical negation is based not on eradication of “the old”, but on “taking it over” keeping all the elements that might be useful for the future progress, which means that the new development phase brings much more possibilities of progress than the previous one. Progressive development is the appropriate result of every new contradiction keeping the previous achievements and making it the basis for further movement. That is why the new development stage is not just repetition of the old one – it constitutes the new circle overgrowing the old one and using previous achievements as a bridge for further development. That law reflects and characterises the succession interdependence between different phases of the progress, the main direction, the essential

⁶⁴ А.Э. Вайно, А.А. Кобяков, В.Н. Сараев, *Образ Победы*, Москва 2012, Институт экономических стратегий РАН, pp. 36–38. Compare: А.Э. Вайно, А.А. Кобяков, В.Н. Сараев, *Глобальная неопределенность*, „Экономические науки” 2011, issue 8, pp. 33–40.

⁶⁵ Ф.В. Константинов, *Основы марксистско-ленинской...*, pp. 89–97; Л.Ф. Ильичев, *Материалистическая диалектика...*, pp. 277–298. Qualitative transition is understood as a transition in character, the essence of phenomena forming a given process and the essential transition of the structure of the process. Every transition that is not qualitative in its nature is referred to as quantitative. Quantity of objects, phenomena and processes is characterised by a degree, capacity and intensity of their development. Quantity has its word number and its characteristic feature is that its transition after reaching some border line affects the quality of objects, phenomena and processes. An example quantitative transitions may be: a greater or smaller intensity of some phenomenon, the frequency of its appearance, extending or shrinking of some objects not concerned with the transformation of their parts, spreading of some process in one way or another. Quantitative transition becoming the qualitative one is a process in which subtle, unnoticeable at first quantitative transitions gradually accumulate and on a given level they affect the size of objects bringing essential qualitative transitions resulting in the objects being subject to changes, the old quality declines and the new one arises. Based on: *The grounds of Marxist philosophy...*, pp. 239–252.

development trend, based on the movement from the “simple” one to the “complex” one, from the “lower” one to the “higher” one, i.e. the “spiral” form of the movement⁶⁶.

In the opinion of the Russian military theoreticians those laws show processes and mechanisms of every military revolution. If in a given period of time there was a quantitative and qualitative modernisation of the material base, it resulted in the change of the superstructure – forms and ways of war activities. In practice it meant the emergence of new forms and means of military actions – psychotronic, cosmic, cybernetic⁶⁷. The reference to that law is clearly visible in the opinion of Four-Star Gen. Valeri Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation who pointed out that the appearance of cyberspace influenced the growth of the effectiveness of informative and psychological influence:

The central point of today’s conflicts is moving towards the direction of the integrated use of non-military, i.e. political, economic, informative and other means, used with the support of the armed forces. Their essence is pursuing political goals with minimal military pressure on the enemy through neutralising their military and economic potential with the help of informative and psychological influence and active support of the internal opposition, as well as sabotage and guerrilla actions. Those are the basic means applied in “colourful revolutions” which, in the intentions of the initiating parties, should lead to a peaceful transition of power in the territory of the enemy. In fact, every “colourful revolution” is a coup organised from the outside, which is based on IT technologies allowing for manipulation of the protest potential in connection with the use of other non-military means. In that case a huge meaning is given to a mass, planned influence on citizens’ awareness – the object of aggression through the Internet. Information has become one of the most effective weapons. Its global use allows for destabilisation of the internal order of a given country in just a few days⁶⁸.

As a comparison it is worth to cite Col. Pavel Dulnev’s and Col. Vladimir Orlansky’s – researchers at the Military Training Center of the Land Forces in Moscow – opinion, who presented the interdependence between new digital technologies development and the growth of the meaning of information warfare using dialectical method:

⁶⁶ Ф.В. Константинов, *Основы марксистско-ленинской...*, pp. 105–110; Л.Ф. Ильичев, *Материалистическая диалектика...*, pp. 298–322; Б.М. Кедров, *Отрицание отрицания как один из основных законов материалистической диалектики*, in: *Диалектика отрицания отрицания*, А.М. Голубев (ed.), Москва 1983, Политиздат, pp. 9–28; Ю.А. Харин, *Что составляет основу закона отрицания отрицания?* in: *Диалектика отрицания отрицания...*, pp. 173–183.

⁶⁷ И.Н. Воробьев, В.А. Киселев, *Военная наука на современном этапе...*, p. 28. Compare: В.А. Киселев, *К каким войнам необходимо готовить Вооруженные Силы России*, „Военная мысль” 2017, issue 3, p. 46.

⁶⁸ В. Герасимов, *По опыту Сирии. Гибридная война требует высокотехнологичного оружия и научного обоснования*, „Военно-промышленный курьер” 2016, issue 9, p. 4. Compare: С. Володенков, *Потенциал и особенности технологий интернет-пропаганды в современном политическом управлении*, „Информационные войны” 2017, issue 2, pp. 2–6.

Computerisation of the military, being the result of a rapid development of digital technologies, created enormous possibilities for the use of automated systems of command at a high level of effectiveness, as well as new quality of the precision-guided munition systems consisting of system-integrated means of intelligence, targeting and destruction. Hence, like never before, the key role in military actions, and thereby in wars, has been given to intelligence as a means of information and disinformation (misguidance) provided to individuals, groups and categories of population and the global public opinion, also as an informative-psychological means of exerting influence on thereof (...). Thus, in the political process, in which exacerbation of international relations occurs, an essential role for the realisation of political goals shall be given to information warfare which, unlike military actions, can be carried out both during peacetime and wartime. In order to achieve that goal social steering organs as well as forces and means of various countries and social institutions should be integrated. As opposed to military actions, information warfare may be carried out in much larger spaces, including global space. It can also be carried out much more intensively than military actions. That is why information warfare in present times may play as important role as military actions and even create greater possibilities, substituting the armed forces and at the same time reducing the chance of the armed conflict. Thus, military actions and information warfare constitute an integral part of a country's policy. Although they are characterised by fundamentally different features and properties they are interrelated to each other. That is why in the forthcoming two or three decades the intense development of digital and other technologies will result in closer interrelation between military actions (their goals, means used and ways to carry out) and information warfare, as well as psychological fight and political fight⁶⁹.

In the abovementioned interesting interpretation we can see the reference to not only the unity and struggle of contrasts law (in this particular case as the interrelation between military actions and information warfare as two different methods of carrying out given activities) but also to the contradiction of contradiction law and qualitative and quantitative interdependence of transitions law. The most important target of information warfare is the human mind. The influence on people's thinking, attitudes and orientations is not a new phenomenon – it has been known from the early years of the mankind. However, qualitative and quantitative changes that have appeared in the material base (development of new technologies) did not only cause the decline of that form of fight, but even enhanced it into a “new quality”. Thanks to technical development the range of methods and techniques of influencing human awareness and perception, as well as the means used for that purpose, has been extremely enhanced.

⁶⁹ П.А. Дульнев, В.И. Орлянский, *Основные изменения в характере вооруженной борьбы первой трети XXI века*, „Вестник Академии военных наук” 2015, issue 1, pp. 44–45.

Specific and unitary law (so-called laws and regularities of war)

Dialectical materialism assumes that laws may be more or less general depending on the nature of the phenomena they refer to. Some laws are applied to every phenomena of nature (e.g. the law of conservation and conversion of energy), but some are typical only for the chosen forms of the movement of the matter, e.g. the biological form. Social laws also have various ranges of their application: some are applied to all formations, other only to the chosen ones. The law as a general phenomenon exists not against or outside a given phenomena, but in strict connection to specific and unitary phenomena and processes etc. What is general in its nature is just objectively existing community of genuine things or phenomena. The community is expressed in the unity of their features, qualities and attributes. The unitary character, on the other hand, is perceived as particular things, phenomena, processes and events occurring in nature and the society. However, the unitary character may also include the whole group of things or phenomena. It happens when we try to analyse that group by comparison to some other, more general group, connected to the first one with a particular common group of features⁷⁰. In that context, war as a social phenomenon is also subject to general laws of dialectic. War is also conditioned by specific and unitary (subject to general ones) laws, i.e. the ones which are characteristic exclusively for war as a specific phenomenon. Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov confirmed that regularity by stating in 1929 that war as a phenomenon and means of violence has its own laws, spirit and nature⁷¹. In the Russian military terminology specific and unitary laws are described as the laws and regularities of war (Russian: законы и закономерности войны). In dialectical materialism the terms “law” and “regularity” express the relations of the same category. That is why they are often used interchangeably. However, there is a subtle difference between the two. The term “law” is referred to as a particular, necessary connection between phenomena, whereas “regularity” is used most of all for characterising some specific sequence of phenomena⁷². Laws and regularities of war are the objective, crucial, necessary, constant and repetitive connections and relations between fighting parties, determining the outbreak, the course and the result of war or conflict. They are objective in nature which means that whether reflected in the fighting parties’ awareness or not, they are determined and explored and function independently of their will. The category of laws and regularities of war has been created and popularised by the Russian scientists and military theoreticians who, alike their western counterparts, claimed that war is the ground of the activity for objective laws, not only subjective principles and views depending on the will and creativity of the commanders’ minds. That means that laws and regularities of war constitute some guidance which should

⁷⁰ See: Ф.В. Константинов, *Основы марксистско-ленинской...*, pp. 88–89, 112–115.

⁷¹ Б.М. Шапошников, *Мозг армии*, vol. 3, Москва–Ленинград 1929, Воениздат, p. 230.

⁷² *Podstawy filozofii marksistowskiej...*, pp. 208–209. Pof. Н. Кузьмин, Н. Кребер, Л. Баженов, *Закон*, in: *Философская энциклопедия*, vol. 2, *Дизъюнкция – комическое*, Ф.В. Константинов (ed.), Москва 1962, Большая Российская энциклопедия, pp. 149–153.

be taken into account in order to increase one's chances for a victory. The negligence of thereof, on the other hand, may result in failure⁷³. According to Russian servicemen, laws and regularities of war are qualitative and quantitative in nature which means that they determine the interdependence of factors (cause and effect relationship). They also have adequate mathematical dimension which might be helpful in the prediction of the course of military actions⁷⁴. Research on laws and regularities of war enables to discover principles of the art of war. Russian theoreticians and military practitioners postulate the division of laws and regularities of war into two groups:

- 1) system laws of initiating, the course and the result of war, i.e. the laws determining the dependence of war on the interrelation of economic, scientific, moral–political and military potentials of the fighting parties,
- 2) laws and regularities determining the dependence of military actions and other, independent forms of fight on the mentioned potentials⁷⁵.

The issue of laws and regularities of war has been reflected in the works of a significant group of Russian servicemen⁷⁶. It is worth underlying that in spite of the USSR disintegration, their research is till applied in the contemporary Russian military science. For example laws and regularities of war were the subject of research done by Gen. Maj. Stepan Tiushkevich, a scientist and the Head of the Board in the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR⁷⁷. Taking into account his experience of wars and conflicts he formulated the following laws and regularities of war:

- the law of the dependence of the outbreak, the course and the result of war on political goals of the fighting countries,
- the law of the dependence of the outbreak, the course and the result of war on the interrelation of economic potentials of the fighting parties,
- the law of the dependence of the outbreak, the course and the result of war on the scientific potentials of the fighting parties,
- the law of the dependence of the outbreak, the course and the result of war on the interrelation of moral–psychological potentials of the societies engaged

⁷³ А.И. Владимиров. *Концептуальные основы Национальной стратегии...*, р. 45; В.Ю. Микрюков, *Война: наука и искусство. Книга 2...*, р. 93.

⁷⁴ М.Ф. Ваккаус, *Сущность и механизм действия законов вооруженной борьбы, количественно отражающих ее характер*, „Военная мысль” 2008, issue 3, р. 70; О.Ю. Ефремов, В.А. Родин, *Статистический аспект законов вооруженной борьбы*, „Военная мысль” 2009, issue 8, pp. 71–74. Compare: К.В. Тараканов, *Математика и вооруженная борьба*, Москва 1974, Воениздат, pp. 4–5.

⁷⁵ В.Ю. Микрюков, *Война: наука и искусство. Книга 2...*, р. 93.

⁷⁶ See for example: П.И. Трифоненков, *Об основных законах хода и исхода современной войны*, Москва 1962, Воениздат; М.В. Попов, *Сущность законов вооруженной борьбы*, Москва 1964, Воениздат; С.А. Тюшкевич, *Законы и обычаи войны*, in: *Советская военная энциклопедия*, vol. 2, *Вавилон – Гражданская война в Северной Америке*, Н.В. Огарков (ed.), Москва 1976, Воениздат, pp. 375–378.

⁷⁷ Е. Чельшев, И. Даниленко, *Хранитель огня Победы. Историк и философ Степан Андреевич Тюшкевич отмечает шестидесятилетие научной деятельности*, „Военно-промышленный курьер” 2014, issue 31, р. 12.

in the conflict (so-called moral-psychological factor, currently referred to as the spiritual factor),

- the law of the dependence of the outbreak, the course and the result of war on the interrelation of military potentials of the entities taking part in the conflict,
- the law of the dependence of the outbreak, the course and the result of war on the social system and structure of the fighting parties⁷⁸.

The catalogue of laws and regularities of war formulated by Tiushkevich and other experts is not closed and is being constantly modified by adding new categories. It is worth underlying that in the minds of the Russian military and decision-making elites international relations are still the relationships of power and interests. The most vivid example of the first one is the military power (perceived as a physical aspect of international relations) constituting the basic element of a given political entity's strength. Military power is based on specified potentials determining its size and character. Both military power and the potential, as well as other symptoms of power, can be calculated within defined boundaries and with a determined degree of reliability, which means that the measurements of power (actual, ready or just prepared to use in some specific time) can be beneficially used for the policy of the state, especially in its theoretical-analytical and practical, i.e. decision-making, dimension⁷⁹.

Generally speaking, the potential is means, stocks and resources which can be mobilised in order to realise some tasks or undertakings. In the Russian military nomenclature the term "potential" means the totality of material and spiritual powers of a country and the ability to use of thereof for military purposes. The distinction is made between political, economic, spiritual and scientific potentials⁸⁰. The definitions of the potentials are presented in the Russian military science as follows:

1) „political potential” means the ability of a given country's political power to make use of various means and resources in order to keep the stability of the country and support the development of the society. It means also the properties of the political system of the state and the characteristics of the decision-making elites (e.g. the ability of the elites to properly define and realise their own national interests, their competences, political culture etc.)⁸¹.

⁷⁸ С.А. Тюшкевич. *Законы войны: сущность, механизм действия, факторы использования*, Москва 2002, Книга и бизнес, р. 71. Compare: В.Ю. Микрюков, *Война: наука и искусство. Книга 2...*, pp. 85–90; А. Брычков, Г. Никоноров, *Законы войны незыблемы. Философы вносят достойный вклад в дело борьбы за чистоту военной научной мысли и достижения объективной истины*, „Военно-промышленный курьер” 2013, issue 42, р. 4.

⁷⁹ М. Sułek, *O potęgonomii i potęgometrii*, in: *Geopolitics. Elements of theory, methods and research* Z. Lach, J. Wendt (ed.), Częstochowa 2010, Institute of Geopolitics, pp. 57–58; R. Białoskórski, R. Kobryński, M. Sułek, *The power of states 2017. International balance of forces in the proces of changes*, Warszawa 2017, Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, pp. 23–29.

⁸⁰ С.А. Тюшкевич, *Потенциал*, in: *Советская военная энциклопедия*, vol. 6. *Объекты военные – Радиоконпас*, Н.В. Огарков (ed.), Москва 1978, Воениздат, р. 473; А.Х. Шаваев, *Военная мощь государства и ее взаимосвязь с политикой*, „Военная мысль” 2010, issue 3, pp. 58–59.

⁸¹ В.И. Голубев, *Потенциал политический*, в: *Военная энциклопедия*, vol. 6: *Огарков – „Прогресс”*, С.Б. Иванов (ed.), Москва 2002, Воениздат, pp. 544–545.

2) „economic potential” means the ability of the country to support its society with material needs, which enables its stability and secure development. It consists of human resources, territory, fuel, energy and informative resources, natural resources, infrastructure and financial reserves, as well as the monetary and financial system⁸².

3) “spiritual potential” (in the Soviet military science referred to as moral–political) is a society’s state of mind reflecting spiritual abilities of the nation and society. It is also a degree of moral, political and religious maturity of the nation which, under the influence of ideological, informative and psychological activities, may be turned into a real factor influencing the realisation of economical, political and military goals of the country. The spiritual potential includes ideological potential, i.e. the system of views and ideas which reflect the evaluative attitude of the society towards the surrounding reality, and the moral–psychological potential, i.e. the value system, moods, national and historical awareness, emotional reactions to events etc. The spiritual potential is a synthesis of all spiritual forms of the society’s life: historical, political and legislative awareness, science, art, morality and religion, relatively binding ideology. In the Russian military science the spiritual aspects of power are considered almost as important as objectively measurable material potentials and they function in an indissoluble dialectical unity⁸³.

4) “scientific potential” (also referred to as scientific–technical potential) is a degree of scientific development and the country’s and other public institutions’ ability to influence science in order to achieve the optimum economical growth and the social development with possibly most effective use of different means allocated to scientific research. Innovative policy, which is very often referred to as a part of broadly understood scientific policy, is meant to introduce research results, innovations and improvements to the economical and military practice etc., which means practical use of the key sciences in order to strengthen the security of the country. The scientific potential includes material, intellectual and human resources⁸⁴.

⁸² В.Н. Горбунов, С.А. Богданов, *Экономический потенциал – основа обороноспособности государства*, „Военная мысль” 2009, issue 4, pp. 35–43. Compare: С.А. Богданов, *Экономическая составляющая военной безопасности России на современном этапе*, „Военная мысль” 2004, issue 12, pp. 11–20; Б.Г. Григорьев, *Экономический и моральный потенциалы в современной войне*, Москва 1970, Воениздат, p. 16 and the following.

⁸³ О.А. Рахимов, *Потенциал духовный*, in: *Военная энциклопедия*, vol. 6: *Огарков – „Прогресс”*, С.Б. Иванов (ed.), Москва 2002, Воениздат, pp. 543–544; Б.Г. Григорьев, *Экономический и моральный потенциалы...*, pp. 80–90; А.Ю. Голубев, *К вопросу о роли духовности в современной войне*, „Военная мысль” 2008, issue 1, pp. 52–56; В.А. Родин, О. Ю. Ефремов, *Духовные основы воинского воспитания*, „Военная мысль” 2003, issue 8, pp. 26–30; О.А. Павловская, *Моральный фактор в жизни человека и общества: исторические уроки и современные проблемы*, Минск 2014, Беларуская навука, p. 130 and the following.

⁸⁴ В.М. Бондаренко, *Потенциал научный*, in: *Советская военная энциклопедия*, vol. 6, *Объекты военные – Радиолокация*, Н.В. Огарков (ed.), Москва 1978, Воениздат, pp. 475–476; Б.И. Каверин, *Потенциал научный*, in: *Военная энциклопедия*, vol. 6, *Огарков – „Прогресс”*, С.Б. Иванов (ed.), Москва 2002, Воениздат, p. 544. Compare: В.В. Чиркин, *Кибермощь как элемент военной мощи государства*, „Известия Уральского федерального университета.

The summary and interdependence of the potentials define the so-called general power of the country (Russian: *общая мощь государства*). The military potential, constituting a separate category, is a maximum number of forces and means which a given country can isolate from its general power (i.e. the summary of the mentioned potentials) and dedicate to enlarging its own military power. The military power means the number of forces and means cumulated and gathered in a given time, devoted to the military protection of its interests and the realisation of determined goals of internal and international policy⁸⁵.

The international power means the ability of some entity to impose its will on other political entities. The term “ability” refers to the potentiality of the power (something “may” be done), whereas the term “impose” suggests the ability of breaking the resistance, i.e. points to the active element. Will is connected to the psychological aspect of power⁸⁶. From the point of view of the Russian science, reflected in laws and regularities of war, the military potential and the military strength of a particular country, which also takes the ability of the country to pursue a profitable policy in the area of international relations, depend on its general power, i.e. the system of potentials building it. The abovementioned facts mean that the necessary condition for realising your own interests and facilitating the victory in a possible war is gaining control over a given country’s potentials or weakening them. As it has already been said, the foreign policy is seen by the Russian military personnel and decision-making elites as a field of competition, confrontation and the fight of opposite powers, tendencies and interests. Hence in order to weaken or subordinate the material and spiritual potentials of respective actors on the international relations stage the so-called non-military (Russian: *невоенные меры*) means are used. In the 21st century that term displaced the term “active measures” (Russian: *активные мероприятия*) in the Russian military science and strategic documents⁸⁷. Interesting considerations on the importance of non-

Серия 3. Общественные науки” 2012, issue 7, pp. 56–61.

⁸⁵ В.А. Золотарев, *Военная безопасность Государства Российского*, Москва 2001, Воениздат, p. 12; А.Х. Шаваев, *Военная мощь государства...*, pp. 60–71; В.В. Кириллов, *Военная мощь государства: сущность, структура, проблемы*, „Военная мысль” 2005, issue 9, pp. 2–12; В.В. Чиркин, *Сущность и структура военной мощи государства*, „Геополитика и безопасность” 2012, issue 1, pp. 42–48.

⁸⁶ M. Sułek, *O potęgomii i potęgotetrii...*, p. 58.

⁸⁷ J. Darczewska, P. Zochowski, *Active measures. Russia's export commodity*, Warsaw 2017, The Centre for Eastern Studies, pp. 56–57. The term „active measures” means offensive undertakings based on disinformation, deception, sabotage, destabilisation and agents which result from the assumptions and priorities of the foreign policy of the USSR. The goal of those undertakings was making the enemy act in the way desired by Moscow. The term joins different techniques used in operations aiming at exerting influence on the international environment of the USSR and operations aiming at strengthening the Kremlin’s foreign policy. The basic aim of using active measures was the destruction of the key areas of social activities such as religion (or ideology), politics, economy, morality, law, culture and education. The desired results of those actions was a complete weakening of the country and depriving it of the defence abilities in case of a military invasion. See: *Контрразведывательный словарь*, Л.В. Каленская, Ю.И. Смирнов, (ed.), Москва 1972, pp. 90–91; J. Darczewska, P. Zochowski, *Active measures...*, pp. 8, 12–14.

military means and their interdependence on military actions were presented by Col. Vladimir Lutovinov, who in the period of 1998–2004 held the position of the Deputy Head of the Division of the Main Board of Educational Work of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and later the Head of the The Centre for Military-Strategic Research of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. In his opinion the non–military means constitute the entirety of particular situations, directed on the realisation of the defined activities used by the country in the situations demanding completion or substitution of military actions. The use of non–military means belongs to the competences of all institutions and organs pursuing internal and external policy of the country⁸⁸. As Lutovinov underlines, the non–military means are used most of all to prepare for the war or the armed conflict or to weaken the aggressor or the country that is the target of a potential attack. That is done through carrying out activities of political, diplomatic, economic, legislative, informative–psychological, informative–technical and humanitarian character, as well as in the spiritual sphere⁸⁹. Similarly to active measures the use of all non–military means is the substitute of military actions and serves the Kremlin’s geopolitical goals⁹⁰. It is worth underlying that the choice of non–military means that are mentioned by Lutovinov, which in his opinion remain in dialectical interrelation, is adequate to the system of potentials which build the general power of a given country. He divides them into the following:

1) political and diplomatic means – complex and multidirectional activities of social and political institutions, bodies and state structures, carried out in order to create beneficial political conditions, favourable for the realisation of geopolitical interests of the Russian Federation on both global and regional levels. Political and diplomatic means are used to win new allies, isolate countries which are considered as the hostile ones, establish relations with other countries in different areas of international relations etc.⁹¹.

2) legislative means – complex activities aiming at manipulating and the use of norms of international law and its assurance by appointed institutions (e.g. the International Court of Justice, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the United Nations Security Council etc.) with the intention of supporting one’s own policy⁹².

3) economic means – forms, ways and activities allowing to influence the economy and at the same time ability of a given country to ensure the economic stability to

⁸⁸ В.И. Лутовинов, *Развитие и использование невоенных мер для укрепления военной безопасности Российской Федерации*, „Военная мысль” 2009, issue 5, pp. 2, 3–4.

⁸⁹ Ibidem, pp. 4–5. Compare: Е.Е. Кондаков, *Невоенные меры обеспечения военной безопасности Российской Федерации и основные проблемы их реализации*, in: *Военная безопасность Российской Федерации в XXI веке. Сборник научных статей*, Ю.Н. Балуевский (ed.), Москва 2004, Центр военно-стратегических исследований Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации, pp. 126, 133.

⁹⁰ J. Darczewska, P. Żochowski, *Active measures...*, p. 57.

⁹¹ В.И. Лутовинов, *Развитие и использование невоенных мер...*, pp. 5–6; Е.Е. Кондаков, *Невоенные меры...*, pp. 133–134.

⁹² В.И. Лутовинов, *Развитие и использование невоенных мер...*, p. 9. Compare: Ch. Bartman, *Lawfare: Use of the Definition of Aggressive War by the Soviet and Russian Federation Governments*, Cambridge 2010, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, pp. 1–2.

its citizens. In Lutovinov's opinion economic factors are the basis of geopolitical rivalry aiming at getting large stocks of energy sources, minerals or using a given country's or some other countries' territories for transit purposes. Exerting a destructive influence on economic potential of a given country may be carried out in two ways: steering and managing of export and import or taking control over the market, monetary fund and national debt, as well as provoking political tensions caused by unfair competition⁹³. Formulating and imposing false strategies of economic development, corruption of institutions and entrepreneurs etc. play an important role in destabilising the economic potential of a given country⁹⁴.

4) informative–psychological means or spiritual means – ability to control the leadership elites of a given country or groups forming the society. The informative–psychological means associated mainly with information or ideological fight are of great importance since they can be used to weaken the political, economic and spiritual potential of a country, which can be confirmed by Col. Anatoliy Nogovitsyn (who, from July 2008, held the position of the Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the Military Scientific Committee of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation⁹⁵. In his opinion information warfare means:

Confrontation between countries carried out in the informative sphere in order to damage information systems, processes, means, critical infrastructure and to weaken the political and social systems, as well as to psychological manipulation of the military personnel and civilians on a mass scale in order to completely destabilise the enemy's society and country. The main goal of information warfare is to destroy the foundations of the national identity and the way of living of the hostile country. In the ideological sphere the goal of the information warfare is to blur the philosophical and methodological basis of the nation's cognitive abilities, spreading chaos in its awareness and establishing false moral and economic superstructure. There are some characteristics of information warfare distinguishing it from other forms of confrontation, constituting new challenges for its participants, such as: low costs of development and application of information warfare, enlarging the role of perception management and growing dependency of both economy and the society on computer systems, which incorporates a given country's information infrastructure to new strategic goals. Endangering the key elements of national information infrastructure may exert pressure on the process of taking actions and disorganise the whole system of ruling a country⁹⁶.

⁹³ В.И. Лутовинов, *Развитие и использование невоенных мер...*, pp. 6–7; Е.Е. Кондаков, *Невоенные меры...*, pp. 134–135.

⁹⁴ В.Е. Лепский, А.А. Мельников, А.Е. Пойкин, *Информационные войны за доминирование в инновационной сфере на евразийском пространстве*, „Рефлексивные процессы и управление”. *Международный научно-практический междисциплинарный журнал* 2014, issue 14, p. 104.

⁹⁵ Ноговицын Анатолий Алексеевич – биография [online], <http://viperson.ru/people/nogovitsyn-anatoliy-alekseevich> [access: 17 VI 2017].

⁹⁶ А.А. Ноговицын, *В центре внимания – информационная безопасность*, „Красная

A special kind of information warfare are the so-called “cognitive operations” (Russian: когнитивные операции), which mean manipulating the environment of scientists and experts with false scientific theories, paradigms, concepts and strategies influencing the process of ruling the country in order to weaken its scientific potential influence⁹⁷. It is worth underlying that such kind of actions were carried out during the Cold War by special services of the countries belonging to the Communist Block. They were known then as “scientific disinformation”. As it has been described by Ladislav Bittman, who in the period of 1954–1968 served in IV Division of the Czechoslovakian State Security Service (Czech: Státní bezpečnost, StB); the main goal of the scientific disinformation was to mislead a given group of great scientists from the developed countries, who played a leading role in the rivalry between the capitalists and the socialist blocks. It was done, for example, by making them believe that the problem or project they were working on was unsolvable because of insufficient knowledge at that time or because it needed so huge funding that it was advisable to give it up. The result of a successful operation like that was disorganisation or disruption of a scientific research which was of key importance for defence abilities of a given country⁹⁸.

It is worth underlying that, from the point of view of the Russian military science, the choice of both military and non-military means and the actions carried out with the help of thereof are subjective in their nature, which means they are subject to objective laws and regularities of war. That means that they depend on their principals’ and executors’ invention and creativity. It is reflected in the opinion expressed by Georghiy Smoljan, a scientist of the System Analysis Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He dealt with the problem of reflective management, i.e. the complex of social manipulation and steering techniques which consists of the energetic methods (force, constraint, pressure, fear) and informative-psychological methods (propaganda, disinformation). Preparation of thereof is based on a special model of the enemy imitating their behaviour⁹⁹. According to Smoljan, who refers to the arrangements of the Russian servicemen, the reflective management is based on the subjective factor, i.e. the invention and creativity of the ones using it:

A successful reflective management of the enemy allows for exerting pressure on their military plans and the picture of the situation and, as a result, on their actions. In other words, one party may impose their will on the enemy and force them to make

звезда” 2009, issue 34, p. 1.

⁹⁷ С.С. Сулакшин, *Когнитивное оружие – новое поколение информационного оружия*, „Вестник Академии военных наук” 2014, issue 1, pp. 57–58.

⁹⁸ L. Bittman, *The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View*, Washington 1985, Pergamon-Brassey’s, pp. 65–66. Compare: V. Volkoff, *La désinformation. Arme de guerre*, Lausanne 2004, L’Age d’ Homme, pp. 115–116.

⁹⁹ For more see: M. Wojnowski, „Reflective management” as a paradigm of Russian information and psychological operations in 21st century, „Internal Security Review” 2015, issue 12, pp. 11–36.

the decision which will be desirable for that party in a given situation. Various methods of reflective management may be used: camouflage (on all levels), disinformation, provocation, blackmail and discrediting of the officers and civil servants. Thus, reflective management is focused on less substantial, subjective factor of the art of war, instead of a more objective military science. For the reflective management to be successful what is necessary is a deep analysis of the “internal nature” of the enemy, their ideals and concepts. Leonienko described thereof as a „filter” transmitting all the data about the external world. A successful reflective management is the climax of the informative operation¹⁰⁰.

As Gen. Valeri Gerasimov underlined, every war is a specific case which requires creating its own, unique logic, not applying just any pattern¹⁰¹. Gen. Maj. Victor Riabchuk has presented the essence of such a philosophy and practical steering of the contemporary confrontation:

The main and the most difficult task of a commander is to penetrate the enemy’s mind. Surprising the enemy is just a partial victory – that is what Suworow said about influencing your enemy’s mind (...) Informative confrontation is not what matters most at present, what matters is the intellectual–informative confrontation. i.e. getting intellectual–informative advantage over the enemy. The effectiveness of our intellectual–informative advantage is measured by how much our enemy has been surprised by our actions, i.e. what is the extents of their losses – human, material and informative ones. And that is the area we should develop, take advantage of and use in both science and in the battlefield. We should realise the main goal of our scientific process – teach the listeners how to think¹⁰².

And that is why in the process of education of the officer personnel of the armed forces as well as the officers of civilian and military special services so much attention is paid to the ability of creative and logical thinking targeted at dialectical interdependence of the two opposites: “objective” and “subjective”. In that meaning the decision is the result of individual, mental and subjective picture of ways and means necessary to achieve the objective goal, realisation of which is determined by laws and regularities of war¹⁰³.

¹⁰⁰ Г.Л. Смолян, *Рефлективное управление – технология принятия манипулятивных решений*, „Труды Института системного анализа РАН” 2013, issue 63, p. 56.

¹⁰¹ В. Герасимов, *Ценность науки в предвидении*, „Военно-промышленный курьер” 2013, issue 8, p. 3.

¹⁰² В.Д. Рябчук, В.И. Ничипор, *Философия войны и теория управления современным противоборством*, „Военная мысль” 2007, issue 8, p. 71.

¹⁰³ Ф.Ф. Гайворонский, Н.Г. Попов, И.Н. Воробьев, *Культура военного мышления*, Москва 1991, Воениздат, pp. 13–14, 20, 36–37, 43, 49, 82–83. Compare: А.В. Первов, *Ситуационный анализ в сетевых войнах на основе рефлективного подхода*, „Вестник академии военных наук” 2009, issue 2, pp. 85–88.

Summary

In spite of the disintegration of the Soviet Block and rejecting of the ideological superstructure of Marxism–Leninism, dialectical materialism still functions as a universal paradigm used in the Russian military science. Its regulations and categories create the collection of universal principles, frames and laws which help to paint the picture of war, peace and policy in the awareness of military and decision–making elites, as well as the Russian society. Dialectical materialism functions as a worldview, gneseological, i.e. theoretical–cognitive, and methodological factor. These functions are pictured in the beliefs of universal and undisputable laws guiding the nature, the societies and our history, which are applied in the research on war and peace. After the collapse of the communism the „Marxist–Leninist scientific worldview” was substituted by the “scientific geopolitical worldview” with its importance enhanced to the level of foreign policy and state security doctrines. It means that in the Russian point of view the conflict of classes declined as a driving force for international relations policy after the collapse of the communism – it has been changed into geopolitical confrontation between civilisations and the countries creating them. In that context, in the Russian military and decision–making elites’ awareness politics becomes a permanent fight for power and resources, wartime and peacetime being just different stages of the same process. Hence, war with its nature restricted to military actions becomes only one of the ways to achieve political goals, which means that having in mind the Russian understanding of foreign policy we can talk about a strategy of a “permanent conflict”. That strategy means annihilating the enemy with the help of scrupulously chosen operations, taking the form of deceptive manoeuvres, psychological, ideological and economic forms of fight waged with the use of any determined forms of violence. In the Russian understanding those forms constitute the domain of politics seen as a permanent process of rivalry, confrontation and fight, which periodically, depending on the situation, may be supplemented with military actions. The process is diachronic in its nature, which means it consists of the phases occurring one after another, interrelated and interdependent on each other, which reflects the law of dialectical understanding of the reality. Such an attitude is diametrically different from the Western concept of hybrid wars and asymmetrical conflicts, according to which any activity is viewed as synchronous, which means that the emphasis is put on simultaneous occurrence of some processes at a precisely given time. It is to be underlined that the strategy of “permanent conflict” consists of various military and non–military forms and means, not different from each other since they become instruments of a given conflict which enable to reach the same goal – annihilation of the hostile country. Annihilation of the enemy becomes a kind of penetration, i.e. invading their territory or slow and gradual taking over the political, social, economic and cultural influences in their country. Such a perception of dialectical interrelation between war, peace and politics enters into the “Russian–Soviet” strategic culture, which is permanently characterised by:

- constant pursuit of guaranteeing national security with no attention paid to other countries' security,
- legitimisation of the regime through the transfer of the internal social tensions to the enemy from the outside,
- assumption that politics is a permanent fight for power, war and peace being just different phases of the same process,
- presenting the offensive activities as the defensive ones,
- imposing the ideologised view of the world and building confrontational approach to the international environment,
- reluctance to any form of compromise, even as a reaction to other countries' compromise,
- preserving the syndrome of a besieged tower, the authoritarian regime's eternal fear of the revolt, alienation and passivity of the citizens constantly encouraged by the regime,
- permanent assumption that war is always possible and the theory that in case of an armed conflict the military sector gets out of the civilian control and aims at the total war¹⁰⁴.

War is perceived as a social–historical phenomenon subject to objective laws and interrelations formulated on the basis of dialectical materialism categories – the branch of science dealing with the objective, i.e. material reality. Declaration, defining and describing the objective laws and interrelations is the main goal of the Russian military science and that is because they act as a kind of guidance, compliance with which may eliminate or at least limit the possibility of making a mistake and, as a result, help to win a war. Laws and regularities of war are structural and hierarchical in their nature and they are divided into general, specific and unitary ones. That results in a potential enemy viewed as a system or structure of interrelated material and spiritual factors understood as a general power constituting the total of the potentials reflecting key areas of the country's and the society's lives. The range of fighting methods, means and activities chosen in order to annihilate the enemy is strictly dependent on those potentials.

Taking into account the Russian view of politics, war and peace, as well as the activities of the Russian Federation in international environment, it worth underlying that there exists a necessity to create the system of various kinds of solutions aiming at securing the key sources of power and stability of the NATO and the EU Member States. So far their efforts have been mainly focused on creating the methods of counteracting

¹⁰⁴ On the basis of: J.W. Grabowski, *Russian power. Armed Forces and main problems of the Russian Federation defence policy 1991–2010*, Częstochowa 2011, p. 13; J. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: implications for Limited Nuclear Operation*, Santa Monica 1977, Rand Corporation; C. Gray, *National Style in Strategy. The American Example*, „International Security” 1981, issue 6, pp. 21–47; D. Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation. The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel*, Stanford 2010, pp. 24–58; S.J. Blank, *Class War on a Global Scale: The Leninist Culture of Political Conflict*, in: *Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions*, S.J. Blank, E.L. Grinter (ed.), Alabama 1993, pp. 1–51.

the Russian disinformation campaigns and operations aiming at influencing the Western audience. Those activities, however, have been restricted to establishing various governmental institutions, as well as non-governmental organisations and centres. The actions of those entities are defensive in their nature and have been restricted to deconstructive activities of the Russian narration and to various educational projects¹⁰⁵. That is definitely not enough. What is necessary at the moment is establishing, on both national and international levels, the system which would protect all the potentials being a guarantee for the state to exist: political, economical, spiritual, scientific and military ones. In the steps to follow offensive activities aiming at the neutralisation the Russian engagement in those areas should be developed and implemented.

Abstract

The article applies to dialectical materialism, which is still a universal paradigm used in Russian martial science. Its rights and categories compose a set of universal precepts, frames and rules, with help of which a picture of war, peace and politics in awareness of military elites, decisive elites and Russian society is constructed. Dialectical materialism serves as worldview, epistemology (theoretical and cognitive) and methodology. It is based on a conviction about totally universal and unquestionable rules that direct the nature, societies and history. These rules are applied in research concerning war and peace as well. After communism collapsed, “the Marxist and Leninist scientific worldview” was changed into “geopolitical scientific worldview”, and it was elevated to the status of the state foreign and security doctrine. It means that in Russian terms, with communism collapse, the role of a driving force for states’ politics in international relationships does not play the class struggle any more. It has been changed for geopolitical confrontation between civilizations and states. In this context, and in the awareness of Russian military and decisive elites, politics is becoming a permanent struggle for power and resources, and war and peace are only different phases of the same process. War is perceived as a social and historical phenomenon which is subject to objective rules and correlations formulated on the basis of dialectical materialism category – a science that studies an objective, that is material, reality. Disclosure, defining and description of that objective rules and correlations is the main task of the Russian martial science. Since they serve as guidelines, which taken under consideration eliminate or, at least, limit the possibility of mistakes, which enables to win in a possible war. The rights and regularities of wars are of structural and hierarchical

¹⁰⁵ J. Janda, *Overview of countermeasures by the EU28 to the Kremlin’s subversion operations How do the EU28 perceive and react to the threat of hostile influence and disinformation operations by the Russian Federation and its proxies?* Prague 2017, European Values. Report of the Czech think-tank also available online at: <http://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Overview-of-countermeasures-by-the-EU28-to-the-Kremlin%E2%80%99s-subversion-operations-1.pdf>.

nature. There are general, specific and individual rights. It makes a potential opponent is perceived as a system or structure consisting of interdependent material and spiritual factors meant as a general power being a sum of potentials reflecting the most important areas of life of a country and a society. The range of methods of fighting, measures and actions to destroy enemy is strictly dependent on those potentials.

Keywords: dialectical materialism, geopolitics, Marxism, Russian martial science, hybrid war.